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ABSTRACT 
Water is the most important natural resource for human existence. The critical 
importance of Fresh water for the survival of human race was recognized even in early 
civilization whose growth and sustenance were closely tied to water distribution 
systems. 
The issue of sharing rivers water and problem of water shortage has become acute 
in the west Asian region. These problems are likely to become critical unless urgent 
and immediate action is taken both to increase and to conserve existing supplies of 
water resources. West Asia is a developing arid region and is facing the problem of 
water crisis. It has arid or semi-arid climate with average annual rainfall leavels of less 
than 250MMY. It is also cyclone dominated area. Some parts of the region which are 
near the Mediterranean Sea, Experience a special type of climate called the 
Mediterranean climate. There winters are mild, summers are warm and rainfall is during 
the winter season. These are three major drainage basins: the Jordan draiiiage basin, 
the Litani drainage basin and the Euphrates- Tigris drainage basin. 
The Jordan River is the most important source of water in the Jordan basin. The 
river flows through Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. The length of the river is 156 
miles of which 73 miles is under Israeli controlled territory. Its total flow is 1880 
MCMY of which 77 per cent is in the Arab states and 23 per cent in Israel. The 
Jordanian northern headwaters have three tributaries- the Hasbani in Lebanon, The 
Dan in Israel and Baniyas in Syria. The major tribatory of Jordan is the Yarnuk. The 
Jordan basic also includes Israeli occupied territories of West Bank, Gaza Strip and 
the Golan Heights. The Jordan system discharge an average annual flow of 1850MCM 
into the Dead sea. 
For centuries, the Jordan River had been a symbol of life and peaceful co-
II 
existence in West Asia. The creation of Israel in 1948 sowed the first seeds of discord 
over the sharing of the waters of the Jordan. From the early 1950's several plans and 
proposals were drawn up for the utilization of the waters of the river on a coopiative 
basis. Some of the importants plans are: McDonald Plan (1951), Cotton Plan (1954), 
Arab Plan (1954), Baker Harza Plan (1955), Unified Johnston's Plan (1955), and Arab 
League Plan(1964). However, due to the intrasigent attitude of the Irsael's as weK as 
Arabs none of the plans could be implemented. 
Israel considers the control over water supply a strateigc instrument and defen-
sive technique that greatly effects regional balance of power. Predictably, Israel, policy 
has generated a lot of tension as the Arab riparian state have opposed. 
Israel's attempt to control the water of the Jordan river. After its failure to ac-
quire water of the Jordan in cooperation with the Arab states, it emarked on its National 
Water Carrier Project. A major feature of the Israeli project was the irrigation of ihe 
Negev and its articulated water policy. The second river ones which there is ?cate 
controversy regarding the sharing of its waters in the Ltani. 
The Litani river originates in the south of Lebanon and is a national river in the 
Republic of Lebanon. The Litani is 170km long and has narrow ridge and width 
approximately 6km. Its basin has been divided into three major parts; the Upper basin, 
the Middle basin and the Lower basin. The area of its basin covers 2,290sq km that 
separates the Litani from the Hasbani river, a tributary of Jordan. The totj 1 flow of 
Litani is approximately 700 MCM. 
The Awali river is also a major contributor in the context of waters of Lebanon. 
The water of the Litani have been a source of great attraction for the Jewish state since 
1948. Prior to the establishment of the state of Israel, the Zionist Agency in Palestine 
made every possible efforts to include the Litani river within the boundaries of the future 
Jewish State. However, they failed in their efforts and the Litani remained witl. Lebanon. 
Its was only in the late 1970's that Israel could manage to abtain a foothold on the 
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Litani when it occupied a portion of southern Lebanon. With the second Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon in the early 1980's this occupation was further expanded and consolidated. 
Israel carriedout extensive hydrological and technical studies, aimed at diverting part 
of the Litani's water into northern Israel. The movement towards a comprehensive 
settlement of the Arab-Israel Conflict which began in the early nineties has rekindled 
hopes of solving the water dispute in a peaceful manner. 
The 1991 Gulf was acted as a catalyst in recopening peace talks in the region. 
The first round of the talks between the frontline Arab states and Israel took place in 
Madrid in October 1991. One of the items on the agenda of the multilateral talks was 
sharing of river waters in the region. At the subsequent rounds of negotiations Israeli 
government has shown a willingness to withdraw from southern Lebanon in return for 
some amount of assured water supply from the Litani. The Lebanese government too 
has indicated that it is not averse to sharing water with Israel if it can lead to faster 
economic development of the region as a whole. 
The longstanding problem of sharing Litani waters can only be solved by adop-
tion a pragmatic approach in the frame- work of regional cooperation. Both Israel and 
Lebanon can workout a formula where by water can become an instrument for promoting 
peace and regional development. What is needed is a willingness to make mutually 
beneficial compromises on the part of Beirut as well as Tel Aviv. Without such a positive 
attitude it is extremely unlikely that the vexed question of sharing waters can ever be 
solved in this turbulent region. 
The Euphrates and Tigris are the major rivers in the Euphrates- Tigris bfsin. The 
Euphrates flows through Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The Euphrates is 1,480 miles in length 
from the confluence of Karasu and Murad- Suyu to Basra. Three Major tributaries of 
Euphrates originates in Turkey- Khabur, Sajur and Balikh rivers. The Firat is the main 
stream and it has four important branches the Karasu, the Murat, the Munzur and the 
Peri. The mean discharge of Euphrates is 31,820 MCM. The annual discharge varies 
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from 16,871 mem to 43,457MCM. 
The Tigris originates in southern Turkey and then enters Iraq near the border 
village of Fiesh Khabur and then it flows through Fatha which separates Hamrin and 
Makhood uplands. The total length of Tigris is 1,718 km. The important tributaries are 
the Great Zab, the Lesser Zab, Diyala and the Adhaim. 
The minimum discharge of the river is estimated to be 5,140 MCMY, and the 
maximum 440,000MCMY. During times of flood, the Tigris receives about 20,000 ppm, 
silt by weight. Tigris and Euphrates together drain 808,000sq km. 
The Euphrates and Tigris rivers have been a source of livelihood since 4000 B.C. 
In this basin variou old civilization have developed and thrived. The region is called as 
the 'Cradle of Civilization'. The mesopotamian and Babylonian civilizations have 
flourished in this region. From the beginning of this century, the sharing states of 
Euphrates- Tigris drainage basin have all formulated plans and implemented projects 
to regulate the flood waters of Euphrates as well as utilize its water for multipurpose 
projects. 
These river have immense regional importance. The economic prosperity of 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq revolve around the two rivers as they constitute the principal 
source of hydropower and agricultural development. As the up stream state Turkey 
has sought to exploit water in its territory, thereby causing acute concern to its 
downstream states. The relation between Turkey and Syria have been strained many a 
times mainly due to the formers efforts to control the flow of river. Durir.g 113 dry 
seasons which the Turkish and Syrian dams impounded part of Euphrates spring flood, 
a major crisis developed between Syria and Iraq that brought the two countries to the 
brink of war. Iraq and Syria traded hostile statements in which Iraq threatened to take 
any action necessary to insure the Euphrates flow and Syria protested that it was passing 
on to Iraq 71 per cent of the water it receive from Turkey. In the early 1980's Iraq 
and Syria complained against Turkey that it was holding back a main part of the water 
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from the Euphrates for its use. In 1982 a Joint Technical Committee was setup by 
Turkay and Iraq to discusse on exchange of hydrological data. But the problem of water 
allocation however has not been solved so far. Turkey's assertive position on the issue 
of Euphrates water right is unacceptable to both Syria and Iraq. They have therefore 
spurned Ankara's offer of joint ventures as long as their legitimate rights are not 
recognized by the Turkish government. 
In the 1990's the problem of sharing Euphrates water has become more 
complicated as Syrian and Tarkish irrigation works are nearing completion. Sewage 
and industrial development in the two countries threaten to lower water quality. Growing 
population is also a source of concern as the demand for domestic use has perceptibly 
increased in the past decade. 
International Law regarding the sharing of river water resources is still in a nascent 
stage and a full fledged international legal regime pertaining to this issue can develop 
only with the cooperation of all riparian states. 
Europe was the first continent which witnessed disagreement over the sharing of 
river waters. In 17th century controversy arose over navigation rights on the Danube 
and Rhine rivers. This controversy was resolved with the signing of several agreements 
which have become a milestone in the development of international law on navigation. 
The Rhine and Danube commission were primarily administrative bodies concerning 
navigation issue. The American continent too witnessed sharp disagreement over the 
sharing of river water in the Uth and 19th century. The treaties signed on the Euro-
pean continent at times provided the basis for cooperative action with regard to the 
allocation of river water. However in some cases the situation demanded a completely 
new set of ideas and rules which had to take account the particularties of a specifice 
situation. There various treaties were signed in connection with the navigation boundary 
waters in an important landmark in the evolution of international rules regarding water 
rights.For instance; Jay treaty (1794), Rio-Grande treaty (1906), Columbia river treaty (1909), 
and Tijiuana and Colorado treaty (1944). 
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International water treaties in the Afro-Asian continent are of relating recent origin 
and the earliest treaty that was concluded in this part of the world was concluded in 1929 
between Egypt and the United Kingdom. This treaty was in the context of the diversion of 
the waters of the Nile river proportionately among riparian states. The British Government 
suggested that it should be based on following consideration: The legal principle is that the 
waters of Nile river, the combined flow of the white and blue Nile and their branches should 
be accepted as a single unite, designed for the use of people inhabiting their banks according 
to their needs and capacity to benefit from the Nile. 
Just after the partition of India, a conflict developed between India and Pakistan in 
relation with the water allocation of Indus Basin. The treaty was signed between these two 
countries on May 4,1948 for the utilization of water of Indus basin. The Ganges water 
agreement was signed on November 5,1977 over the sharing of Ganges water at Farakka. 
Its aim was also to seek a long -term solution for a augmentation of the dry season flows of 
Gangas. 
Treaties regarding international rivers in West Asia have been patterned on the lines of 
European and American water treaties. The earliest treaty in this connection was following: 
the Franco-British convention concluded in December 1920 involving the Tigris, Euphrates, 
Jordan and the Yarmuk rivers: It reflects the practice where the vested as well as reserved 
rights of riparian states were protected. During the mandate, Britain and France adopted 
several agreement to regulate the flow of international rivers under their jurisdiction to de-
velop upstream consumptive uses in Syria and Lebanon. They agreed to permit Palestinian 
authorities to do work in Syria for the benefit of down stream users. The mandatory system 
provided legal machinery for resolving conflicts over water through bilateral consultations. 
In 1921 the treaty of friendship concluded between Persia and Russia stated that the two 
countries they "shall have equal rights of usage over the Atrak river and other frontier rivers 
and water ways". An important West Asian water treaty was signed between the United 
kingdom and France on 3 February 1922 in connection with the utilization of the Yarmuk 
waters in equal proportion. The Final Protocol of the Franco-Turkish delimitation commis-
sion. May 3,1930 recommended that: "whereas its neighbourhood on the Tigris imposes on 
the riparian specific obligations, it becomes necessary to establish rules regarding the rights 
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of each sovereign state in its contexts with other water purpose." In March 1946 the treaty 
of Friend Neighbourly Relation was concluded between Iraq and Turkey. As per this treaty 
both countries could carry out conservation works relating to t^e Euphrates and Tigris in 
order to regulate the flow of the two rivers with a view to avoiding the danger of floods 
during the annual period of high water. The main aim of this treaty was both countries can 
conservation relating Euphrates and Tigris, in order to regulate the flow of the two river 
during the annual period of high water. 
In June 1953, Syria and Jordan signed a treaty concerning the joint development and 
utilization of the Yarmuk river waters. In July 1987 an economic cooperation agreement was 
signed between Turkey and Syria. Turkey was infavour of ad-hoc bilateral joint ventures in 
water and energy development and was prepared to cooperate on data management. It is 
obvious that; International water treaties in West Asia are few and even the over's that have 
been signed are of a general nature. Many questions still remain unanswered and these 
seems to be very little effort to deal with contentious issues. Do upstream states within which 
a river originates, leave specific, have priority over down stream states? Do population 
growth and other needs in are riparian state gave it priority over another? Should a riparian 
state be demanded to consume water in more economical ways? Should be demanded of 
one riparian state to use only certain sources of water and leave specific sources for supply-
ing the needs of other? These and related questions are as yet unanswered in the region and 
there is very little by way of international water treaties regime to serve as a guide. The result 
is that each country prefers to go it alone and all practical considerations and pragmatics 
solutions have been sacrificed at the alter of populist and sometimes grandiose schemes. It is 
only in the 1990's that the states in the region have shown some degree of willingness to 
eschew unilateral action and workout solutions on a cooperative basis in the light of existing 
unilateral laws and conventions. 
From the foregoing analysis it is apparent that the instead of exploiting the river on a 
regional basis, each of these states has preferred to go it alone on whatever portion of the 
river that happens to lie within or along its borders. The result of this approach has been 
tragic, not only because such an approach is insufficient and uneconomical, but also and 
perhaps more importantly, such action has the potential of precipitation war among the shar-
ing states of West Asia. 
Water, however, has often been seen as the primary strategic factor behind the politi-
cal and military manoeuvring in region. Under such tensed conditions, issues that might oth-
erwise be managed peacefully can always trigger extreme responses. Water conflict in West 
Asia have been zero sum water for one user means lack of water for the other. Factors of 
ideology and nationalism, prevent West Asian states from cooperating with each other to 
alleviate the problem of water scarcity. However, in the present scenario the only remedy 
lies in taking a regional approach to the problem. That is, water from certain countries could 
be diverted to other, according to the needs. This implies tacit recognition of the legitimacy 
of various demands. Thus factors like population growth and other needs in one riparian 
should be given priority over another. At the same time a riparian should be asked to coii-
sume water in more cronomical ways. It should also be demanded of one riparian to use 
only certain sources of water leave a specific source for supplying the needs of other. Con-
servation measures such a reduction of waste in irrigation, phasing-out of water intensive 
crops and price increases towards real value should be taken up an endangering basis. 
Neither time, money or hope should be wasted on regional water development projects. 
Care must be taken, however, to avoid plans that are grandiose or impossible part water 
deveiopmeiii piojwi^ lllw tl.; ICfO's pHn of Eric Johnston failed to anticipate the level of 
hostilities in the region. In order to avoid past mistakes future project could be financed by 
the international monetary fiind on the condition that the granting of money depended an 
unanimous agreement among the all riparian states. 
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PREFACE 
PREFACE 
Water is an important basic natural resource. It is the most fundamental sub-
stance crucial for the existence of civilization, or for the existence of life it-
self. With increasing global population and improvement in the quality of life, 
more and more water will be required for different uses. Water as a resource is 
not evenly distributed over space and time. Some times during the year, it is in 
plenty and at other times becomes scarce. Moreover, it is abundant somewhere 
and scarce in other places. Water has always been in great demand for multi-
purpose uses e.g.domestic industrial, agriculture, navigation, recreation and 
aqua-culture. Through water has been unquestionably identified as a precious 
resource, its management and utilization has distinctly differed from those of 
other economic resources. While the total amount of water available in the 
world is constant this amount of water can certainly meet vastly higher human 
needs if used efficiently. 
Anproximatelv Vlner ce"t "f the surface of the earth is covered with wa-
ter including the great oceans, lakes rivers and the polar icecaps. Lakes, rivers 
and oceans have provided sustenance, transportation and protection. Current 
estimates demonstrate the total volume of water on earth to be 44,150 MCM; 
of this 93.3 per cent is ocean water which can be used for fisheries and naviga-
tion. Only 2.7 per cent is fresh water. 77.2 per cent of the fresh water is stored 
in polar icecaps and glaciers and 22.7 per cent is stored as groundwater and 
soil moisture. As deep groundwater is not easily accessible, only lOper cent 
fresh water is available for human consumption. 
Many countries are tied together by joint dependence on the same river 
system, which can lead to conflict. An international river has become an ele-
ment of dispute in the politics of arid region. One such region is West Asia 
facing acute crisis over water resources. 
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The region has arid or semi arid climate with shortage of rainfall. While 
demand for water is rapidly growing in West Asia, the supply of fresh water is 
limited. As far as an arid region is concerned typical war is generated by in-
creasing competition for water combined with problems of water shortage 
during the dry seasons. 
Water resources management and allocation has crept on the strategic 
agenda in West Asia, since water related allocation data has become politically 
sensitive. The strategic significance of water in West Asia requires considera-
tion of the following issues: the concept of the water weapon itself; can it 
serve as a useful deterrent? An upstream state on an international river may 
threaten to build dams regulating flow downstream. A downstream state on 
the other hand can threaten to destroy water diversion works. Water is a major 
part of a complex system of political and economic leverages. There is ample 
evidence to show that actual conflict in West Asia is directly and exclusively 
related to the control and exploitation of water resources. 
The purpose of this study is to present a detailed account of the conflict 
surrounding sharing of river water resources and study its cause and effect on 
the West Asian region. It will look into the potential conflictual situation that 
has been built up as a result of the regions limited water resources. This study 
aims at looking into the problem in a clear and objective manner and to iden-
tify the prime factors responsible for generating intense international tension 
and conflict. The eventual aim of this work is to seek out possible practical 
solution to tide over water crisis in the West Asian region. 
The primary concern in the present in the present study is to develop a 
conceptual frame-work in connection with rivers water allocation among 
riparian states. The focus of this study is on four rivers. These rivers are the 
Jordan, the Litani, the Euphrates and the Tigris. It is these four rivers which 
have been the centre of acute controversy since the Second World War. There 
is intense competition among the riparian states to control the flow of these 
rivers which at times has degenerated into actual hostilities. All rivers have 
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perennial water course in semi desert to land and as such they assume impor-
tance far out of proportion to their modest discharges. Dispute over allocation 
of water has blocked cooperative efforts to solve the problem and the per-
petual interference of great powers in the region have made these issues more 
complex and intractable. 
The Thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter begins with a 
discussion of the geography of the West Asian region as a whole. It then 
moves on to the hydrology of the region wherein the four rivers which are the 
focus of the study are discussed in detail. 
The second chapter opens with a discussion of the historical background. 
The struggle over Jordan as well as Litani water resources have been an im-
portant component of the Arab-Israeli Conflict since its inception. Water de-
velopment project which have been put forth from time to time for the utiliza-
tion of the waters of the Jordan and Litani have also been discussed in this 
chapter. The development of the Euphrates-Tigris basin began since around 
4000B.C. and the conflict that have arisen in this century have also been ana-
lysed in this chapter. 
The third chapter deals with the political dimension of the conflict. It is 
hydro-politics more than economics that is at the base of much of the conflict 
over rivers' waters. Jordan and Litani rivers have become in inextricably linked 
to the Arab-Israeli Conflict and water is being perceived as a primary strategic 
factor behind political and military manoeuvring. In the case of the Tigris-
Euphrates too, control over water is seen to be a decisive factor in the compe-
tition for regional hegemony. 
Chapter four analyses the role of International Laws and Treaties and the 
extent of their applicability to the problem of sharing river waters in West 
Asia. The last chapter is a summarization of the entire study. It also highlights 
solution proposals in consonance with the situation obtaining at present. 
I shall never fail in my duty to bow down down in reverence to Almighty 
God who has always been bestowing His blessings generously given me 
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CHAPTER: I 
GEOGRAPHICAL FRAME-WORK AND HYDRO-
LOGICAL SYSTEM OF FOUR RIVERS: JORDAN, 
LITANI, EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS 
INTRODUCTION 
West Asia is a rapidly developing region and water scarcity is not a new 
phenomenon in the arid region. Annual water supply in the West Asian region 
is neither reliable nor plentiful. While demand for water is rapidly increasing in 
West Asia, the supply of fresh water is limited'. As a result, the situation is get-
ting worse progressively and the shortage of water is approaching crisis levels. The 
major rivers of the region are • the Jordan, the Litani, the Orontes, the Euphrates, the 
Tigris, the Shatt-al-Arab, and the Nile.- (See Fig-1). The physiography of this region is 
very complicated and its topography directly influences the life style and occupation of 
the inhabitants of the region. 
The region may be divided into separate units.. The northern mountain zone, 
overlying the states of Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Iran which consists of lofty 
mountain ranges. The southern zone consists of plains and plateau-*. A characteristic 
feature of the region is that plateaus are situated in between most of the mountains. 
The Anatolia stands between the two major mountain belts (Pontus and Taurus). The 
Pontus mountains lie in the north along Black Sea with the highest peak, Kalar Dagi, 
3870 metres above sea level. The Taurus range is a great formidable mountain chain. 
1. Murakabnii, Masahiro, Manai^ing Water for Peace in the Middle East: Alternative Strategies 
(Tokyo; United Nations University Press, 1995), p.l 
2. Ibid. 
3 Peter, Beaumont. Gerald Blake, and Wagstaff J.Malconi, The Middle liast-A Geographical Study 
(New York: .lohn Wiley and Sons, 1976), p. 17 
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Figure I : Regional Map of West Asia 
Source : Middle East Research Institute ( Naff and Maston ) 1984 
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The highest peak is Mor Dagi, 3147 meters located in the eastern Taurus." The moun-
tain ranges are the Elburz and Zagros mountains. 
The plateaus have an important place in the physical features of the region. The 
Central Plateau Iran is occupied by a series of closed basin with no outward drainage 
of any sort. Plains also play a significant role in the physical features of the region. The 
climatic conditions of West Asia also varies from region to region. In most of the West 
Asian States climate is harsh and arid with scanty rainfall and very high potential 
evaporation except in the coastal and mountainous regions. West Asia is also a cy-
clone dominated area. Cyclones come from the west, cross over the Mediterranean 
Sea and enter West Asia . Some areas of the region which are nearer the Mediterranean 
Sea experience a special type of climate called the Mediterranean climate. The winters 
are mild, summers are warm and there rainfall is during the winter season.^ Through-
out the region there is a shortage of water. Only in parts of north - eastern Turkey and 
north-western Iran there is surplus water supply. Smaller areas of surplus water sup-
ply occur along the highland regions of Turkey , the higher parts of the Elburz moun-
tain in Iran, along the coastal strip of Syria and the Lebanon and the Black Sea coast of 
Turkey. Water suiplas m^uz pcr:r*t river system to exist in the region . They are also 
responsible for replenishing the ground water resources. 
The surplus water of northern region is transported through very great dis-
tances into areas experiencing water scarcity by river systems and ground water reser-
voirs . For example, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers transport the surplus water to the 
intensively arid regions of Southern Iraq.* The type of water resources development 
which has been most common in the West Asia since the Second World War has been 
the construction of large dams with the objective of serving a number of purposes. 
These have usually included the provision of irrigation water, domestic and industrial 
water supply, hydro-electric power generation and flood control. The West Asian re-
4. Longrigg Stephen H, The Middle East: A social Geography (Gerald : Duckworth and Co., 970 ), p.l9 
and see also W. B . Fisher, The Middle East: A Physical Social and Regional Geography (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1971), p. 344. 
5. Peter , Beaumont, op.cii; pp. 55-60. 
6. W.B. Fisher, Change and Development in the Middle East ( London: Methuen & Co., 1981), p.41. 
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gion can be divided into three main river basin: the Jordan Basin, the Litani and the 
Euphrates-Tigris Basin. 
1. THE JORDAN RIVER 
The Jordan River is the major source of water in Jordan Basin. It is the third largest 
perennial river in West Asia. The Jordan is a multinational river. It has four riparian 
states: Israel , Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (See Fig-2). The length of Jordan is 156 
miles of which 73 miles is under Israeli occupied territory and the remainder in Syria, 
Lebanon and Jordan.' The Jordan river flows southward rising in the slopes of Mount 
Hermon and draining into the Dead Sea. The total flow of water of Jordan river is 
1880 million cubic metre(MM) annually. Of this 1488 MCM or 77 per cent originates 
in three Arab States and 432 MCM or 23 per cent in Israel. 
The Jordan river has two-sections the al-Sharea and the Jordan. The al-Sharea, 
is the name of the Jordan river, before it rises from Lake Tiberias and descends from a 
height of 230 feet above sea level to Lake Tiberias, 650 feet below sea level.* The 
northern headwaters of the Jordan are formed by the confluence of three rivers. 
These are, from west to east, the Hasbani in Lebanon, the Dan in Israel and Baniyas in 
Syria. 
The Hasbani originates in southern Lebanon near Hasbia in the south west of 
Gabal-El-Sheikh. Its annual flow varies widely depending on rainfall and its annual 
discharge is 138 MCM. The Dan river rises entirely within Israel. It flows from Tel 
Khadi in Israel and is the largest among the three tributaries. Its annual discharge is 
245 MCM. The Baniyas river has its source in south-western Syria. It has an annual 
discharge of 121 MCM. These three sources of the Jordan river meet at a point six 
kilometres inside Israel where they give rise to the Upper Jordan river. The total 
7. Omar Z, Ghobashy, The Devolopmeni of the Jordan River (Arab Infomation Centre, Information 
Paper No. 18, November 1961), p. 279. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Thomas Naff and Ruth Maston, Water in the Middle East : Conflict or Cooperation ? (Colorado; 
Boulder, Westview Press .1985), p. 20. 
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average annual flow of the three rivers based on the above cited statistics is 491 MCM.' 
The Jordan river and its tributaries are the principal water source for Israel and Jordan. 
The Jordan river is joined ten kilometres south of the lake by the Yarmuk river. Before 
reaching the Jordan, the Yarmuk river forms the Syrian -Jordanian border for 40 kilometer 
and then becomes the Isreali-Jordanian border."* The Yarmuk is a major tributary of 
the Jordan river. The headwaters of the Yarmuk (450-475MCM) are in Syria. Its basin 
covers an area of 7,252 square kilometres of which 1,424 sq. km, lie within Jordan and 
5,828 sq.km. within Syria. The Yarmuk's flow is derived from winter precipitation that 
average 364 MM in a year." The mean annual discharge is 400 MCM, which is 65 per 
cent of the total discharge of 607 MCMY from the Jordan's East Bank. The flow is 
largely influenced by rainfall pattern in the Mediterranean climate. The salinity of the 
Yarmuk is quite low.'-
Surface water resources are dominated by the Yarmuk and Zarqa rivers which 
provide the majority of the irrigation water for the Jordan Valley. The Yarmuk's mean 
annual discharge of 400 MCM provides almost half of the surface water resources of 
the Jordan river. South of its confluence with the Yarmuk, the Jordan flows on the 
surface of the '.ate tertiary rocks that partially fill the Rift Valley.'^ For the first 40 km 
the river forms the international boundary bctwe&ii Israsl and Joi Jan; south of that 
reach, it abuts the Israeli occupied West Bank of the Jordan where it forms the present 
cease-fire line. The Jordan here flows via the deepest subaerial portion of the Rift 
Valley to pass the Dead Sea at 398 metre below sea level, which is the lowest point on 
the surface of the Earth. Jordan is shaped into a shallow Valley along the Lake Tiberias 
and the Dead Sea, which it meanders for about 320 km in broad loops.'" 
The ground water inflow have important place in the discharge of Jordan river. 
10. Moshe Inbar and Jacob Maos, IVaier Planning and Development in the Northern Jordan Valley 
(Water Information 9, 1984), p.20. 
11. Thomas Naff and Maston, op. cii. 
12. J.Huang , A. Banerjee, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Water ( Sector Study Report, World Bank 
Report, No.4 699 ) pp 35-36. 
13. Cited in Murakami Masahiro, op.cii. , p.78. 
14. Thomas Naft and Maston, op.cii. , p.21 and See also World Bank Jordan Water Resources ( Sector 
Study World Bank Report, No.7099). 
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Upper Jordan and the headwaters of the Yarmuk play a key role in ground water re-
sources. This is supplemented by spring flow to the lower parts of the system. Rather 
much of that contributed is saline and its effect is to contaminate water quality. The 
catchment of the Jordan river, excluding it upper basin, is an integral part of the arid to 
semi-arid region. The total area covered by the Jordan basin is 18, 300 sq km. Of this 
three per cent is located in pre-1967 Israel." The Jordan basin also includes Israeli 
occupied territories i.e. West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. 
The Jordan system discharge an average annual flow of 1,850 MCM into the 
Dead Sea.'^ Generally high quality of water is received by the headwater of Jordan. Its 
three branches have a salinity of about 15-20 parts per million (ppm). The quality of 
water of Jordan is good for agricultural, domestic and industrial purposes. As the Jor-
dan proceeds down into the Rift Valley toward the Dead Sea it becomes saltier. Ulti-
mately, the salinity of the Jordan River system reaches 25 per cent or 250,000 ppm in 
the Dead Sea. The qi's'.tty of the lower Jordan is reflected by rainfall patterns and the 
quantity of base flow extracted up stream. Water salinity is about 350 mg of total 
dissolved solids per litre in the rainy season. It increases io 2,000-4,000 mg per litre in 
the dry season at Allenby Bridge near Jericho. Finally, the salinity reaches 250,000 mg 
of total dissolved solids per litre in the Dead Sea." The riparian states which share the 
Jordan basin are dependent on the waters of the Jordan river in varying degrees. The 
degree of dependency rests on a numbers of factors such as climatic conditions, rain-
fall and availability of other sources of fresh water etc. 
In Syria the climate and economic activities are very closely related and de-
pendent on each other. The rainfall in the west is up to 700 MM in a year. Though most 
of Syria has an annual rainfall of 250 MMY, rainfall is fairly abundant in the west, 
where the height of the land tends to determine the amount received. The eastern and 
southern zone of Syria are almost rainless. The north has sufficient rainfall to support 
15. Murakami Masahiro, op.c//., p.74. 
16. Natasha Beschomer, "The Jordan Basin And Litani Basin ." Water and Instability in the Middle East, 
AcJelphi Paper 273. (Winter 1992-1993), p.8. 
17. Murakami Masahiro, op.cit., p.79. 
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light vegetation." Syria controls the headwaters of the Yarmuk river. In 1967 Syria 
received 50-60 MCM of water from the Yarmuk and 20 MCM of the water from the 
Lower Yarmuk. Since 1975, Syria has been increasing the use of Yarmuk for irrigation. 
It is planning to construct a number of projects. Syria's farmers are fully dependent on 
the Yarmuk river water for irrigation purpose. In 1990 Syria was using 153 MCM from 
Yarmuk river.'** 
Lebanese water supplies are seasonal and storage facilities are practically non-
existent. The total water supply of water in Lebanon is approximately 4,800 MCM. 
There are 15 permanent rivers, of which three are shared by other countries : the Kabir 
and the Asi draining into Syria and the Hasbani which flows into Israel. The climatic 
conditions of Lebanon varies according to elevation and distance from the sea. The 
coastal lowlands are moderately hot in summer and warm in winter and completely free 
from frost.-" Lebanon is the only state in West Asia which is relatively rich in surface 
and ground water resources. At present Lebanon is working on a project to harness 
the water of the Hasbani river.-' 
Israel and Jordan both have semi-arid climate and arc located between the rela-
tively high rainfall area of Lebanon in the north and the low rainfall land of Egypt in the 
south Tn the northern and central portion of the country the annual rainfall ranges from 
400 to 700 MM. In the southern desertic section the annual rainfall varies from 25 MM 
in the south to 250 MM in the north. Annual rainfall estimated to be around 500-700 
MM, is received by the western slope of West Bank. The eastern slopes receives about 
100-500 MM of rain, while the Gaza Strip receives 200-400 MM of rain throughout 
the year. 
The north of Israel provides 80 per cent of Israeli water resources of which 65 
percent is used in agriculture. The total renewable fresh water resources of Israel is 
18. Shebonti Dadwal Ray, "The Politics of Water in West Asia ," Siratigic Analysts, Vol XIX, No.3 (June 
1996), p.475 and See also, F.W. Fisher , "Physical Social Geography ", the Middle East and North 
Africa (Londan: Europa, 40* Edition, 1994 ), pp.802- 803. 
19. Natasha Beschorner, op.cii., pp. 17-19. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid., pp.78-87. 
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estimated to be 1,600 MCM, of which 35 per cent originate from the Jordan river 
valley and Lake Tiberias. Israel's water consumption was estimated at 1,750 MCM in 
1990. Of this 1,162 MCM was consumed for irrigation purposes, 484 MCM for do-
mestic and 106 MCM for industrial uses.-- In addition Israel utilizes approximately 70-
100 MCM of water from the Yarmuk river per year. 
Ground-water supplies account for 60 per cent of Israel's annual water supply. 
The main reservoirs are the coastal aquifer, with an annual safe yield estimated at 240-
300 MCMY. The mountain or Yarkon-Taninim aquifer is located in the western high-
lands of the West Bank and supplies 340 MCMY of water, 80 per cent of which is used 
by Israeli consumers.-^ This aquifer is considered an important and integral part of the 
Israeli network. Few ground water systems are available in Galilee, in the northern part 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israeli water sector is facing major problems. 
Over use of existing water stocks and mismanagement by the water authorities of the 
countries of the region have collectively contributed to a situation of extreme water 
scarcity. 
Water is a scarce natural resource in Jordan. Only 8.6 per cent of the country 
leceivcs moio than 200MM annual rainfall. This scarcity has led to considerable con-
cern among Jordanian technocrats about the countiy's> dwindliag water supplies.^" The 
annual water supply of Jordan is approximately 800 MCMY, of which surface water is 
320 MCM, renewable ground water 270 MCM and non- renewable water 210 MCM, 
the latter being Jordanian strategic resources abstracted at a rate of 50 MCMY.^' 
In 1990 the total water consumption in Jordan was 360 MCM of surface water 
and 383 MCM of ground water. The domestic in sector consumed 75 MCM water, the 
industrial sector 35 MCM and the agricultural sector 520 MCM. Jordan has one of the 
lowest percapita annual water consumption in the world. But despite this, water de-
22. Naff and Maston, op.c/7., p.63. 
23. State of Israel , Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 1991. Cited in Natasha 
Beschorner, Adlphi Paper 273. op.cil., pp. 10-11. 
24. TAHAL Water Master Plan, Report on the Water Sector in Israel. 1990. Cited in Natasha Beschorner 
Ibid., p. 10. 
25. Natasha Beschorner, Ibid., pp.16-17. 
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mand began to outpace supply in 1987 and municipal rationing was introduced.-* Con-
sumption is expected to reach 1,120 MCM, of which 300 will be in the domestic sector 
in the year 2005. Jordanian ground water is being abstracted at a rate of 170 MCM, 
beyond its safe yield. It has precipitated the decline of water tables, notably at the al-
Azraq oasis, the main source of supply of drinking water to Amman. The Disi aquifer 
shared with Saudi Arabia, could produce 100-120 MCMY of high-quality drinking 
water, to be pumped to the cities of Aqaba, Amman and Zarqa." 
Jordan is also facing water management problem, which may be broadly sum-
marized as follows: institutional competition; heavy municipal network losses; irriga-
tion network losses, lack of storage facilities , industrial pollution and a weak water 
pricing policy. The Jordanian water planners are acutely aware of the need to educate 
the population in water conservation.^^ 
2. THELITANI RIVER 
Lebanon is a small mountainous country, and is rich in water resources. How-
ever, the country has very little mineral resources or raw »i»aterialb. The southern part 
of the country stretches from the Awali river to the Israeli border and from the Medi-
terranean Sea in the west to Mount Hermon and the Syrian-Israeli border in the east. It 
is called Jabal Amil. Topographically, the main regions of south are following: (i) A 
coastal Plain 1.5 km in width, (ii) A group of plateaus, gentle valley and rolling hills 
which becomes more rugged as it connects with Mount Hermon of the Lebanese Syr-
ian-Israeli border. The Moimtains on the two sides of the border face each other, with 
Jabal Sheikh forming the highest peak overlooking the area around it. In the south, the 
Jabal Amil is connected with the lower Jabeel mountain of Palestine (iii) Mount Hermon 
and Jabal Amil join in the Rashayya where the Litani river from the north is blocked 
and diverted westward by Jabal Al-Gharb. Al Gharb is strategically important for the 
defense of Damascus, (iv) The inner Maijuy'un Valley runs south of Jabal Al-Gharb, all 
26. Ibid. 
27. M.M Abu, Ejamich F.K. Bender, and R.N.Eicher , Natural Resources in Jordan, Ministery of Energy 
and Mineral Resources (1988), pp.148-150 Cited in Natasha Beschorner op.cil., p. 16. 
28. Ibid. 
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the way to the Hula Valley in Palestine. The Hasbani river is the branch of the Jordan 
river which passes through Marjuy'un Valley-'^ . The Litani, which flows in the south of 
Lebanon is the most important river in the Republic of Lebanon. A wholly national 
river, the Litani is 170 km in length and has narrow ridge and width approximately 6 
km (See Fig-3) The Litani basin is divided into three parts: The Upper Basin lies in 
Biqa Valley of eastern Lebanon. The Middle Basin starts near Qir'un, an area of rugged 
terrain, where the southern ends of the Lebanon Mountains and Mount Hermon meet. 
The river itself flows in a deep gorge. From Nabatiyah, the river turns westward and 
enters the lower basin. Then it flows to the sea through the Galilean uplands, which is 
an area of low hills with steep slopes.^" 
Litani river flows within Lebanon and drains not far from Israel. It rises in Bekaa 
Valley, a short distance west of Baalbek and it flows south between the Lebanon in the 
west and the anti-Lebanon in the east.^' 
The basin covers an area of 2,290 square kilometre that separates the Litani 
from the Hasbani river, a branch of Jordan. Approximately 700 MCM of water flows in 
Litani per year, of which the Upper Basin contributes 325 MCM annually, the Middle 
Basin adds a net flow of 315 MCM and the Lower Basin 60 MCM. The source of water 
in the Litani Basin is precipitation. The Middle Basin has 1,000 MM to 1,600 MMY of 
annual rainfall. The rainfall quantity decreases to the northeast in the Upper Basin. In 
between Nabatiyah and the Lower Basin the annual rainfall is about 800 MMY.^ - Percipitation 
is highly seasonal and varies substantially from year to year. The flow of Litani is some-
what less seasonal because of snow storage and ground water storage. Most of the 
annual flow of about 60-65 per cent occurs during a four month period from January to 
April. About 15 per cent occurs during May and June, 12 per cent during July to Octo-
ber and 10 per cent during November and December. Hence, reservoirs are very sig-
29. Khalil. A.Khalil, The War of Lebanon and Crisis of the Arab Revolution { Beirut: Centre of Socialist 
Study of Socialist prograssive Party , No-2, 1977), pp.11-106. 
30. James Hudson," The Litani River of Lebanon: An Example of Middle Eastern Water Development", 
Middle East Journal. Vol .25, No.l (Winter 1971), pp. 1-4. 
31. Amor Soffer," The Litani River: Fact and Friction ," Middle Eastern Studies , Vol.30, No. 1 ( January 
1994), p. 963. 
32. Thomas Naff and Maston . op.cit., p .63. 
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nificant for the development of the Litani's water resocurces. They provide the storage 
necessary to dam the cyclical fluctuations in water availability. Litani Basin is only 
region which is relatively well endowed with surface and ground water resources. The 
five major uses of the Litani water are: household and businesse, industrial, hydroelec-
tric power, cooling water for steam electric power plants and irrigation. The first four 
are primarily important to urban users and largely non-consumptive in nature. Hence, 
they have greater opportunity for reutilization." Redistribution of Litani water is very 
significant for the development and it was undertaken to provide hydropower. At Markaba 
water of the Litani is diverted to the Awali through a tunnel. The total annual flow at 
Markaba is 520 MCM. From Markaba, 25 MCMY water comes into the Litani to y 
weather demands of the Qasimiyah Project. The remaining water goes through a tunnel 
to the Awali, making it the second largest river (645 MCMY) in Lebanon. Thus on the 
Litani below Markaba, there is 25 MCMY from Qasimiyah plus 120 MCMY of inflow 
between Markaba and Khardali, for a total of 145 MCMY at Khardali. Inflow from the 
arid region below Khardali of 60 MCMY provides 205 MCMY to the Lower Litani.^'' 
The Litani Project is multipurpose in nature and hence beneficial for both agri-
cultural and industrial utilization. Lebanon consumes approximately 900 MCM of water 
every year. Of this 185 MCM is for domestic use, 35 MCM for industrial use and 670 
MCM for irrigation purposes.-'^ The projected increase by the turn of the century is 
1,700 MCM including 450 for domestic use, 120 for industrial use and 1,120 for the 
agricultral sector. Litani is intensively exploited for Hydro Electric Power (HEP) gen-
eration but its relatively low salinity level, less than 20 mg/1 makes it an attractive 
sourceof drinking water too. Since 1950's studies were prepared for a comprehensive 
Litani development project to develop HEP and irrigate large areas of the south to 
improve the standard of living of Shia population. The Litani Valley authority claimed 
that 80 per cent water of Litani were still not being utilized. Currently, plans are being 
considered to divert the Litani at its source, in the Beqa Valley and to build a dam at 
Basri (120 MCM) and at Khardali which at present is located within South Lebanon 
33. Ibid., pp. 68-69. 
34. Ibid., p.67. 
35. Natasha Beschomer, op.ci/, p. 18. 
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Security Zone^^ 
3. THE EUPHRATES RIVER 
The main source of water in Euplirates-Tigris Basin is Euphrates river. It is 
an international river, which flows through Iraq, Syria, Turkey and some part 
of Iran. These riparian states are sharing the water of Euphrates and its tributaries. 
The Euphrates is 1480 miies/2333 kilometres long from the confluence of the 
Karasu and the Murad Suyu to Basra. It rises in the mountains of southern 
Turkey and flows in a south easterly direction through Syria and subsequently 
into Iraq." The Euphrates joins the Tigris in its lower course at Qurna, to 
form the waterway known as the Shatt-al-Arab (See Fig.-4). The Euphrates 
passes though Nassiriya and Suqash Shuyukh before it enters Hammara Lake. 
The total flow of Euphrates river is not as great as that of the Tigris.^^ 
The Euphrates is Syria's largest river. Within Syria, three main tributaries feed 
into it; each year the Sajur contributes 125 MCM, the Balikh 100 MCM and the Khabur 
some 1900 MCM. Syria was the first of the riparian states to try extensively to control 
the flow of the Euphrates. The main stream of Euphrates is formed by the junction of 
two principal arms, the Karasu which has a length of 280 miles/450 kilometres and the 
Murad - Suyu which is 400 miles/650 kilometres long.^' 
The Firat is the major stream of the Euphrates in Turkey. It has four chief tribu-
taries the Karasu, the Murad, the Munzur and the Peri. After leaving Turkey, the Euphrates 
has one large tributary the Khabur, which joins the main stream in Syria. The waters of 
the Euphrates and its major tributary the Khabur, are used primarily for agricultural 
purposes in Syria.''^ The water resources of the Euphrates river have been almost fully 
developed since 1970's by the construction of large dams at Keban, Karakaya, Ataturk 
36. Jenixalem Report, \2 March 1992, p.24. 
37. E.D. Vamus , A.L Furat-Furforiyus, Encyclopedia of Islam II (Nether Lands: Copy right 1965 by 
E.J.Brill, Leiden), p.945. 
38. Sihuhin. Reviat'and Asses.snwnl of Water Resources m the Arab Region Water International 
(Water of international Association, 1989). Vol.14, pp.207-208. 
39. Peter Beaumont, et.al., The Middle East: A Ucographical Study ( London: David Utton Publishers. 
1988),Cited in Murakami Masahiro op cii . pp 36-37. 
40. Shahin; op.cit., pp.207-209. 
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and the Tabqa on the Upper and Middle reaches of the main stream/ ' 
The Euphrates has a mean discharge of 31, 820 MCMY. The annual discharge 
varies from 16,871 MCM to 43,457 MCM. Maximum discharge is 164,000 MCM per 
annum.The melting of winter snow in the uplands of Turkey releases large quantities of 
water into the river to produce a discharge peak during April and May. The Euphrates 
carries as much as 6,100 ppm silt by weight and it is deposited in the inland delta. The 
salinity of the river increases from 160 to 525 ppm over the seasonal cycle as measured 
at Samama and Qurna. The lower portion of Euphrates and Shatt-al-Arab are facing 
severe problem of salination.''-
The Euphrates and its tributaries drain an enormous basin, 444,000 sq km in 
area of which 28 per cent lies in Turkey, 17 per cent in Syria, 40 percent in Iraq and 15 
per cent in Saudi Arabia. Approximately 88 per cent of the average annual flow is 
generated within Turkey and the remaining 12 per cent within Syria.''-' After flowing for 
440 kms through Turkey the river enters Syria where it is joined by the Balikh and 
Khabur. The area from which the Euphrates is fed is virtually confined to the mountain 
of north Turkey. 
4. THE TIGRIS RIVER 
The total length of Tigris is 1,71 8km. The Tigris rises in the mountains of south east-
ern Turkey and is joined by various large branches in Turkey and Iraq. It flows directly 
into Iraq from Turkey. The river first passes through the border village of Fiesh Khabur 
and then it flows through Fatha which separetes Hamrin and Makhood uplands. There 
are narrow flood plan and well defined snowy banks in the area of Tigris. It has four 
main tributaries, all of which unite with the main stream in Iraq. The Great Zab origi-
nates in the Turkish high lands andjoins the Tigris i,, .,;', cil) ofMamood."" 
This is the major tributary of the Tigris and 33 per cent of water flowing in the trunk 
41. Murakami Masaliiro, op cii., p. 36. 
42. Naff and Maston, o;> cil., p . 86. 
4.V Ibid. p.83 
44. liiicyclopodia ofl.slam . op cii.. p . 947. 
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river is brought by the Zab Kabir . The Lesser Zab and Diyala originate in Iran. All of 
the catchment of the Adhaim, which is the smallest stream in Iraq. It is a seasonal 
tributary. On the eastern bank of Tigris between Baghdad and Mosul there are many 
small streams which descend from the Zagros ranges.'^ '' 
The Tigris carries an average of 42,230 MCM of water per annum.The mini-
mum discharge is estimated to be 5,140 MCMYand maximum 440,000MCMY. The 
Tigris effluent is due to direct surface runs from mountain torrents. The lower Tigris 
carries more silt because it is closer to the sediment source.'"' During times of flood, the 
Tigris has received as much as 20,000 ppm silt by weight. The Tigris moves annually 
40,000,000 MCM of sediment past Baghdad, of which only a tenth reaches the Persian 
Gulf.'" The basin formed by the Euphrates and Tigris includes Turkey, Syria, Iraq and 
Iran. Between the Upper Tigris and Euphrates lies the region known as the Jezirch. It 
is bounded on two sides by the rivers and on the north by the fold ranges of Asia Minor. 
The total length of the Tigris-Euphrates is approximately 4,051 km. The rivers origi-
nate from widely separate sources in the Guneydogu Toroslar and Zagros mountains, 
each deriving the bulk of water from winter rains and snow.''* The Shatt-al-Arab is 
formed by convergence of Euphrates and Tigris rivers near the head of the Persian 
Gulf. It is a broad navigable waterway, fringed by a belt of palms for a depth of l-4km 
behind which occur masses of i.ali reeds sometime more than 6 metre in height. The 
Euphrates and Tigris lowland consists of valleys and forms associated with fluvialite 
deposition; such as Lagoons and marsh bordered lakes, channels, embarked rivers and 
course with oxbow. The whole area is extremely flat, with a fall of only 4cm per km 
over the last 300km of the Euphrates and under 8cm per km along the Tigris. 
The two rivers drain 808,000sq km. The basin is located in the mountains of the 
Turkey and Iran and some of it lies in the desert of Syria and Iraq."" Geographically; 
both rivers have carried heavy content of silt from the highlands during the flood sea-
45. Marakami Masahiro ,op .cii. 
46. Naff and Maston ,op .cil. pp. 86-87. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Encyclopedia of Islam, op cil., p . 947. 
49. Marakami Masahiro, op .cit.. 
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sons. However, little of this sediments reaches the sea, but rather it is deposited across 
the plain. It is useful for agricultural development. A large area of the plain is irrigated 
with water of Tigris and Euphrates to support crops of wheat, barley, milllet, rice and 
dates'". 
CONCLUSION 
West Asia is an underdeveloped region and is facing the problem of water scarcity. 
The climate is largely arid or semi-arid with average annual rainfall levels of less than 
250 MM Y. West Asia is also a cyclone prone area. Cyclones come from the west, cross 
over the Mediterranean Sea and enter West Asia. Some areas of the region which are 
nearer the Mediterranean Sea, experience a special type of climate called the Mediter-
ranean Climate. The winters are mild, summers are warm and there is rainfall during 
the winter season. Throughout the region there is an acute scarcity of water. Only in 
parts of north-eastern Turkey and north-western Iran there is surplus water supply. 
Smaller areas of high water surplus occur along the high land regions of Turkey, the 
higher parts of the Elburz mountain in Iran, along the coastal strip of Syria and the 
Lebanon and the Black Sea coast of Turkey. The surplus water of northern region is 
transported through very great distance into areas of severe shortage of water by river 
systems and ground water reservoirs. For instance, the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers 
transport the surplus water into the intensively arid regions of southern Iraq. 
The West Asian region can be divided into three major river basins; the Jordan 
Basin, the Litani Basin, the Euphrates-Tigris Basin. The Jordan River is the major source 
of water in Jordan Basin. It is fed by headwaters and tributaries rising in Israel, Jordan, 
Syria and Lebanon. The Jordan is 156 miles long of which 73miles is under Israeli 
occupied territory and the remainder in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. The total flow of 
water of Jordan river is 1880 million cubic meter annually. Of this 77per cent rises in 
three Arab states and 23per cent in Israel. The northern headwaters of the Jordan have 
three important tributaries; Hasbani in Lebanon; the Dan in Israel and Baniyas in Syria. 
The Yarmuk river is a major tributary of the Jordan river. Its basin covers an area of 
50. NalTand Maston, op til, pp. 86-87. 
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7,252sq knis. of which l,424sq km is located within Jordan and 5,828sq km within 
Syria. 
The Yarmurk's mean annual discharge of 400 MCM flows in to the Jordan river. 
The Jordan here flows via the deepest subaerial portion of the Rift Valley to pass the 
Dead Sea at 398 meter below sea level, which is the lowest point on the surface of the 
Earth. Jordan is shaped into a shallow valley along the lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea, 
which it meanders for about 320 km in broad loops. 
Ground water inflow has an important role in the discharge of Jordan river. 
Upper Jordan and headwaters of Yarmuk are major sources of groundwater. The Jor-
dan Basin includes Israeli captured territories-West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan 
Heights. The Jordan system discharge an average annual flow of 1,850 MCM into the 
Dead Sea. Generally high quality of water is received by the Jordan's headwaters. As 
the Jordan proceeds down into the Rift Valley toward the Dead Sea it becomes saltier. 
The Litani, which flows in the south of Lebanon is the most important river in 
the Republic of Lebanon. The Litani is 170 km in length and has narrow ridge and 
width about 6 km. The Litani Basni is divided into three partrs: the Upper Basin the 
Middle Basin and the Lower Basin. The Basin covers an area of 2,290 sq. km that 
separates the Litani from the Hasbani river, a branch of Jordan. Approximately 700 
MCM of water flows in Litani annually, of which the Upper Basin contributes 325 
MCM, the Middle Basin adds a net flow 313 MCM, and Lower Basin 60 MCMY. In the 
Litani, precipitation is main source of water. The Middle Basin has 1,000 MM to 1,600 
MMY of annual rainfall. The rain quantity decreases to the north-east in the Upper 
Basin. The Lower Basin has an annual rainfall of 800 MMY. The Awali river is also an 
important source of Lebanon's water. 
The major source of water in Euphrates-Tigris basin is Euphrates River. The 
Euphrates-Tigris Basin is located primarily in three countries-Turkey, Syria and Iraq. 
The length of Euphrates is 1,480 miles from the confluence of Karasu and Murad-
Suyu to Basra. It rises in the mountains of southern Turkey and flows in a south-
easterly direction through Syria and subsequently into Iraq. 
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The Euphrates joins the Tigris in its lower course at Qurna, to form the water-
way tcnown as the Shatt-al-Arab. The total flow of Euphrates river is not as great as 
that of the Tigris. The Firat is the major stream of the Euphrates in Turkey. It has four 
major tributaries, the Karasu, the Murad, the Munzur and the Peri. After leaving Tur-
key, the Euphrates has one large tributary, the Khabur, which joins the main stream in 
Syria. The Euphrates has a mean discharge of 3 1,820 MCMY. The annual discharge 
varies from 16,871 MCM to 43,457 MCM. The maximum discharge is 164,000 MCM 
per annum. The Euphrates carries as much as 6,100 ppm silt by weight and it is depos-
ited in the inland delta. 
The Tigris rises in southern Turkey and flows directly into Iraq from Turkey 
and the total length of Tigris is 1,718 km. It has four main tributaries- The Great Zab, 
the Lesser Zab, Diyala and Adhaim. The Tigris carries an average of 42,230 MCMY of 
water. The minimum discharge is estimated to be 5,140MCMY, and the maximum 440,000 
MCMY. The lower Tigris carries more silt because it is closer to the sediment source. 
During times of flood, the Tigris receives about 20,000 ppm silt by weight. Tigris and 
Euphrates drain 808,000sq km. The basin is located in the mountains of the Turkey and 
Iran and some of it in the desert of Syria and Iraq. 
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Since time immemorial, the Jordan River has been a symbol of life and peaceful 
co-existence in West Asia. As water comes down the southern slopes of Jabel-el 
Shaikh, it stops for a time in Lake Huleh and the Sea of Galilee and then it meanders 
southward through the Jordan Valley into the Dead Sea. All through history people 
have lived and worked together on the land of River Jordan and along its banks, 
without any tension. However, with the passage of time, the situation began to change. 
The emergence of Zionism demanding exclusive control over historic Palestine sowed 
the first seed of discord in the region.' 
1. BACKGROUND TO THE CREATION OF iSRAEL 
In 1897, Theodor Herzl proposed a Jewish State in which Jews could live, free 
from oppression. The Jewish problem was not religious or social; "The Jews were" 
according to Herzl, "a nation without a land-". On 27 August 1897, Herzl convened 
the First Zionist Congress at Basle. The congress endorsed the call for a Jewish 
home in a resolution, which came to be known as the Basle Programme. It stated 
that "the aim of Zionism is to create a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured 
by public law."^ 
The main objectives of this programme were: The promotion of the colonisation 
of Palestine on suitable lines by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers; the mobilization 
of Jewish people scattered all over the world by means •>;'appropriate situation 
1. iidward Rizk, The River Jordan (New York: Arab Information Centre ,1964), pp.5-7. 
2. Samir N. Saliba, The Jordan River Dispute ( The Hague: Martinus, Nijhoff, 1968), p.4. 
3. Don Pereiz. 'The dovernineni and I'oiiiic.s of Israel (Colorado: Boulder, Wcslview Press, 1983), 
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local and international; the strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiments 
and consciousness, preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, where 
necessary to the attainment of the aims of Zionism"."* 
The Zionist Programme required an imperial power to act as an instrument of 
'Public Law' for its implementation. Herzl began offering Jewish services in return 
for the realisation of this goal. For instance Herzl offered help to the sultan of Turkey, 
Abdul Hamid, in reorganising his financial affairs in return for assistance to Jewish 
settlement in Palestine. To the German Kaiser, Wilhelm 11, 'The Zionist leader offered 
help to their interests in the Near East. Similar offers were made to the Russian 
Czar, The King of England and the Holy See.^ 
The British Foreign Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, welcomed the suggestion 
and offered a place in East Africa. The majority of the Zionists rejected this proposal 
on the ground that the place was not appropriate for their sentiments. Therefore, the 
idea was opposed by the Fifth Zionist Congress. 
Herzl died on 3 July 1904 without fulfilling his life's dream. Under the leadership 
of Chaim Wiezmann, who succeeded Herzl, the Jews intensified their compaign.'' 
Between 1904, the year of death of Herzl, and the beginning of First World War 
nothing significant occurred. As the First World War broke out, Britain entered into 
negotiations with the Sharif Hussain of Mecca to secure assistance in the war against 
Turkey in a long exchange of letters known as the, McMohan correspondence. The 
Arabs agreed to side with Britain, in the war on the condition that the British would 
openly recognize Arab aspirations. Sir Henry McMohan pledged England's support 
to independence of Arabs. In his correspondence, Sharif Hussain unequivocally demanded 
the independence of the Arab countries, specifying the boundaries of the territories 
which clearly included Palestine. The Arabs argued that they had been promised 
Palestine by the British, in return of Arab help against the Turks. Unfortunately the 
correspondence was not perfectly clear as to the area of Arab independence. In the 
meantime, Britain made two other agreements which were incompatible with their 
4. Shah Abdul Qayyuin, The Arab Israeli Con/lia (Aligarh: AMU Press, 1975), pp.6-9. 
5. Khalid El Sheikh, Palestine Ilumciii Tragedy (New Delhi: Vani Publication, Published by 
Arab States), pp. 10-11. 
6 Fred .1. Khouri, The Arah-hraali Delininia ( Nc\v York- Syracuse University Press 1976), pp.7-8. 
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pledge to the Arabs\ 
One of them was Sykes-Picot agreement named after the British negotiator. 
Sir Mark Sykes and his French counterpart Charles Picot signed in May 1916. It 
constituted a breach of promises made to the Arabs. This treaty was an Anglo-
French-Russian understanding which promised the internationalization of Palestine 
under the combined authority of three members of the treaty. Sharif Hussain wanted 
an explanation but the reply given was vague. The other was the Balfour Declaration 
of 2 November 1917 which was in favour of a Jewish homeland in Palestine and 
constituted a betrayal to the Arab aspiration. It was addressed by Arthur Balfour, 
the British Foreign Secretary to Edmund de-Rothschild in 191 7, who was a prominent 
British Zionists leader. It say; 
"His Majesty's Government favours the establishment 
of a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine 
and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this objective it being clearly understood 
that, nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil 
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities 
in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews in any other country".* 
This declaration, Britain sowed seeds of prolonged conflict and unending problems 
and suffering for the people of Palestine. Lord Grey, the former Liberal Foreign 
Secretary exposed the inherent contradictions in the Balfour Declaration and pointed out 
in the House of Lords in March 1923. "A Zionist home my Lords, undoubtedly means 
or implies a Zionist Government over the district in which the home is placed, and 
it's population is 93 per cent Arab. I don't see how can you establish a Zionist 
Government without prejudice to their civil rights".' 
By 1918, when the rest of Palestine was captured from the Turks, a national 
conference representing several Jewish settlements elected Weizmann and his Russain 
7. Khalid El Sheikh, op.cit., p. 10. 
8. Quoted in Samir N. Saliba, op.cii.. pp.4 -5. 
9. J.R. Gainsborough, The Arab Isareli Conjlici: A I'oUlical I.cgal Analysis (USA; Gower Publish 
ing Company, Limited 1986), p.6. 
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Zionist friend Nahiim Sokolow, to represent them at tiie Paris Peace Conference. 
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, negotiations were held regarding the boundaries 
of Syria and Palestine and the assignment of the Syrian Mandate to France and the 
Palestinian Mandate to Great Britain. The latter opposed a mandate for Palestine, 
that did not retain Jordan within its borders. In this conference, the British Prime 
Minister, David Lloyd George, emphasized, that Great Britain would not approve a 
mandate for a Palestine that would merely include the barren rocks of Judea, which 
might at any moment be rendered a desert through the cutting off of waters of the 
same. Furthermore he stated that the waters of Palestine were essential to its existence.'° 
Without these waters, Palestine can be a wilderness. On the other hand, those water 
were not suitable for use to any one holding Syria. Britain was less interested with 
regard to the northern boundaries of Palestine (See Fig-5). The issue that Palestine's 
northern limit should be on the Litani River or further north near Sidon or any of a 
half a dozen more places as outlined in various Zionist plans was of little importance 
to the British, once they had succeeded in placing strategic depth between the Suez 
Canal and the French forces in the Levant. It was of course, a matter of tremendous 
importance to the Zionists leaders, who had hoped to retain Litani waters within 
Palestinian boundaries." 
The Sen Remo Conference, was held in April 1920, was appointed to finalize a 
settlement with Turkey and to allocate mandatory responsibility in Levant. It endorsed 
the idea of Jewish homeland and instructed the British administration in Palestine to 
create a home for Jews in Palestine.'- Under this agreement Turkey expressly renounced 
its rights over the Arab territories and introduced mandatory government for Palestine, 
Syria and Iraq which had been decided upon by the Allied Powers. The new Turkish 
nationalist Government ratified the treaty of Severes and a new peace treaty was 
substituted which was signed at Lausanne in Switzerland on 24 July, 1923. In 1928 
the establishment of a Jewish Agency to manage Jewish interests in Palestine caused 
10. The Jordan Water Problems ( An Analysis Summery of Avialable Documents) Americans 
Friends of the Middle East ( Washington D.C: Inc, 1964), pp.4-6. 
11. David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties (London: 1938), The Israeli Water Plan 
Background Notes on Current Themes, No. 35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (December 1959), p . l . 
12. Neville Barbour, Nisi Domimis: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy ( London ; George G. 
Hanap. 1946). p.l03. 
13. Leagiie oj Nations Treaty Series, Vol XXVIIl, p. 12. 
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grave concern among the Palestine Arabs.'^ The following year there was a friction 
between Jews and Arabs concerning the farmer's rights to pray at the Western Wall 
of the old Jewish Temple in Jerusalem. On 23 August 1929, Arabs attached Jerusalem 
and its neighbourhood. A commission appointed by Sir Walter Shaw in its report 
recommended that restrictions be placed on Jewish immigration and the purchase of 
land from Arabs.'" 
In April 1936 an Arab Higher Committee (AHC) was formed to unite the Palestine 
Arabs in opposition to the Jews. The AHC gave a call for mass strikes and demonstrations 
against the continued presence of British troops and Jewish settlements. After six 
months of continued total strikes, which paralysed the life in Palestine in November 
1 936, a commission, under Robert Lord Peel arrived to study the situation.'^ 
Due to various factors, the Royal Commission concluded that the Palestine 
Mandate was not workable. These factors were; the Jewish immigration, purchase 
of Arab lands by Jews complete absence of Political cooperation between the Arabs 
and Jews. The commission admitted that the Palestinian reaction was quite logical 
as they could not obviously accept the creation of a national home for the Jews in 
Palestine. Among the Arabs, Emir Abdullah, who was ruler of Transjordan, wanted 
a partition. The R.oyal Commission recommended partition as a solution for settlement. 
The commission stated that: "Partition seems to offer at least a chance of ultimate 
peace"'^ which could not be seen in any other plan. 
In July 1937 the recommendations of the Royal Commission were accepted by 
the British government. But the Palestinians rejected these recommendations and 
the revolt mounted, increasing the demand for full independence and the replacement 
of the mandate by a treaty between Britain and independent Palestine. 
In 1938 the Woodhead commission was appointed by the British Government 
under Sir John Woodhead to consider the Partition Plan as suggested by the Peel 
14. While Paper- of 1930 (The Passfield White Paper) Cmmd. 36 92, House of Commission, 
Secssional Papers, 1930-31,Vol. 16. 
15. J.C Hurevvitz , The Struggle for Palestine ( New York: Schocken Books 1979), pp. 66-67. see also 
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Amrican Journal of Intunwiional Law. Vol. 64, (1970), pp. 1-8. 
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Commission. This Commission rejected the Peel report as being impractical.''' In 
the London conference, that commenced on 7 February 1939, the Palestinian delegation 
condemned the British policies towards Palestine, called for Palestine's National 
independence and for scrapping the Balfour Declaration, termination of the mandate 
and halting the .(cwish immigration. This conference could not reach an agreement 
because of differences between the Palestinian and Zionist delegations. Later in May 
1939, Britain decided to present its unilateral policy which came to be known as the 
MaDonald White Paper. In this White Paper the British Government disclaimed any 
intention to establish a Jewish State, rejected independence of Palestine as an Arab 
State and envisaged the termination of the Mandate by 1949 after granting independence 
to Palestine in which both the Palestinians and the Jews would share the government. 
I 8 
When the War ended in 1945, Jewish attitude was seen to be anti-British in 
varying degrees. Prime Minister Churchill himself, once a strong friend of the Zionist 
cause, was deeply shocked when the Stern Gang in 1944 assassinated his friend, 
the British Minister of State for the Middle East, Walter Edward Guinness, the First 
Lord Moyne. England was unwilling to continue its mandate over Palestine and requested 
the United Nations to handle it." 
The UN General Assembly appointed a special committee on Palestine. In August 
1947 the majority of United Nations special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) 
recommended a plan Partition Palestine into Arab State and a Jewish State with economic 
union, and an international trusteeship for the city of Jerusalem.^° On 29 November 
1947, General Assembly voted infavourofUN Resolution 181(11), which called for the 
creation of a Jewish State and Arab State within a Partitioned Palestine. The British mandate 
over the area was to end 15 May 1948 and the two states were to be established by 
1 July 1948. Jerusalem and Bethlem were to become corpus separatum under UN jurisdiction 
The passage of the UN Partition Plan immediately led to the first Arab Israeli 
War, thus transforming the Palestinian Jewish struggle in and over Palestine into an 
18. See Report of Commission Reflected to as the McDonald White Paper Cmd, 6019 (1939). 
19. Shah Abdul Qayyum, op.cit., pp.16-17. 
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Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab intervention was the result of genuine support for 
the Palestinian Arabs. This phase of the war lasted eight months, in the course of 
which a dramatic change occurred.-' (See Fig.6). 
The Israeli army moved into Sinai, which it had to evacuate under international 
pressure. In the north, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) pushed Lebanon's army back 
to its border and occupied South Lebanon which Israel evacuated as part of the 
1949 armistice agreements.(See Fig.7) The First Arab- Israeli War was concluded 
by four Armistice Agreements signed between Israel and Egypt on 23rd February 
1949, between Israel and Lebanon on 23rd March 1949, between Israel and Jordan on 
23rd April 1949, and between Israel and Syria on 20th July, 1949 Although the Armistice 
Agreements did not lead to envisaged peace treaties, they established Israel's borders 
with its Arab neighbours for nearly twenty years, until the Third Arab-Israeli War of 
1967." 
(i) PROPOSED PLANS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF JORDAN 
RIVER 
The potential of the Jordan river for irrigation purpose was realised as early as 
1910 by the bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire. In 1913 Gorge Franghia, Director 
of Jordan for irrigation and power generation. The main aim of this plan was the 
diversion of Yarmuk into Lake Tiberias. A canal with 100 MCM flow capacity to 
irrigate the Jordan Valley was to be constructed with two power plants to produce 
electricity for the development of Jordan Valley. Franaghia plan failed to take off 
due to the First World War. Severe problems cropped up in the aftermath of war as 
a large number of Jewish immigrants started to arrive in Palestine. The arrival of 
Jewish immigrants led to an increase in demand for water. In order to meet this 
growing demand various revised proposal for the utilization of Jordan river were 
putforth. In 1920 a survey was conducted for the utilization of Jordan's water and 
its main branch Yarmuk for irrigation and electricity purposes by the British colonial 
government.-^ But due to increasing tension between the Arab and Jewish people no 
21. Deborah J. Gcrner. One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict Over Palestine (Calorado: Boulder 
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action could be taken by the mandatory Government.-' ' 
Two years later in 1922 Movromatis proposed an elaborate scheme to irrigate 
the area of Huleh and drain the marshes. Two dams were visualized for generating 
electric power and the construction of a canal on both banks of the Jordan. However, 
like the earlier plan the Movromatis plan also could not be implemented. A subsequent 
plan known as the Henrique plan (1928) which proposed irrigating the Yarmuk Triangle 
was also not approved. As Jewish immigration to Palestine increased rapidly in 1930's, 
the issue became more complicated.- ' 
In 1939 MG. lonides, Director of Development in the Transjordan government, 
submitted a report on the water resources of Transjordan and their development 
after a study of two years. The report recommended the construction of an irrigation 
canal on the eastern part of the Jordan Valley. It was to use the water of Yarmuk. In 
this way, 3,0364hectare (30,000 dunams) on the East Bank could be irrigated. The 
same canal could also irrigate land on the West Bank. In the Jordan Valley lonides 
plan was the first hydrographic survey. For the flood waters of Yarmuk the report 
proposed Lake Tiberias as a storage reservoir (See Fig.8).-* 
It also suggested the use of Jordan waters in the Jordan's own drainage basin. 
In 1944, the Lowdermilk plan visualized the irrigation of the arid lands in the Jordan 
Valley and the utilization of the river channel for development of hydroelectric power. 
This could be accomplished through the diversion of the waters, of the Jordan and 
Yarmuk rivers. Lowdermilk calculated that it would be possible to irrigate 121,457ha 
(1200,00 dunams) of land, of which 62,753ha (600,000dunams) were in the Jordan 
Valley. The surplus water would flow by gravity to provide irrigation in the plains of 
Esdraelon, Beisan and Valley of Galilee. The plan also envisioned the development 
of hundred million kilowatt hours of hydroelectric facilities annually. Additionally, 
the Jordan Valley Authority would give aid for the artesian water supplies and the 
construction of dams for storing rain water from the Hebron Dam to the Negev. As 
large parts of Israel was covered by the Negev desert.-^ The development of the 
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Negev was a critical factor as far as absorbing further Jewish immigrants were concerned. 
Israel, therefore, decided that a Jewish agrarian presence in the Negev would be an 
important symbol of the vitality of the Jewish State. The proposed dams would be 
used for irrigation, hydroelectric power and industrial works. The Jordan Valley is 
25 miles from the Mediterranean at Haifa Bay. JVA plan provided for an open canal 
for 7 miles from near Haifa to Mount Carmel and a 20 miles tunnel through the plain 
of Erdraelon to the edge of the great gorge of the Jordan Valley. It was to have a 
capacity of 1 ,OOOCFS. The JVA would construct dams higher up in the hills to hold 
excess water. -** The JVA also includes the use of Litani River as part of the regional 
plan a suggestion which was to be re-emphasized in all plan of Israel. The details of 
the JVA were developed by James Hays, Chief Engineer of TVA. The Hays-Savage 
Plan was submitted in 1948 at the request of World Zionist Organisation. The plan 
recommended that half of the Yarmuk waters would then be diverted into Lake Tiberias 
to replace the water lost from the diversion of upper Jordan. -' The other half of the 
Yarmuk waters would be allocated to Transjordan but only at a subsequent stage in 
the plan. However, Hays says, the recovery of the remaining Jordan water must 
await the completion of the previous irrigation works and diversions for the river 
which will enable a more accurate determination of what is left in Jordan.^" 
The Lowdermilk-Halys Plan noted the possibility of tapping the Litani and 
diverting some of its water to the coast and Negev. This plan also took into account 
the development of underground water sources and proposed a dam on the Hasbani 
for the power generation. The plan also visualized the utilization of the upper Jordan 
and its summer flow in relation to Hasbani storage water for irrigation of Huleh, 
Aiyelet Haswaher Lower Galilee, Emek Esdraelon and Afuie Beit Alfa. 
The Arab-Israeli War of I 948, however, served to fundamentally alter the 
prospects for such a co-operative undertaking. Meanwhile during the period of 1948-
1949 more than , 800,000 Arab refugees fled their homes in Palestine and went to 
neighbouring Arab countries. Most of these refugees went to Jordan, perhaps the 
27. Walter Clay Lowdermilk, Palestine: Land of Promise (New York: Harpen and Bross, 1944), 
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poorest of the Arab States.^' 
The McDoand Report was submitted by the Jordanian Government with the 
help of British firm in 1951. It was prepared by Sir MaDonald.lt aimed at providing 
perennial irrigation for the 1 9,048ha (1 88,200dunams) on the east of the Jordan 
from the Yarmuk to Wadi Zerka. The main aim of this plan was the construction of a 
diversion canal which would flow over the Jordan's plain in the eastern side. It would 
be approximately 70 km long. In 1951 the British engineers published their comprehensive 
scheme for the irrigation of both sides of the Jordan Valley between Lake Tiberias 
and the Dead Sea". 
The McDonald plan has crystallized a basic issue in the conflict relating to use 
of the Jordan waters; whether or not these should be used within the water shed or 
outside of it. In addition, provision was made for water which would be utilized for 
development of perennial irrigation of approximately l,052ha (104,000 dunams) 
on the west side of the Jordan around Beisan in the Jordan-Yarmuk Triangle." The 
McDonald report made apparent the conflicting positions on out-of-basin transfers 
held by Israel and the Jordan. In the McDonald plan, all water developed would 
remain in the Jordan Valley.^'' 
In 1952, the Bunger plan was submitted by United States engineer. Mills E. 
Bunger. He visualized a dam on the Yarmuk at Maqarin dam with storage capacity 
of 480 MCM, 65 MCM of which would be used to irrigate land in Syria and surplus 
of this would be used in Jordan.^' A new proposal was also included in which a 
canal to lead from the dam on the south bank of the Yarmuk to Adasiya, where a 
diversion dam would conduct water directly from the Yarmuk River and Maqarin 
southward into the East Ghor canal and almost to the Dead Sea. 
A small dam across the Jordan River shortly below the Israel Jordan border to 
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facilitate the pumping of water from the river into a West Ghor canal leading to Jericho 
was also to be constructed. A power plant situated at Maqarin, as well as another 
at Adasiya with power output of 281 million kilowatts annually were also recommended. 
Jordan was to bear 95 per cent and Syria 5 per cent of the cost of construction and 
maintenance of the Maqarin dam.^* Both the United States Technical Cooperation 
Administration in Jordan and UNRWA evinced great interest in the project. They 
joined forces with the Jordanian government and earmarked funds for the financing of 
the Yarmuk River scheme. 
At this point however, political difficulties came into existence. Spokesmen for 
Israel in Washington and at United Nation point out that unilateral development of 
the Yarmuk would diminish the chances for any regional development of the Yarmuk 
River system.^'' They claimed that Israel as the lower riparian state on the Yarmuk, 
had a right to use these waters. As a result of these Israeli representations, work 
over the Yarmuk scheme was delayed. 
On October 16,1953 President Eisenhower appointed Eric Johnston as a special 
ambassador to mediate a comprehensive plan for regional development of the Jordan 
River system. The plan Known as the Unified Plan, based on the Marshall plan in 
Europe, sought to resolve the conflict by promoting cooperation and economic stability.^ ^ 
The technical features of the United Plan were as follows: (i) The construction 
of a dam on the Hasbani River in Lebanon was proposed in order to store and 
regulate the waters of that river. A hydroelectric power Plant would be constructed 
at Tel-Hai which would take the water from the Hasbani dam, use it to develop 
power and then return it to the main irrigation canal (ii) Canals would be constructed 
in order to carry the diverted waters of the Baniyas River, the Hasbani, and Tel-al-
Qadi springs to irrigate areas in the Galilee hills section. Irrigation water for the 
Yavnell Valley would be supplied from well water system (iii) In addition, hydroelectric 
power facilities would be constructed on the Yarmuk River consisting of a dam at 
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Maqarin and a power canal running about 30 km to a power house near Adasiya. 
Control works and canals were to be constructed for the use of perennial flows 
from the Wadis. It was calculated that the total area of land that could be irrigated 
underthe plan would be 44,534ha (440,000 dunams) ofwhich42,105ha(416,000dunams) 
was Israel, 49595ha(490,000dunams) in Jordan, and 3,036ha (30,000dunams) in Syria. 
The quantity of water available for the irrigation purpose of these areas was estimated 
at 1305 MCMY, of which 879MCM of water would based for irrigation in the Arab 
States, and 426MCM in Israel.^^ 
In January 1954, at the request of Eric Johnston and as a result of a seris of 
meeting and technical studies, The Arab League Political Committee (ALPC) comprising 
of Egypt, Syria and Lebanon was set up, headed by Muhammad Salim, Secretary-
General of Egypt's National Production Council. In March 1954 the ALPC submitted 
a plan for the development of Jordan river water resources under the Arab plan, it was 
earmarked that 49,393 ha (488,000 dunams) of Jordan territory be irrigated. The 
plan estimated that 975MCM of water should be made available for the purpose, 
146MCM more than that proposed by the Unified Plan. The break up was as follows: 
287MCM of water lu iirigatc 23,68ha (234,000 dunams) in Israel 132 MCM of 
water to irrigate 12,045ha (119,000dunams) in Syria and 35MCM of water to irrigate 
305,42ha (35,000dunams) in Lebanon.''" 
The Arab Plan reverted to the Hunger Plan which visiialized the construction 
of a high d^m at Maqarin in the Yarmuk basin. This would store approximately 400MCM 
of the Yarmuk waters which would be used primarily to irrigate land in Syria and Jordan 
according to an agreement signed by them on June 4,1953.'*' 
In 1955 the Baker-Harza Plan for the Irrigation of the Jordan river basin was submitted to 
the Jordanian Government by two private American Engineering firms Michael Baker, Jr. of 
Rochester, Pennsylvania, who prepared a land and soil analysis, and the Harza company of 
Chicago which made a study of the hydrological conditions during 1953 and 1954. The plan 
recommended utilization of the Yarmuk and Jordan rivers water to irrigate 15,3238ha 
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(l,514,000dunams) in the Jordan Ghor and to provide 167 million kw of power at total 
cost of $ 116,874,000. The main intention of the plan was increased agricultural production 
and futuristic betterment of the Valley. The plan gave 760MCM water for the development 
of .lordan, 605MCM of which was to come from the Yarmuk river and Wadis in Jordan. 
1 55MCM water was to be diverted from the Lake Tiberias. The plan also proposed the 
irrigation features of the project could be carried out without the Yarmuk hydroelectric power. 
The irrigation construction would cost $216 per dunams or $864 per acre, and operation, 
maintenance as well as replacement would cost $1.86 per dunums annually. The irrigation 
scheme would increase net farm income in the Jordan Valley by an estimated average 
$674,000 per annum in the first 20 years. Thus, the ratio of annual increased income to 
annual costs showed that the project was justified economically.''-
The Cotton Plan was put forth by J.S.Cotton, an American engineer in 1954 and 
sponsored by Israel. The main point of the plan was the development and utilization of the 
water resources of the Jordan and the Litani river basin. It was beneficial for the full irrigation 
of all irrigable lands in the Kingdom of Jordan and southern Lebanon as well as Syrian lands 
in upper Yarmuk basin. 
The Cotton plan included the following features: extra water of the Litani not required 
for inigation in Lebanon estimated to be around 50 per cent flow of the river or approximately 
400 MCM was to be diverted into two lakes at a point where the river flow changes from 
north-south to east-west, 5.5 km across Israel's border in Lebanon. From the lake a conduit 
would lead the water into Israel. In fact the water would be diverted through a tunnel at a 
point, 7 miles from the Israel border where the Litani makes a sharp westward turn towards 
the Mediterranean. Jordan would receive 575 MCM water per annum to irrigate 4305202ha 
(430,000dunams) Israel, 1,290 MCM to irrigate 18,1174ha(l,790,000dunums), Lebanon 
450.7 MCM to irrigate 3,5425ha (350,000dunams) and Syria would receive annually 30 
MCM of water to irrigate 3,036ha (30,000dunams). Approximately 1,412, 400,000Kwh 
per year of electric power would be generated implementing the Cotton Plan."^ 
In 1955 the US once again sought to revive Eric Johnston's Unified Plan as neither the 
Cotton plan nor the Baker-Harza plan found acceptance by all the states party to settle the 
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dispute. In July 1955 the plan was discussed by the Israeli Cabinet. The plan was approved 
by the Arab experts committee in September 1955 and was handed over for final approval 
to the Arab League Council. In October 1955, the Arab League decided not the ratify the 
Plan because of its serious potential implications and sent it back to the technical committee 
for further consideration.'''^ 
Jordan had the following major issues to resolve: the exact amount of water each 
basin was to receive: (ii) die degree and type of neutral supervision needed for the implementation 
and the overseeing of the operatin of the river system; Johnston, however, was very confident 
that these issue could be resolved. He submitted a revised version of the Unified Plan which 
called for the construction of a dam on the Upper Yarmuk River. The 300 MCM of stored 
water would generate 150 million kwh of electric energy per year. 
In October 1955, it was reported that the Arab technical experts had approved the 
Unified Plan as revised, which, in its final form very much resembled the Arab Plan. Under 
the revised plan, Lebanon was to receive 35MCM of water from Hasbani, Syria 132 MCM 
Jordan of water. As for Israel, except for the above withdrawals and deliveries, the water of 
the Jordan river would be available for Israel's unconditional use (See Fig. 9).''^  
The Ten Year Plan of 1956 was sponsored by Israel. The main intention of this plan 
was to increase availablity of water during a ten year period for its 3 million people. It was 
based on the Hays-Lowdermilk scheme. Israel's Ten Year Plan aimed at exploitation of 
700MCM of waters of Jordan river by Israel through the diversion of Jordan river resources. 
It would give Israel 56 per cent of the river basin's discharge. The main features of this plan 
v/as +he diversion of 500MCM of upper Jordan and Tiberias waters out of the watershed to 
Negev in the south. Initially, Israel had planned to carryout this diversion through a canal 
Banat Yaccub, near lake Huleh. This scheme, the Tiberias-Negev Project, Consists of a 
conduit 65 miles long with intermediate reservior and pumping and booster stations."** 
In the early 1960's tension mounted when Israel started construction of its National 
water carrier to bring water from the Lake Kinneret in the south to the west of country.'" 
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This unilateral action alarmed the Arab States and they decided counter the Israeli attempts 
to divert the river waters. 
In November 1960, the Technical Committee of the Arab League decided the following: 
(i) East Ghor canal would be completed and the Yarmuk water would also be stored in the 
river valley, (ii) Diversion of the Baniyas river by canal for irrigation lands of Syria lying to 
the west, south of the river as far as the Yarmuk.''* 
An Arab Summit meeting was held in Cairo in 1964 in order to coordinate a policy 
aimed at counteracting Israel's action of diverting the water of Jordan River for irrigation. 
The Jordan river's headwaters originate in Lebanon from the Wazzani and Hasbani rivers.'*' 
Members of the Arab Summit, therefore, recommended that these waters be diverted to 
Jordan and Syria while a United Arab Command be established along the Lebanese-Israeli 
forntier for the purpose of guarding against any Israeli attack. In this Arab Summit, the 
Kings and Heads of State of the Arab States adopted measures designed to safequard Arab 
rights threatened by the Israeli Project.^" ( See Fig. 10) 
After a second Summit Conference the Arab States finally decided to divert the 
sources of the Jordan River. This was to be done by the two storage dams on the main 
tributary of Jordan, the Yarmuk which originates in Syria. This would divert waters into 
Syria and Jordan, thus preventing Israel a lower riparian state, from receiving any of the 
Yarmuk waters.^' Work began on the Arab League's plan and Lebanon decided to proceed 
with its share of the scheme while at the same time declining to invite forces from other Arab 
countries to help defend Southern Lebanon from Israel attacks. 
The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, caused in large measure by tension arising from the 
water crisis, put a sudden and final end to the Arab League's diversion plan. In a period of 
six days the amount of territory controlled by the Jewish State tripled. The Golan Heights, 
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the balance of Mandatoiy Palestine and the Sinai Peninsula all the come under Israeli occupation. 
With the seizure of Baniyas stream by Israel in 1967 the water crises itself lost much of its 
urgency. 
2. ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO ACQUIRE THE LITANI WATERS 
The largest river in Lebanon, the Litani (100 miles), originates from the ruins of a Baalbek 
close to Lebanese border with Syria and flows southward through the broad Bekaa Valley. 
Near the frontier with Israel, the water drops to enter a deep Canyon, turn west and cuts 
through the Southern coastal mountain range and then joing into the MediteiTanean Sea near 
historic Tyre." 
The Modern Lebanese State came into existence in 1920. Before 1920, the Lebanese 
State was geographically a much smaller entity comprising only the mountaineous region. 
Mountain Lebanon was traditionally the home of Maronite Cluistians. Besides the Maronites, 
Mount Lebanon was also the home of Druze, a religious sect of Islam. In the early sixteenth 
century the Ottomans captured Mount Lebanon and Syria from the Mamluks. With the 
defeat of the Ottoman Empire in Firf.t World War, Syria and Lebanon came under the control 
ofFrance.^^ 
Israel has shown interest in the Litani since the time of Theodor Herzl. His diaries 
reveal that in 1897 the German Chancellor Prince Hohenlohe had asked him whether the 
Zionists wanted the territory of their State to extend "as far north as Beirut or even beyond 
f 1-1 of 54 
During the First World War, the Zionist Organisation began to draw up firm plans 
for the establishment of Jewish national home in Palestine. On 19th September 1918, the 
allies established the Occupied Enemy Territorial Administrations (OETA) in order to provide 
military Government to conquered Ottoman territories in the eastern Mediterranean coastal 
region." 
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In February 1919 the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) placed before the Supreme Council 
at the Paris peace talks, a proposal regarding the boundaries of Palestine. The proposed 
boundary sought to extend the northern frontiers of Palestine upto the foothills of Mt. Hemion. 
it started from the mediterranean coast just south of Sidon, running in an easterly direction 
across the Litani river and included the whole of the Jordan catchment area upto it northern 
most source in Rashayya before turning south towards Golan Heights (See Fig.-l 1).^ * The 
Zionist proposal was opposed by France which insisted upon the original Sykes-Picot line. 
The WZO then launched a vigorous campaign aimed at persuading the French to give up 
Litani but it did not succeed." In 1919, Great Britan put forth the Deauville proposal, which 
recommended a boimdaiy followiuLg the Litani (Qasimiyya) River from the coast, that continues 
eastward and encompasses the village of Baniyas. According to British statesmen this was 
the ancient Dan. The Deauville proposal was rejected in February 1920 by the French and 
Litani remained inside Lebanon.^^ In the same year, British Prime Minister met Secretary 
General of the French Foreign Ministry Berthelot, who said that "all Jews" were unanimously 
agreed that the sources of the Hernion and the headwaters of the Jordan played vital role in 
the existence of Plalestine. Berthelot replied, Lloyd George recalled in his memories of the 
Peace Conference, that the snows of Hemion "dominated the town of Damascus" and could 
not be excluded from Syria nor could the waters of the Litani.^' In June 1920, an agreement 
was proposed by France, which recommended a line that would leave the coast at Ra'san 
Naqurah, a few miles north of the the Sykes Picot/OETA line, proceed eastward and then 
turned sharply north, so as to include within Palestine a vertical strip of territory containing 
the northmost Jewish settlement (Metulla) and the Hula Valley.*" 
Weizmann, tried to convince General Gourud, the French High Commission in Beirut, 
of the importance of the waters of the Litani to Palestine but could not arose any interest.*' 
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Finally the agreement between Britain and France was reached in December 1920. From 
the Zionist perspective the implications of Palestine's northern frontiers were quite serious. 
In the north the country was deprived of almost all important water resources which the 
Zionist leaders considered vital for the power and irrigation plans they had in mind. More 
important, by failingto approximate natural geographic boundaries, the borders left the country 
all but indefensible militarily.'^ -
The boundaiy agreement of 1920 cut shaiply into tlie most optimistic Zionist estimates 
of the amount of water available to support extensive Jewish agricultural colonization in 
Palestine. Zionist planners wanted to divert part of the flow of Litani River eastwared into 
the Hasbani River, where the Litani would flow into the Jordan Valley and eventually be 
piped overland to the Negev desert." In 1921, in the book of Jewish Foundation Fund, 
Karen Hayesod recorded, pessimistically, "it is, of course much to be regretted that we must 
abandon for the present all plans concerning the Litani".^'' 
In 1923, the British and French agreed on the final boundary lines, to the great 
disappointment of the Zionist leaders. They had hoped to retain the Litani, the Upper Jordan, 
Mount Hermon and the Hauran in Syria. They attempted, neverthless, to achieve changes in 
the boundaries by settling immigrants in Syria and Lebanon, a move violently opposed by 
the French. The Anglo-French boundary agreement of 1923 was approved by the League 
of Nations in 1934. And after that the Zionist leaders gradually lost hope of ever achieving a 
change in the frontier line.*^ 
hi 1943 the Zionist received a small measure of encouragement when some Maronite 
leaders appeared to be willing to share the water of tlie Litani for the agricultural development 
of tlie Jewish colony. The Lebanese engineering firm of Alfred Naccache and Jewish engineers 
of the Palestine Water Cooperative conducted a joint study which concluded that Lebanon 
could usefully exploit only one seventh of Litani's flow. 
The study approved, therefore, that most of the water be diverted from a point 
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where the river takes a westward bend through a tunnel into Palestine. In exchange for water 
Lebanon would receive all or part of the power produced by tlie water drop from the mountains 
to the Jordan Valley. The study heartened the Zionists, whose dreams of Negev deveopment 
could not be fully realized without the Litani waters.** 
In 1944, the Jewish Agency utilized the services of Walter Clay Lowdermilk, who 
was the Assistant Chief of the United States Soil Conservation Service, and later the Head 
of the Department of Agricultural Engineering at Technion, the Israeli histitute of Teclmology. 
After three months of field studies in Palestine and Transjordan he proposed a Jordan Valley 
Authority (JVA) on the lines of the Tennesse Valley Authority (JVA). The details of JVA 
were developed by James Hays, Chief engineer of TVA. Lowdermilk noted the possibility 
of tapping the Litani and diverting some of the water to the Palestine coast and Negev." 
These schemes however, lost relevance because of establishment of the State of 
Israel in May 1948. The establishment of Israel immediately sparked off the first Arab-
Israeli War Lebanon along with Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq participated in this war. The 
Israeli Army occupied Southern Lebanon upto the point where the Litani takes a westward 
bend. When negotiation for a General Armistice Agreement (GAA) started, Israel tried to 
couple it withdrawal from Lebanese territory with guaranteed access to the waters of the 
Litani. ** The Lebanese Government, however, refused to give any concessions and several 
weeks of stalemate followed. It was only after Israel was finally made to withdraw completely 
in March 1949 that a GAA was signed between the two. Immediately, thereafter, the Lebanese 
Government begun preparing a proposal for the Litani Project which had triple objective (i) 
sending the potable Litani water to Beirut (ii) utilizing the water for irrigating the Biqa and 
South Lebanon (iii) utilizing the water flow for the generation of hydroelectric power.*' 
Irrigation the Negev was a venerable Zionist dream and although its failure to acquire the 
waters of the Litani had wrecked plans for large-scale desert irrigation, Israel decided that 
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even a token Jewish agrarian presence in the Negev would be an important symbol of the 
vitality of the Jewish State. In July 1953 therefore, the Israeli Cabinet approved a plan to 
draw water from the Jordan river at the banat Yakub bridge for diversion to the Negev. 
Work on the canal began in September 1953 but as the diversion point was located in a 
demilitarized zone created by the 1949 Israeli-Syrian Amiistice Agreement, Syria immediately 
protested. The Syrian position was upheld by both the UN and the US . American pressure 
ultimately forced Israel to suspend work on the project the following month.™ In October 
1953 President Eisenhower despatched Eric Johnston to the region to undertake the joint 
development of the Jordan Valley. Johnston carried with him a Charles T. Main which called 
for a dam and reservoirto be built in Lebanon on the Hasbani river. The ommission of the 
Litani angered Israelis, In response to the Main plan they came up with the cotton plan 
designed by an American engineer John S. Cotton. The Cotton Plan tied the Litani to a 
regional development scheme and estimated that the surplus water not needed for irrigation 
in Lebanon (amounted to nearly 50 per cent or 400 MCM of ties Litani's water) be diverted 
to Israel from a point near Marjuyun. This diversion was to take place through a tunnel at a 
point seven miles from the Israeli border where the Litani makes a sharp westward turn 
towards the Mediterranean Sea. The Cotton Plan gave sufficient water for all of irrigable 
land of Lebanon. Lebanon would receive per aruium 450.7 MCM water to irrigate, 35,425ha 
(350,000 dunams). However, a report prepared by a group of US Bureau of reclamation 
experts working for the Foreign Operation Administration was of the opinion that Lebanon 
did use about 80 percent of the Litani waters.'" 
Israel's attempts to bring the Litani into a regional water development scheme could 
not find favour with the Americans. As Brecher states, "while a strong case could be made 
on teclinical and geo-economic grounds, Israel's legal claim was non-existent; the Litani was 
a wholly national river of an enemy State.^- James Hudson points out that, since Israel has 
no real share of the Litani basin, it has no claim under international law to any Litani waters. 
Israel stood better chance of eventually obtaining some Litani water if an acceptable 
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arrangement was first made and executed with the Arab States for Jordan river. In any case 
the water sharing negotiations initiated by the US in the 1950's itself failed amidst proposals 
and counter proposals and in October the Arb Leaque decided against signing an agreement 
might deal the case of Litani later on." 
Israel remained determined, with or without Arab co-operation, to divert a part of 
the Jordan river water for irrigation. Consequently in 1956, a national Water carrier Project 
for irrigating the Negev was approved and work begun in 1958.''' The construction of Litani 
Project started in 1957. The major features of this Project were : (i) Hydroelectric production 
and simultaneous irrigation of parts of the southern Biqa, irrigation of some agricultural lands 
in the upper Galilean regionand some part of the Sidon-Beirut coastal region. On 30 January, 
1961, a plan was adopted by the Political Committee of the Arab League which was designed 
to defeat the Israeli National Water Carrier Project. Though Lebanon was a party to the 
Arab League plan, Beirut's political leaders felt uncomfortable with the plan as it would 
drawn Lebanon into direct confrontation with the Jewish State." (See Fig. 12) 
In the 1960's a dam was built a lake Qaraoun with a 200 MCM capacity. A mountain 
tunnel was built from the lake to carry the Litani waters, four, miles south to a hydroelectric 
power station at Markabi. Two other hydroelectric power stations Awali and Joun were 
built from there westward before joining with Awali which flows into the Mediterranean Sea 
just north of Sidon.'*' Lebanon had proposed one more dam to be'built at Maifadoun, where 
the water could be stored and distributed for irrigation purposes. But this plan was never 
carried out." 
In January 1964 the Arab League adopted a plan designed to defeat the Israeli 
intention of diverting the waters of the Jordan. The Arab Plan amounted to an attempt to 
reroute the headwaters of the Jordan-Hasbani and Baniyas away from Israel. The Hasbani 
was to be diverted partially into the Lower Litani with a smaller quantity going eastwards 
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Figure ! 12 
Source : James Hudson,The Litani River of Lebanon, 
Middle East Journal vol.25,1971 
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into Syria's Baniyas river. The Baniyas in turn was to be connected to the Yarmuk river, a 
tributary of the Jordan.'* Israel, quite expectedly was severely critical of the Arab league 
decision. Nothing that the Arab League had earmarked part of the flow of the Hasbani for 
irrigating Southern Lebanon Israel argued that: 
"All irrigation plans for Southern Lebanon have turned in the 
first instance, on utilizing tlie river Litani with its annual flow of 
850 MCM of which to this day, most runs to waste into the 
Mediterranean. Now a good deal of this flow of the Upper 
Hasbani is to be wasted as well. Lebanon has sufficient water 
for iiTigation, arable land, not water has always been the factor 
limiting the development of Lebanese agriculture".'''^  
Work began on the Arab League's plan and Lebanon decided to proceed with its share of 
the scheme while at the same time declining to invite forces from other Arab countries to 
help defend Southern Lebanon from Israeli attacks. Feelings once again ran high in the Arab 
world as tension mounted between the frontline Arab States and Israel. The June 1967 Arab 
, -Israeli War, put a sudden and final end to the Arab League's diversion plan. 
The First Phase of the Litani project was completed before the beginning of June 
1967 Arab-Israeli War. With its completion the assumption on which the Cotton Plan and 
previous Zionist plans tor using the Litani had been based were dramatically changed. Although 
Israel wanted to get 400 MCM of water from the Litani river, after the construction of the 
Qirwan dam only 100 MCM water was left for the Lower Litani. 
The history of Litani thus revolves around three issues : (i) Continuing Zionist interest 
towards South Lebanon's most significant water resource the Litani River; (ii) independent 
Lebanon has performed a role in Arab efforts to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River 
away from Israel's Hula Valley; (iii) the climax of water tension before and during the June 
1967 Arab-Israeli War. After the 1967 War, Moshe Dayan, defence Minister proclaimed 
that: "Now Israeli borders are all geographically natural except the northern border with 
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Lebanon" This theme was repeated again and again throughout the 1970's. On December 3, 
1976, the Israeli daily Hatsoufeh pointed out, "The natural and historic border between the 
land of Israel and Lebanon is the Litani River, for the Jabeel mountains extend naturally with 
the three mountains to the Litani River." ^° 
In April 1972, the Lebanese Minister of Hydroelectric Resources asked a U.S. 
delegation to finance a Litani scheme to irrigate 23,000ha. (227,240 dunams) of southern 
Beqaa Valley and provide a new water network for Beirut. In October, 1974, the President 
of the Council of the Administration of National office of the Litani concluded an agreement 
in principle with the World Bank to provide 60 per cent of the $ 130 million cost of the ten 
year project.'' 
3. HISTORY OF THE EUPHRATES - TIGRIS BASIN 
The Euphrates and Tigris rivers have long been the focus of development and planning in 
the lands through which they flow. These are old multinational rivers and the Euphrates -
Tigris basin is located in three countries- Turkey, Syria and Iraq. These have flourished since 
4000 B.C. Several ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia developed and flourished in the 
basin formed by these two rivers.'- Some of these are also mentioned in the Bible. It is 
believed that the land between these two rivers is one of the oldest, continuously inhabited 
regions of the world. The earliest recorded settlement goes back to 6000 B.C. This region is 
therefore, rightly known as Cradle of Civilization.'^ Mount Ararat in Turkey is the source of 
origin of these rivers. Botli these gaint rivers originate in South-East Turkey, then flow through 
Syria and northern Iraq to the rich delta land, where they join to empty into the Persian 
Gulf.''' These rivers were extensively used for irrigation during the ancient period,as a result 
of which the effect of over irrigation was apparent, during the mediveal period. 
As Egypt is considered to be the Gift of Nile so is Mesopotamia considered to be 
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the Gift of Tigris and Euphrates. Mesopotamia is a Greek words meaning "A Land Between 
two Rivers". Since the ancient times this part of the world has been referred to as the 'Fertile 
Crescent'.^ ^ Since early times, the waters of these rivers have been used in the development 
of agiiculture. A canal system existed which althougli simple, was highly effective for agricultural 
as well as domestic use. A number of canals were constructed on both sides of the river, 
southward from Tikrit. Five canals supplied water from the Euphrates to the Tigris in the 
region of Baghdad and Babylon. 
In brief, the extensive irrigation system is largely responsible for the prosperity of the 
famous Mesopotamian Civilization. The ancient Babylonian Civilization gained its wealth 
from the fertile lands and invested this in constructing vast irrigation works, which further 
enhanced productivity giving it the title of the 'Granary of World'.'^ ^ 
The major invasions of Mangols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as well as 
Turkish vanquisliments in 1638, destroyed the irrigation works and with its the prosperity of 
the country. During the Ottman empire attempts were made by the Sultan's representative in 
Baghdad to revive the ancient irrigation network. However, these efforts co'jld not succeed, 
because of the lack of resources, as well as a strong administration. Sir William Willocks, 
advisor to the Ottoman Ministry of Public works, submitted a scheme for the irrigation of 
3.5 million acres at a total capital cost of 26 million pounds in 1909." 
The riparian states-Turkey, Syria and Iraq have all formulated plans and implemented 
projects begining in the early decades of this century to achieve flood control on the Euphrates 
and to use its water for hydro-electric power generation and large scale irrigation (See Fig. 13).** 
In 1911, the first part of the scheme, the Hindiyia barrage, was taken up by the 
British firm of Sir John Jaikson Ltd. In 1913 a barrage was formally constructed at Hindiyia 
on the Euphrates. The major aims of this barrage were : the diversion of water from the 
Euphrates into a canal as well as increment in the general water level of the Euphrates and 
the provision of irrigation in the Karbla region. It was a diversion barrage which affected five 
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canals and provided water to the upsteam riparian states.**^  
In the 1950's a second barrage was built at ar-Ramadi. The main aim of this barrage 
was the diversion of Euphrates flood waters into Lake Habbaniyah and the Abu Dibbis 
depressions to avert the danger of flood in the Euphrates. These natural depressions are 
located on the right side of the river. These depression have proved to be very functional. 
They are used for storage of water purposes. Simultaneously canals were dug to return 
water from the reservoir back to the river during the low flood seasons. The second reservoir 
is connected with the Habbaniyah reservoir by a channel and is for flood control only. The 
total capacity of Habbaniyah is about 3,000 MCM, of which 2,500 MCM is left for storage. 
Evaporation is the only source to release water from Abu Dibbis as it has no outlet. It holds 
as much as 24,000 MCM, when it is full.^ ° 
This barrage was constructed in 1955-56, since then, whenever the water level is 
very high it has been possible to divert 88,300 MCMY of water in the direction of Lake 
Habbaniyah along a canal on the right side of Euphrates, 3 kilometres from Ramadi town at 
the Warrar Stream. The length of this canal is 8.5 kilometres and it is 210 metres wide. In 
addition, another canal leads to the Abu-Dibbis reservoir, a depression west of Karbla 
town. This depression is used only to receive surplus water from Habbaniyah during the 
flood season.^' 
In this way, tlie importance of the Tigris in relation to the Euphrates cannot be overlooked. 
In Baghdad, both the rivers flow in distinct and well defined valleys. At Baghdad they come 
closest, flowing at a distance of 40 kilometres, only from each other. They get separated 
again below Baghdad, though the Valley Walls disappear. Because of greater volume, the 
largest flood control scheme of Iraq is located on the Tigris. 
Tharthar barrage, similar to the Ramadi, was completed in 1955-56 at Samara on 
the Tigris. It was capable of diverting 28,382 MCMy of water in the direction of the depression 
of Wadi. Tharthar is also a natural depression and it has storage capacity of 72,840 MCM. 
For the first time in its history, Iraq was protected from the catastrophe of regular floods by 
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the completion of these two projects. It had been hopeHthatstored water from these two 
projects might be used for irrigation during the summer months. But it was discovered that 
very large evaporation losses, coupled together with the dissolution of salts from the soils of 
the depression, seriously diminished water quality and rendered it unsuitable for irrigation 
purposes. In conjuction with the barrage on the main stream themselves, two major dams 
were constructed on the tributaries of Tigris. The Dukhan dam was completed in 1959 on 
the Lesser Zab river. The total capacity of the resei'voir is 6,300 MCMY while further south, 
the Darbandi Khan dam was opened in 1961 on the Diyala river with the storage capacity of 
3,250 MCM. 
In 1957 Damascus signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to carry out survey 
and research work on the river. The Soviet Union submitted its reported at the end of 1960, 
proposing to build a 75m. dam on the Euphrates at Tabqa with an electricity generating 
capacity of 800,000 kw and the potential to irrigate upto 850,000ha (8,398,000 dunams) of 
farm land.*^ -
During the 1960's Turkey, Syria and l:?n started discussing plans for the development of 
the Euphrates and the diversion of its waters.'^ The Synan go\'emment accorded high priority 
to the development projects on the Euplirates river setup various organization to work in this 
direction. During the same period, a Five year plan was dravm up which gave special emphasis 
on the devel'^nment of water resources. This plan was put forth by Syria for the expansion of 
irrigated areas on Khabur, Sajur and Balikh rivers, in the Hassaka region. Syria has been 
using the Asi river from 1961 for irrigation in Ghab Valley. The Rustam (250MCM) and 
Hilfaya Mehardeh (65MCM) dams provide water to generate electricity for the cities of 
Hoins and Hama.^'' 
In 1961 First General Organization of the Euphrates dam was setup in Syria. This 
was followed by the establishment of Higher Authority for the Euphrates projects directly 
under the Prime Minister. In 1968 the General Administration was established for the development 
of Euphrates basin.''^  
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The Ziezoun and Kastoun dams having a total storage capacity of 98MCMY, regulate 
the erratic flow of the Asi. This reduces the flow into Turkey to 25MCMY. The Asi river 
originats in Lebanon and it flows though Syria into the Hatay province of Turkey. 
Under the 1972 Syrian-Labanese agreement, Lebanon was alloted 80MCM of Asia 
waters.'* The Asi river is used to irrigate approximately 230,000 ha (2,272,400 dunams) 
and Yarmuk is used to irrigate around 27,000ha (266,760 dunams) in Syria and Lebanon 
have been discussing the feasibility of joint development projects on the Asi. During the 
early I970's differences arose over sharing the Euphrates water among the riparian states. 
As both Syria and Iraq were close allies of the Soviet Union, Moscow Intervened to work 
out a solution for the equitable distribution of Euphrates waters. It assisted both Syria and 
Iraq with funds as well as technical expertise to carry out development projects on the river. 
Ten years after it had first harnessed the waters of the Euphrates, the Damascus government 
began contemplating building a second dam on the river. This dam, known as the Euphrates 
dam is the second largest dam in this region to be built with Soviet assistance. The dam was 
completed in 1973.'^ The basic structure of dam is as follows : It is 4.5 kilometers long and 
60 meters high. The base is 512 meters wide. Also the Tabqa dam built by Syria in 1973 for 
multipurpose use became operational in 1974. The total capacity of the reservoir is about 
1,250 MCM and the live storage is about 750MCM. Estimates available prior to completion 
of the dam suggested that Syria extracted 3,000 MCMY from the Euphrates for local irrigation 
and domestic use whereas the irrigated land in the basin varied from 200,000 ha (1,976,000 
dunams) to 500,000ha (4,940,000 dunams).'* Syrian officials estimated that the dam would 
increase the irrigated area to 600,00-650,000ha (5,928,000 dunams - 6,422,000 dunams). 
Results to date, however have been disappointing. In this light, the Syrian government was 
also concerned with controlling the amount of water used for domestic consumption. Since 
the Euphrates dam of Syria was nearing completion, Turkey started construction of a series 
of three multipurpose dams, downstream from Keban. In 1974, the Keban was completed 
on the Euphrates river. The main purpose of this dam was power production, with reservoir 
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capacity of 1,650 MCM of which 360 MCM is left for storage.^' 
In the late 1970's Turkey followed Syria's lead in trying to exploit the Euphrates for 
irrigation and hydroelectricity. Turkey is also building three additional dams below the Keban. 
The dam at Karbaba, renamed the Ataturk dam, is intended to supply irrigation water for 
300,000ha (2,964,000 dunams) in Urfa, Hassan and Lower Mardin plains and to an additional 
400,000ha (3,952,000 dunams) in the Severek-Hilian, Upper Martin and Nusaybin Cizre 
areas. The total storage capacity of Ataturk dam is 48,700 MCM, an installed electricity 
generating capacity of 2,400 million KWh and target of 27,000 million KWh per year. The 
other, the Karakaya and the Golkay are designed to generate hydropower for the region.'°° 
The water project of Turkey are motivated by a quest for cheaper, domestically produced 
energy. Turkey imports 50 per cent of its annual energy requirements and 25 per cent of 
electricity production depends on imported fuel. The most important Turkish project. South 
East Anatolia Project (GAP) plans to harness the waters of Tigris and the Euphrates rivers 
for HEP generation and irrigation purposes. The hydropolitical implication of GAP appear 
to pose a tlireat to regional stability. The building of the Ataturk dam was widely potrayed as 
a belligerent act in the Arab media but the GAP puts the economic and technical aspect in 
perspectives. It proposes to develop agriculture and agro-industrial production for export 
and to raise the standard of living of the Kurdish people in the region. The first stage of GAP 
consists of 13 projects of which seven on the Euphrates and six on the Tigris.'"' 
The Haditha dam was completed in 1985 on the Euphrates with a total storage 
capacity 6400 MCM to irrigate 1 million ha. The water of Tigris are used to irrigate 2.2 m. 
ha. mainly using tlie Mosul dam (10,700 MCM). The Tishreen d?m was completed in 1991, 
with a total storage capacity of 1900 MCMY an installed hydroelectric power generation 
capacity of 63 MW in a year.'"^ 
CONCLUSION 
Conflict over water resources in the arid parts of West Asia came into existance in the 
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early decades of this centuiy. The Jordan river was one of the source of the first rivers in this 
region which witnessed sharp disagreements over the sharing if its waters. The influx of Jews 
into Palestine and the move towards creation of Jewish State was the principal reason for 
this bitter controversy. As large part of the proposed Jewish State was covered by the 
Negev desert, the development of the Negev was a critical factor as far as assembling 
furthar Jewish immigrants were concerned. The Jewish leadership was therefore keen to 
acquire as much water resources as possible. Several plans for the development of the 
Jordan river were put forward by the Jewish Agency from 1913 to 1948 which aimed at 
obtaining the water of the Jewish. Some of the important plans of this persons were Franghia 
plan (1913),Mavromaties (1922), lonides Survey (1939), Lowdermilk (1944) Hays-Sav-
age plan (1948). However, none of this plans could be implemented due to tremendous 
opposition from the Arabs. 
The creation of Isarel in 1948 immediately led to the First Arab-Israeli War. In the 
wars aftermath, there was absolutely no possibility of due of the Jordan basin on a coopera-
tive basis. Hence the Isarels started is implementing unilateral measures aimed at controlling 
as much water of the Jordan as possible. Predicably Israel's policy has generated a lot of 
tension as the riparians states have opposed Israel's attempts to control the water of the 
Jordan river. The water of the Litani a wholly national river in Lebanon too have been a 
sources of attraction for the Jewish State. 
In February 1919 the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) placed before the Supreme 
Council at the Paris Peace talks, a proposal concerning the boundaries of Palestine. It 
started from the Mediterranean coast just south of Sidon, running in easterly direction 
across the Litani river and included whole of the catchment area upto it northern most 
source in Rashayya before turning south towards Golan Heights. The Zionist proposal was 
opposed by France and the boundary between Israel and Lebanon was demarcated in a 
way that the Litani remained with in Lebanon. The joint study approved in 1943 therefore, 
that most of the water be diverted from a point where the river takes a westward bent 
through a tunnel into Palestine. In exchange for water Lebanon would receive all or part of 
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tlie power produced by the water drop from the mountains to the Jordan Valley. The study 
heartened the Zionist, whose dream of Negev development could not be fully realized with-
out the Litani waters. In 1944,W.C. Lowdermilk proposed a Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) 
on tlie lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The details of JVA were developed by 
James Hays, Chief engineer of TVA. Lowdermilk noted the possibility of tapping the Litani 
and diverting some of the water to the Palestine coast and Negev. Soon, these scheme 
however, lost relevance because of establishment of the state of Israel in May 1948. The 
establishment of Israel immediately sparked off the First Arab Israeli War. The Israeli army 
occupied southern Lebanon up to the point where the Litani takes a West ward bent, when 
negotiation for a General Armistice started, Israel tried to link its withdrawal form Lebanese 
territory with guaranteed access to the waters of the Litani. 
It was only in the late 1970's that Israel could manage to obtain a foothold on the 
Litani when it occupied a portion of Southern Lebanon. With the second Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in the early 1980's, this occupation was further, expanded and consolidated. Israel 
carried out extensive hydrological and technical studies, aimed at diverting part of the 
Litani's water into northern Israel. 
The Euphrates and Tigris are the major rivers in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. The 
Euphrates flows through Turkey, Syria and Iraq.The Euphrates and Tigris rivers have been a 
source of livelihood since 4000B.C. In this basin various old civilization have developed and 
thrived. The region is called as the "cradle of civilization". The Mesopotamian and 
Babylonian civilizations have flourished in the region. From the beginning of this century, the 
sharing states of Euphrates-Tigris drainage basin have all formulated plans and implemented 
projects to regulate the flood waters of Euphrates as well as utilize its water for multipurpose 
projects. In 1913a Hindiyia barrage was constructed on the Euphrates to divert water of 
Euphrates into a canal, and increment in the general water level of the Euphrates. In the 
1950's a second barrage was made at ar-Ramadi. Its main purpose was the diversion of 
Euphrates flood water into Lake Habbaniyah and the Abu Dibbis natural reservoirs to avert 
the danger of flood. The Euphrates dam was completed in 1973 with the Soviet help and 
cooperation. Turkey started work on a series of multipurpose dams. The Keban dam was 
constructed in 1974 on the Euphrates river with a total capacity of 1,650 MCM, of which 
360 MCM is left for storage. The dam at Karababa, renamed the Ataturk dam, is intended 
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to supply irrigation water for 3000,000 lia (2,964,000 dunams) in the Severck-Hilian Upper 
Martin and Nusaybin Cizre areas. The total capacity of Ataturk dam is 48,700 MCM. 
Several dams and barrages have also been constructed on the Tigris river. In Bagh-
dad, both rivers flow in distinct and well defined valleys at a distance of 40km from each 
other. Tharther barrage, similar to the Ramadi, was built in 1955-56 at Sammara on the 
Tigris. It has capacity of diverting 28,382 MCMY of water in the direction of the depression 
of wadi and its storage capacity is 72, 840 MCMY. The Dukhan dam was constructed in 
1959 on the Lesser Zab river and has total capacity of 6,300 MCMY. Further south, the 
Darbandi Khan dam was built with in 1961 on the Diyala River with total storage capacity 
3,250 MCMY. 
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CHAPTER: HI 
CONFLICT OVER RIVER WATERS: 
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 
Control over water resources of the Jordan River has been the most contentious issue 
among the frontline, Arab States on the one hand and Israel on the other. Facing acute 
water scarcity, the state of Israel ever since its establishment, has sought to acquire a 
major portion of the waters of the Jordan. Having faced perpetual hostility from its 
Arab neighbours, Israel considers the control over water supply as a strategic instru-
ment and defensive technique that greatly affects regional balance of power. 
Predictably, the Israeli policy has generated a lot of tension as riparain states 
have opposed Israel's attempts to control the waters of the River Jordan. The absence 
of precise international rules and regulations governing the sharing of waters of inter-
national river has further compounded the problem. The issue has become further com-
plicated as its has become inextricably linked to the Palestinian problem. 
1. HYDROPOLITICS OF THE JORDAN RIVER 
Confronting Israeli threats to Arab water is not confined to a single Arab State. After 
the end of the First World War, the Zionist submitted their demands regarding Palestin-
ian borders, to the Peace Conference and suggested that these borders start from a 
point on the Mediterranean Sea north of the mouth of the Litani, extending eastward to 
include all the sources feeding the Jordan River.' Weizmann, the Zionist leader, had 
sent a letter to Lord Curzon, then British Foreign secretary on October 30, 1920 in 
which he made it clear that there was a Zionist demand for the" annexation of Lebanese 
and Jordanian lands.- Israel has incorporated defense consideration into the foundation 
1. Israel Governmeni Year Bonk (5712/1951), p.84. Ibid., (5720/1960), pp.246-247. 
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of the country by the establishment of agricultural settlement for security purposes. 
Since the early days of Zionism the Jewish settlements in Palestine were not viewed 
solely as economic enterprises or a way of life for their members, but were considered 
also as outposts spearheading or consolidating the Zionist conquest of the country.^ 
The Jewish-Arab War and the humiliation that the Arab armies suffered at the hands of 
the Israelis has played an important role in moulding the thinking of the Arab World. 
The war drove about one million Arabs out of their homes. They left from fear of 
Zionist reprisals and the terror of destruction of their homes and families. 
The impact of Arab-Israeli politics on the Jordan River conflict reveals only in 
part of some of the reasons for Arab rejection of any cooperation with Israel in devel-
oping the Jordan waters. The waters of the Jordan are vital to Jordan, the West Bank, 
Israel and the areas in Syria and Lebanon where some of the rivers of the basin rise.'' 
Dividing these waters, estimated at about 1,500 MCMY and fluctuating from one year 
to the next, has been a nettlesome issue from the onset of Zionist colonization of Pal-
estine. 
A major feature of Israeli water project was irrigation of the Negev and its 
articulated policy in the context of water. Yet Israel feels that water resources for it 
requirements are insufficient. The Jordan Negev water line constitutes the back bone 
of Israeli defense plans and thereby represents the hydropolitical nature of Israeli water 
project.^ As the Israeli bureaucrats suggested, "the main controlling factors in the plan-
ning of the Israeli National Water Project are the dispersal of settlements throughout 
the length and breadth of the state for political and security reasons."* Israel persisted 
in her plans to irrigate the Negev by diverting the Jordan River out of the watershed 
area to the desert. This was the major feature of the National Water Carrier Project. 
The fust stage of this project was started almost immediately after the Armistice agree-
ment of 1949 and it gave Israel a partial access to the headwaters of the Jordan.'' 
In September 1953, Syria brought the case to the United Nations Security Council 
2. Nadav Safran,r/7e t/«i7ec/5/a/e.r a«c^/^rac/(Harvard University, 1963), p.170. 
3. Ibid., p.189. 
4. Samir N.Saliba, The Jordan River Dispute (The Hague: Martinus, Nijhoff, 1968), pp.23-24. 
5. Ibid., p.26. 
6 Quoted in Israel Government Fear/iooA (5719/1958), p.6. 
7. New York Times. (October 6th 1956). 
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and the seriousness of the matter was soon apparent to the world body. Consequently, 
the United Nation in cooperation with the United States decided that the unilateral 
plan of each party should be rejected, in favour of regional development of the Jordan 
River basin.* During the period of Eisenhower in 1953, Joroan River water develop-
ment became an important aspect of US foreign policy in West Asia.' The US pre-
sented a proposal to both the Arabs and Israel for the development of the Jordan basin. 
This proposal came to be known as the Unified Plan. In 1955 Eric Johnston special 
envoy of the US set out on his visit to West Asia to help the Arabs and Israelis achieve 
an understanding on sharing the waters of the Jordan. The Kingdom of Jordan was the 
first country Johnston visited between 25 to 30 August, 1955 because he saw it as the 
key Arab country which stood to benefit most from the project.'° After several rounds 
of discussion the Americans finally managed to persuade the Jordanians to agree to the 
compromise plan. By the end of September 1955 the individual Arab countries had all 
approved the 'Draft Memorandum of Understanding' and the Arab League Technical 
Committee recommended it to the Arab League's Political Committee. After four days 
of deliberation the Arab League's Political Committee decided not to ratify the Unified 
Plan. 
The Arab rejection was basically a political decision and not a technical one. In 
Syria a new redical government had just come to office and it feared that the opposi-
tion groups would force it out of office if it showed the slightest softening of attitude 
towards Israel. Damascus, also, had little economic incentive to develop the Jordan 
Valley as it had access to the waters of Euphrates river. Egypt too, under Nasir, was 
not willing to give any concessions to Israel as this could be interpreted as weakness on 
the part of the Arab resolve to eradicate the Jewish State." 
With the Arab rejection of the Johnston Plan a multilateral approach to Jordan 
water development and management thus failed. Meanwhile the Israeli Water Authori-
8. John Foster Dulles, "Economic Aid to Israel," Department of State Bulletin. Vol.29 ( November 
1953), pp.674-675. 
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pp.20. 
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Studies Vol.29 No.l (January 1990) pp.66-69. 
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ties, Tahal engineers and Directors, Mekorot engineers, and special consultants acted 
together to plan and later execute the National Water Carrier Project. The project 
consists of a main conduit lOSkilometres long, beginning at Eshed Kinroton the north 
western shore of Lake Tiberias, where the water is lifted over 250 meters by pumping. 
The water then travels over 65km via canal and tunnel to the Izalmon pumping station 
and from there to the operational reservoir at Beit Netofa in the Lower Galilee, where 
it passes 8km through Shimron, MenasheA, MenashaB tumiels in the Galilee and Menashe 
Hills. From there the water travels 80km via 108inch diameter pipeline, along the coast, 
to interconnect with all the smaller reservoir especially that of the Yarkon, at Tel Aviv 
until it ends in the northern Negev.'- The total amount of water to be diverted from the 
Jordan Yarmuk system, according to Israeli authorities will not exceed the amount of 
water allocated to Israel under the Unified Plan. 
Israel remained determined, with or without Arab cooperation, to divert part of 
the Jordan river waters for irrigation. Consequently in 1956 tliC National Water Carrier 
Project for irrigating the Negev was approved and work began in 1958.'^ In early 1958 
the East Ghor Canal project was announced, and the United States-after satisfying 
herself that Jordan would tacitly adhere to ihc Johnston formula-granted the Kingdom 
a $4 million grant through the Agency for International Development to complete it. In 
the early 1960's the Technical Committee of the Arab League formalized a plan to build 
a dam on the Hasbani relaying its water to the Litani via a tunnel, and to divert the 
Baniyas southwards to the Yarmuk.'" 
In 1964, the construction was finally started for a dam on the Yarmuk and for 
diversion of the headwaters of Jordan. After Israel started test pumpings in May, a 
second Arab Summit Conference was called at Alexandria in September 1964 at which 
it was decided to build a dam on the Yarmuk at Mukheiba to store water diverted from 
the Baniyas and Hasbani.'^ With the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, 
12. Cited in Sara Keguer, One of the best description of the Project is to be found in Tahal, Summary 
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work on the Project of diverting River Hasbani and on implementing the proposed plan 
for irrigation came to a halt.'* 
During the 1967 War, Israel captured the Golan Height from Syria. The Golan 
Heights, itself has little water resources to offer except the Baniyas river a small tribu-
tary of the Jordan. Israeli water strategy has been at the heart of its campaign to retain 
permanent control of the Golan, since it would assure protection of Israel's Lake Tiberias 
pumping works. More important, control of the Golan Heights enables Israel to pre-
empt any Syrian or multilateral Arab effort to divert the Upper Jordan back to Arab 
territory or to develop Yarmuk.^^In addition Israel has occupied the northern bank to 
the Yarmuk River boundary between Syria and Jordan, opposite the intake tunnels to 
Jordan's East Ghor Canal. Had Israel seized the Hasbani in 1967 it would have com-
pleted the job of securing the source of Jordan river. With the Dan river inside Israel 
proper, and the Baniyas captured in June 1967 by Israeli, only the Hasbani lay beyond 
Israel's grasp.'^ 
In the changed scenario, and early in 1972 the Jordanian government formed a commit-
tee composed of representatives from various related ministries and departments, to 
formulate a comprehensive three year plan for the rehabilitation and development of 
the area. To coordinate and implement various schemes envisaged, a special law was 
passed early in 1973 setting up the Jordan Valley commission which was soon elevated 
to the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) headed by a president of ministerial rank,'* 
In 1987, Jordan and Syria decided on a project to share the run off waters of the 
Yarmuk River. The plan was initiated by Jordan for which the West bank was expected 
to provide funds from Israel. The Israelis demand was to participate in the planning, 
construction and administration of the dam. Basically Israel wanted a share of any 
additional water that would come as a result of the project. Israel also wanted to pre-
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vent the Jordanians from doing any thing that would block o f^ water to Israel.^" 
Water was a prominent factor at the West Asian Peace talks which began in Ma-
drid in 1991. In subsequent rounds of peace negotiation among different parties, held 
in Moscow, Vienna and Washington, little headway could be made over the problem of 
sharing water resources of the region. Syria and Lebanon were unwilling to discuss any 
issue relating to water until Israel withdrew from the occupied territories. As water is 
crucial to the survival of the Jewish State, Israel needs to control the Yarkon-Taninim 
reservoirs which are located on the West Bank. If these sources are handed over to 
Palestine, it would sharply reduce the water availability in Israel and would make the 
latter dependent on the emerging Palestine entity.-' When negotiation began the Pales-
tinians started claiming their right to water, and reallocation of supplies. The Irsaeli 
government was unwilling to give major concessions. While it agreed that the Palestin-
ians could use little more water, it refused to give up over all control. The Israeli water 
commissioner was in favour of cooperative use of unused resources and the production 
of additional water by building desalination plant and coordination of effort to control 
water degradation problem. Israel stated, if a Palestinian state comes into existence, 
Israel must control the 2-6km wide hill ridge in the Anabta region since most of the 
source of ground water are found in the region.''^ Iz. the Vierjia round of multilateral 
negotiations held in May 1992, the Jordanians, Palestinians and Israelis agreed to co-
operate and exchange data on water resources. The Jordanian condition was such that, 
water utilization must be user-related and accord should seek to move from a position 
of disparity to equitable allocation of water.^^ In May 1993 the third round of muhilat-
eral negotiation were held in Washington. A working group on water resources has 
met seven times, since then which was set up in Washington. In September 1995 an 
interim agreement was signed wherein, for the first time, the Palestinians were ac-
corded a right to West Bank ground water. The accord also setup a joint Israeli-Pales-
20. Steve Rodan, " Divided Waters", The Jerusalem Post Magazine ( September 1995), p. 2. 
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tinian committee to manage water affairs in the West Bank. '^' 
The absence of Syria and Lebanon from the talks has effectively limited the number 
of areas of potential cooperation and thawarted hopes that full and all encompassing 
cooperation among the riparian state of the Jordan basin would be developed. In addi-
tion, the varying concerns of the regional participants and their differing expectation of 
this process have burtened the discussion and impeded greater break throughs. In par-
ticular, much of the discussion, especially in the early rounds, flounded over the inclu-
sion of water rights as an agenda item. Israel has sought to separate the technical and 
political aspects of the water issue, regarding the primary object of this working group 
as to focus solely on technical issue and joint water management, with the aim of in-
creasing the overall supply of water within region. The formulation of solution to the 
problems of water supply, in the Israeli view, requires the development of a range of 
functional and technical links between regional experts and officials. The construction 
of these links should not be impeded by the discussion of water rights and shares which, 
for Israel, is essentially political issue and therefore should be confined to the bilateral 
negotiations.-^^ 
Some progress has been achieved despite fundamental differences, essentially because 
the Israeli position on the appropriate fora for the discussion of water rights has pre-
vailed. The water working group has confined its activities to developing strategies for 
managing and increasing the supply of water in the region, and has concentrated its 
efforts an identifying the appropriate methods to supply adequate water to growing 
population at an affordable cost? To this end, the parties have focused upon four broad 
themes, adopted at the first plenary meeting in Vienna, as the starting points for discus-
sion and potential cooperation; (1) enhancement of data availability (2) water manage-
ment and conservation; (3) enhancement of water supply; and (4) concepts of regional 
cooperation and management. 
In the course of these talks, the parties have become increasingly the aware of 
need to translate their deliberation into identifiable achievements and move towards 
24. Steve Rodan , op.cil., p.2-3. 
25. Joel Peters, Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks (Great Britain: Biddies 
Limited, Guildford and King's Lynn, 1996), p.l7 
68 
the implementation of specific projects.^^ 
2. ISRAEL'S POLICY TOWARDS LITANI RIVER 
The Litani, which is in the South of Lebanon has been a major source of friction be-
tween the Republic of Lebanon and the State of Israel. The sharing of water of the 
Litani River has always remained at the centre of a controversy between the two. Though 
the Litani is a wholly national river, for a water scarce Israel, it has always been a 
source of great attraction. Time and again, Israel has made repeated attempts to ac-
quire a portion of the Litani's water but with little success. The Israeli water policy is 
throughout linked with the expansionist and colonialist policy. 
During the course of fighting in 1948, Israel was interested in the transfer of 
water of Litani into Jordan Basin. Annexing Southern Lebanon and the seizure of the 
Litani water were frequently discussed in Israel cabinet meetings. The Israel-Lebanese 
Mixed Armistice Commission had been established in 1949. It had very little work to 
do as the Israeli-Lebanese border, in marked contrast to the Israeli-Syrian or Israeli-
Egyptian border, was so quite. However, all this changed due to the six day war of 
1967. 
(i) AFTERMATH OF JUNE 1967 WAR 
The 1967 war extended the length of the Israeli-Lebanese border by about twelve 
miles, due to the advance of Israeli forces into the Golan Heights. Israeli also occupied 
the Sinai, Gaza and West Bank during the June 1967 War. Following the War, there 
was an influx of Palestinian refugees into the south of Lebanon. These refugees soon 
got organized under the Palestine Leberation Army and stepped up guerilla activities 
against Israel.-' 
At first the Lebanese government objected to guerilla activities but support for 
the Palestinians was strong among the Lebanese muslims. Under pressure from the 
Lebanese muslims the Lebanese government was forced to sign an agreement with the 
PLO in 1969 giving it certain rights in Lebanon. This agreement is known as the Cairo 
26. Ib id . , p. 18. 
27. Avneer Yaniv, Deterrence Without the Bomb. The Politics of Israel Strategy (Lexington: 1987), p.59. 
69 
Agreement. According to its terms which were supposed to be kept "secret" the Leba-
nese Army agreed to allow the Palestinian guerillas free access to Syrian supply lines 
and relaxed restrictions previously placed on the refugees camps. It legitimized the 
right of the PLO to maintain centres in Lebanon. No other Arab Government had ever 
agreed to such an arrangement before. The Cairo agreement therefore caused consider 
able alarm in Israel.-* Due to the strong internal and external support to the guerillas, 
the Government of Lebanon found it difficult to control Palestinian guerilla operations 
against Israel from Lebanese territory. In retaliation Israel initiated a series of raids 
against the Palestinians and the local Lebanese Shi'ite population in the south. These 
raids created extreme insecurity in the South and led to considerable loss of life and 
property. On 6th March 1970 Israeli Northern District Commander, Major General 
Mordechai Gur, warned that it would turn a six miles stretch of Southern Lebanon 
bordering Israel into a scorched-earth desert.-' On 15th October 1972, Israel launched 
air attacks against Palestinian bases in Lebanon. It was announced that it would no 
longer wait for commando acts or terrorist incidents before striking targets in Leba-
non. The presence of terrorists in the area between the border and the Litani River is a 
provocation, so Israel is free to act against them. In the long run the Israeli raids were 
instrumented in the break down of the Lebanese political system and onset of Civil War 
in 1975. The civil war resulted in widespreads physical destruction, and the collapse of 
the country's fragile political system. The war started as a confrontation between the 
Maronite militia, eager to restrict or eliminate the troublesome Palestinian presence in 
Lebanon, and the Fedayeen. The civil war provided an opportunity to Israel to surrep-
titiously implement its long standing scheme with regard to the Litani. In South of 
Lebanon it quietly setup a Christian militia which was to act as a surrogate of the 
Israeli Army.-*" 
In early 1976, as it became apparent that Syria was about to intervene in the civil 
28. For the Text of the Agreement See Al-Nahar, 20 April 1970 Cited in Arab World, 20April 1970. Al-
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30. See Arab Weekely. June 1972, pp. 1-3 and see also Sobel, Ibid., p. 144. 
70 
war, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzliak Rabin announced a red line in Lebanon, South of 
which the Syrain forces would not be permitted to move.. The location of the line was 
not clear but it was widely presumed that "red line" was the lower course of the Litani 
River, as it flows in a westerly direction towards the sea across most of South Leba-
non.^' 
On 19 July 1976 Defense Minister Shimon Peres announced a new Israeli policy. 
It was know as the 'good fence' programme. The good fence programme had three 
aspects: humanitarian relief for the beleaguered residents of Southern Lebanese border 
Villages; the restriction of all non-Lebanese military forces from the southern area; the 
third aspect of the good fence programme was the creation of a pro-Israeli Southern 
Lebanese militia to aid in barring the reintroduction of Fedayeen commandos. This 
militia was headed by a renegade, Lebanese armed forces personal Major Saad Haddad.^ ^ 
In February 1977 Severe fighting broke out South Lebanon, as Haddad's rightist mili-
tia attacked Palestinian and Lebanese leftist position in the villages of Kafr Tibnit and 
Ibil as Saqy, north of Israel's Hula Valley. Since July 1977, attacks and counterattacks 
continued with Israel." 
(ii) ISRAELS liN VASION Ol^  LEBANON: L I l ANI OPERATION 
On 11th March, 1978 eleven Palestinian terrorists arrived by sea into northern Israel, 
a point 30 kilometres south of Haifa. They killed a woman strolling along the beach and 
seized an Israeli bus near the Tel-Aviv highway. In the resulting confrontation 35 pas-
sengers were killed and a number of people wounded. The incident of 11 March sent a 
wave of outrage throughout Israel. A massive Israeli response was inevitable. Although 
the entire world recognized the inevitability of a super-retaliation against Lebanon, the 
scope and intensity of the Israeli operation which commenced three days later took 
everyone by surprise. Just before dawn on 14th March, Israeli artillery opened up on 
Lebanese villages held by the Palestinians and leftists.^" The shelling was followed by a 
31. /i;-(ja//a/7(^/ioot/o/-Le/)a/)on (Washington :US Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 297. 
32. Hirsh Goodman, "Israel Focus Holding Southern Lebanon", Jeruia/em Foi/ (21 March 1978), p.7. 
33. David Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured Country (Oxford: Martin Robutson, 1983), p.148. 
34. Arab Report and Record (1-15 March 1978), No.5, p. 184. 
71 
ground attack with approximately 20,000 Israeli soldiers advancing on five axes.^^ The 
Israeli forces consisted mainly of regular infantry and paratroopers units.-*'' According 
to Ezer Weizmann the operation and plans worked out by the Israel Defense Forces 
(IDF) were to operate against Palestinian terrorists and their bases all along the Leba-
nese-Israeli border upto distance of 10 km inside Lebanon. The original objective of 
the invasion was achieved in the first day itself. The whole area along the border to a 
depth of 10km inside Lebanon was occupied by the IDF. As the Israeli forces moved 
towards north, Haddad's militia followed in their wake, looting the Shi'ite villages which 
had successfully held out for so long." 
On 19 March, just when it seemed that the operation was coming to an end, the 
IDF suddenly broke out of the buffer zone towards the Litani River, and by evening 
Israel controlled the entire area from its borders to the Litani river except for the town 
of Tyre. According to an Israeli source, the new advance was designed to carve out a 
PLO-free security belt in the 1200 square kilometres between Israel's northern border 
and the Litani River. In reality, however, it was international politics that had played 
the crucial role in the decision to expand the operation. 
On 15 March, the Lebanese government launched a complaint to the UN Security 
Council and the following day the US gave a call for an immediate Israeli withdrawal. 
On the same day the US proposed before the UN that the Israeli forces at present in 
Lebanon be immediately replaced by a UN force. When the US resolutely pushed for a 
UN Security Council resolution calling for an Israeli withdrawal and the despatch of 
UN troops to South Lebanon, the Israeli government was taken by surprise. The Israeli 
thrust towards the Litani was, therefore, seen by many as an attempt to achieve the 
maximum possible before the vote on the proposed UN Security Council Resolution. 
This would increase the area, the Israeli government could trade with the UN and leave 
manoeuvring room to fall back on all the way to its recently created security belt.^* 
Given the size and intensity of the Israeli operation, it is obvious that Tel Aviv's deci-
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sion to invade Lebanon was not a spontaneous reaction to a particularly gruesome 
incident of Palestinian terrorism but had been made much before the incident of 11 
March. The three days gap between the Palestinian raid and the invasion gave the PLO 
sufficient time to move its forces to buffer zones in the north. A liquidation strategy 
would have called for surprise seizure of the Litani by amphibian and helicopter-borne 
troops to cut off the PLO forces lines of retreat.-" The IDF also abandoned its tradi-
tional strategy of high mobility, preferring instead to advance its mechanized infantry 
very cautiously behind a devastating wall of casualities. It maximized non-combanant 
deaths and civil destruction and permitted the great bulk of enemy commandos to cross 
the Litani River to relative safety. Finally, the IDF's treatment of Tyre also was at 
variance with the declared Israeli objective of liquidating the PLC*" 
(iii) A REVIEW OF UNIFIL'S ROLE PRECEDINGS JUNE 
1982 INVASION 
On 19th March 1978, hours after the IDF had began to move towards the Litani, the 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 425. The two key points of the resolution 
which was sponsored by the US, were (i) a call upon Israel to immediately "cease its 
military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw its forces from all 
Lebanese territory," and (ii) the establishment of a United Nations Interim Force for 
Southern Lebanon for the purpose of "confirming the withdraw of Israeli forces, re-
storing international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon to 
establish effective authority in the area"."' The Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann 
met with General Ensio Siilasvuo, commander of United Nation Truce Supervision 
Organisation (UNTSO) and Major-General Emmanuel S.Erskine commander of the 
newly oppointed UNIFIL. At this meeting the following point were agreed upon be-
tween Israel and the UN officer."^ 
(i) The area run by the IDF in the second stage of the invasion would become a buffer 
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zone; (ii) UNIFIL would be responsible for patrolling the buffer zone; and (iii) the strip 
of territory lying between the Israeli-Lebanese boundary and the UNIFIL buffer zone 
would be designated as a "peace zone" to be patrolled by the militia of major Haddad 
and units of the Lebanese army. 
The first contingent of UNIFIL consisting of element of the Swedish infantry 
battalion entered Lebanon by way of Israel on 22 March 1978. In the months of April 
to June, an international force began to take up positions south of the Litani.'*^ The 
Israeli withdrawal called for by Resolution 425, took place very slowly and in several 
stages beginning on 11 April. By 30 April, Israel had turned over to UNIFIL around 
550 square kilometres of Lebanese territory and was left in control of the security belt 
seized during the first phase of invasion'''' (See Fig. 14). On 13 June, as promised the 
IDF formally ended its ninety-one day occupation of southern Lebanon. In a military 
ceremony at Meis al-Jabal the Israeli flag was lowered. However, the security belt 
occupied by the IDF was handed over not to the UNIFIL but to Haddad and his militia. 
Soon after the IDF withdrawal, the Lebanese government decided to despatch a army 
contingent to the to the south to establishment a symbolic authority as well as supple-
ment the UNIFIL effort in policing the area. 
In July 1978 when the Lebanese government decided to despatch a force of the 
Lebanese army to south it was bombarded by Haddad's militia and prevented from 
advancing beyond the town of Kawkaba. After protracted mediatory efiforts, two Lebanese 
battalions reached southern Lebanon in 1980. They were deployed in the UNIFIL'S 
area of operation.'*' 
A review of UNIFIL's role makes it clear that it could not successfully implement 
the UN Mandate. Of course, it confirmed the withdrawal of Israeli forces from South-
ern Lebanon, but it could not deploy over the whole of Southern Lebanon, nor could it 
hand the area back to the Lebanese government. UNIFIL could not implement all of its 
mandate because the necessary cooperation was not forthcoming within its immediate 
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surroundings. Infact, the Lebanese government was not in a position to impose its will 
effectively due to its own weakness. Israel was not interested in cooperating with the 
UNIFIL because from the beginning, Israel perceived that it had been imposed on it 
without Israel's case being heard. While the Israeli forces were still carrying out the 
Litani operation, the US and the UN initiated the formation of peace keeping force 
without getting Israeli assent. UNIFIL, thus was formed on the basis of a unilateral 
Security Council decision, and not as a result of an agreement between the hostile 
parties. UNIFIL could not use force either against Israel or its surrogate Saad Haddad's 
Southern Lebanon Authority nor against the PLO.""^  Throughout its active life from 
March 1978 to the Israeli Invasion of June 1982, UNIFIL constantly experienced great 
difficulties. (See Fig. 15) 
(iv) ISRAEL'S INVASION OF LEBANON: OPERATION PEACE 
FOR GALILEE 
In June 1982 Israel lunched a massive land, sea and air invasion of Lebanon 
code named Mivtsa Shalom ha Galilee (Operation Peace for Galilee) At the beginning 
of this invasion Israeli spokesman announced that their aim was to drive the PLO be-
yond a line twenty five miles from the border so that it could no longer be within PLO 
artillery range."' Within a few days, however, the Israeli army had gone well beyond the 
twenty five mile zone. 
The operation was not a limited one like the March 1978 invasion. There were 
deeper and more fundamental objectives associated with this second Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon. These were (a) cruising and destroying the PLO both as a military and politi-
cal force in Lebanon (b) inflicting a humiliating defeat on the Syrian army in Lebanon 
so as to affect its total or partial withdrawal (c) installation of Bashir Jumayil as the 
President of Lebanon and (d) signing a peace treaty with Lebanon."* This treaty would 
satisfy two long-standing Israeli ambitions with regard to Lebanon. First it would ac-
cord diplomatic recognition and record it would provide effective Israeli control over 
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Following the 1982 invasion, Israel's hold over security zone was further consolidated. 
It was during the post 1982 period that Israel carried out extensive hydrological and 
technical studies, aimed at diverting part of the Litani's water into northern Israel.'" 
The IDF which had withdrawn to a line on the Awali river in September 1983 was soon 
confronted with a new challenge. The shi'ites of South rose up in revolt against the 
continuing Israeli occupation. In January, 1984 Haddad died of cancer. Antonie Lahad 
who succeeded Lahad turned Haddads militia into a regular army. The SLA was, how-
ever, no more successful in eliciting shi'ite cooperation than earlier Israeli efforts. In 
1984 there were over nine hundred attacks on the IDF in Southern Lebanon taking a 
heavy toll of Israeli soldiers. At the same time Israel began to isolate the south from the 
rest of the country by completely sealing off the bridges on the Awali river. On 18 
February 1985 Prime Minister Simon Peres succeeded in getting the cabinet to approve 
a staged withdrawal from Lebanon.^" The first stage which was to be completed in five 
weeks envisaged an IDF withdrawal from the Sidon area to a line on the Litani. In the 
second stage the IDF would withdraw from the Jabal Baruk and reposition itself in the 
Hasbaya area. In the third and final stage the IDF would withdraw from the area be-
tween Tyre in the west and Hasbaya in the east. This phase was, however, dependent, 
on the ability of the SLA to take charge of the security belt. Even if the SLA proved 
effective, the IDF would maintain its presence in the from of advisers and intelligence 
installation inside Lahad's territory. This phased withdrawal was completed as per schedule. 
The third phase proved to be a little problematic as the SLA was unable to exhibit the 
required whesiveners or military process which the Israeli desired. The result was that 
the IDF had to come to its aid whenever the challenge from shi'its of the south mounted.^' 
3. POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT OVER WATER RIGHTS 
IN THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS BASIN 
The Euphrates-Tigris rise in the mountains of the southeastern Turkey. Both are im-
49. Naff and Maston op.cii., p.l6. 
50. Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Securiiy: Politics, Strategy and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (Ox 
ford: 1987), pp. 42-44. 
51. Peretz Kidron, "Israel's Withdrawal Plans", Middle East International, No. 292 (25 February 1985), 
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portant international rivers, which have tremendous regional importance. Control of 
these rivers has become increasingly contentious, as the demand for water keeps on 
increasing every year, in this arid region.^- The economic prosperity of Turkey, Syria 
and Iraq depends on the two rivers, as they constitute the principal source of hydro-
electricity and agricultural development. A proliferation of multipurpose dam projects, 
combined with competition for regional, political and economic leadership is a perma-
nent source of tension in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. As an upstream state Turkey has 
sought to exploit water in its territory, thereby causing acute concern to its down-
stream neighbours. The relations between Turkey and Syria have been strained many a 
times, mainly due to the formers efforts to control the flow of the rivers." 
There are no tripartite treaties between the riparian states of the Tigris-Euphrates 
basin in relation to the allocation or exploitation of the river waters. The treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923, included a provision that Turkey must consult Iraq before undertak-
ing any hydraulic works. The 1930 treaty of Aleppo gave Syria certain water rights on 
the Tigris.^'' An attempt was made by Turkey to conclude an agreement with Syria in 
connection with the use of Euphrates waters. The concessions made by Turkey were 
considered to be inadequate by the Syrians and the treaty could not be concluded. The 
two countries are also at loggerheads over Syria's claim over the Hatay province, which 
was ceded to Turkey in 1939." 
The 1946 Ankara Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness, signed be-
tween Turkey and Iraq, stated that Iraq was to be consulted before Turkey carried out 
any development project on the Tigris-Euphrates. Although in 1962 Syria and Iraq 
formalized a Joint Technical Committee, however its role was limited, as no major 
hydraulic works were carried out during this period. In September 1965, a tripartite 
meeting was held in Baghdad and at this meeting, Iraq is said to have demanded 18,000 
MCMY of Euphrates water, Syria 13,000 MCMY and Turkey 14,000 MCMY. In early 
52. Natasha Beschorner , The Tigris-Euphrates Basin Region Water and Instability in the Middle East", 
Adelphi Paper 273 (Winter 1992-1993), p.27. 
53. Shebonti Dadwal Ray, The Politics of Water in West Asia ", Strategic Analysis, Vol.XIX, No. 3 
(June 1996), p. 474. 
54. Natasha Beschomer, op.cit. 
55. RH. Gleick, "Water and Conflict, " International Society, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp.88-89. 
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1967 Iraqi and Syrian were very acquisitive in regard to water allocation, with Iraq 
demanding 16,000 MCMY from Syria and Syria insisting that Iraq needed no more 
than 9,000 MCMY.5<^  
Due to the inability of the three riparian states to reach formal agreement to share 
water the 1970's witnessed several clashes between Turkey, Syria and Iraq over shar-
ing right." A serious disagreement relating to water, arose in 1975 between Iraq and 
Syria over reduction in Euphrates flow as a result of the completion of Syria's Tabqa 
dam. During the dry season when the Turkish and Syrian dams impounded part of the 
Euphrates spring flood, a major crisis developed between Syria and Iraq that brought 
the two countries to the brink of war. Baghdad said the Euphrates flow fell from a 
normal 29,013 MCMY to 6,213 MCMY endangering the livelihood of three million 
farmers of Iraq who depended on the river for irrigation water. Iraq and Syria traded 
hostile statements in which Iraq threatened to take any action necessary to insure the 
Euphrates flow and Syria protested that it was passing on to Iraq 71 per cent of the 
water it received from Turkey. At the end of April 1975 a technical committee was 
formed by the Arab League, which had representatives from Syria, Iraq and seven 
other Arab States to look into the matter and solve the dispute in an amicable way.^ ^ 
As tension subsided, between Syria and Iraq, a new round of hostilities erupted 
between the riparian states and this time it related to the construction of the Karakaya 
Dam in Turkey. During the late 1970's and the early 1980's Baghdad and Damascus 
complained against Ankara that it was holding back a main part of the water from the 
Euphrates for its use. In 1978, Iraq insisted that Turkey should agree that the Euphra-
tes would continue to flow regularly, before Iraq would agree to talks regarding the oil 
debt issue.^^ As a matter of fact Turkey gave the necessary guarantee in August 1978, 
and an agreement was concluded providing for the resumption of oil supplies and for 
repayment by Turkey of its debts with wheat exports. Following this agreement the 
Energy Minister of Turkey, Deniz Baykal announced that a joint commission would 
soon be setup to examine Iraqi water demand. In this way, Ankara wanted to accom-
56. Thomas Naff and Ruth Maston, IVaier in the Middle East Conflict or Coopealion (Colorado: 
Boulder, Westview, 1984),p.93. 
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modate Baghdad. Nonetheless after the Gulf War broke out in September 1980 Bagh-
dad continued to demand ever more water arguing that its new eight year irrigation and 
development plan for northern Iraq required additional water. Ankara promised to do 
its best to satisfy Baghdad.^ "^ During the same period Damascus also stepped up its 
demand for a greater share of the Euphrates water. Consequently the World Bank re-
fused to finance Ankara's GAP project stating that Turkey should work-out a riparian 
treaty with its neighbours before undertaking the project.^ ** 
The work on the South Eastern Anatolia project in Turkey began in the early 
1980's. The project aims at harnessing the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to 
irrigate 1.7 million hectares of land and to build 18 hydroelectric stations. The centre-
piece of the project is the Ataturk Dam, which cost $2300 million and is the world's 
ninth largest dam. The whole Anatolia project is to be completed by 2005 at a cost of 
$32000 million. The Project treats the Euphrates-Trigris as one single Basin.*'' The 
intention of Ankara was to build 22 dams on the Euphrates within the framework of 
southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP). The main aim of the South Eastern Anatolia 
Project is to boost agricultural and agro-industrial production for export and to raise 
the standard of living of the Kurdish people in region.*^ 
In 1982 a joint technical committee was established by Turkey and Iraq. Syria 
joined it in 1983. The committee has met fifteen times for general discussions and 
exchange of hydrological data, but it has been unable to solve the problem of compet-
ing claims by the sharing states.^^ 
In October 1984 a 'Hot Pursuit' agreement was signed between Turkey and Iraq, 
where by both sides could 'pursue subversive groups in the territory of the other up to 
five km. Turco-Syrian rapprochement was started in March 1985 which gained further 
momentum when the Syrian Prime Minister Adb-Al-Rauf Al-Qasm's visited Ankara in 
March. 1986. He pointed out that the water of Euphrates was very important to Syria 
59. Suba Bolukbashi, " Turkey Challenges Iraq and Syria : The Euphrates Dispute", Jour nal of South 
Asian and Middle East Studies. Vol. XVI, XI0.4 (1993), pp.9-11. 
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and also implied that if during the building of major dams of GAP Turkey retained 
additional Euphrates water, Syria would retaliate with other means. During offical ne-
gotiations regarding Syrian demand for water, the Turks were in favour that Ankara 
should provide sufficient water not less than 15,768MCMY from the Euphrates even 
during the accumulation of water at the Karakaya and Ataturk dams.*" The Turkish 
Project for exploiting the Euphrates is seen as disadvantageous to both Syria and Iraq. 
The centre-piece of this scheme is the Ataturk Dam, which will be the fifth largest 
rock-fill dam in the world and will irrigate an area of 875,000 hectares. A trilateral 
committee was set up to look into the issue of water allocation to those states. By the 
end of 1989 the technical committee had met fourteen times but had failed to reach a 
trilateral agreement on the utilization of the Euphrates waters. Syrian and Iraqi worries 
about the water that GAP would leave them with seemed justified when in November 
1989 Turkey informed Syria and Iraq that in order to impound the Ataturk dam it 
would divert the Euphrates between January 13 and February 13, 1990. During the 
impoundment Syria would receive 3,784MCM, from the tributaries below the dam. 
Ankara explained the technical reasons for the move as well as what measures it would 
take to prevent any possible adverse effects on as Iraq and Syria. They wanted more 
information and a meeting was held in Damascus at the end of November 1990 be-
tween officials from the three countries. Technical information was provided by Tur-
key, but it refused to bargain over the amount of water to be released and the period of 
impoundment.^^ 
Turkey has adopted an assertive position on the issue of Euphrates water rights. 
It is determined to go ahead with its development projects without the cooperation if 
Iraq and Syria. According to the Turkish Primer Suleyman Demirel, Turkey is justified 
in taking advantage of its position as an upstream user of water resources. However, 
he pointed out that his country was willing to cooperate on joint ventures with the 
downstream states. Turkey has tried to link a deal on Euphrates to one on the Asi; 
which would imply Syrian recognition of Turkey's jurisdiction over the province of 
64. Cited in Natasha Bescliorner, Protocol on Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperation between the 
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Hatay. Syria and Iraq reiterated their calls for a trilateral as at the most recent meeting 
of the Joint Technical Committee in Damascus in September 1992, the first since the 
Kuwaiti crisis. The meeting ended in deadlock amidst accusations of Turkish intransi-
gence. The Turkey argued yet that Iraq and Syria were receiving adequate quantities of 
water and that they should use their water supplies more efficiently. '^^  
Syria as well as Iraq have opposed the project from the beginning, for it views 
negotiations were held between Turkish and Syrian in September 1992 at which both 
sides reiterated their commitment to border security; Syria stated that it had outlawed 
Kurdish rebel activities in territory under its control. The long term significance of 
these developments remains to be seen." 
CONCLUSION 
Since ancient times, the struggle between riparian state for the water of the West 
Asian rivers has been a crucial problem. Thus, the scarce water supply of the rivers in 
arid region has represented one facet of the multidimensional conflict between riparian 
states of the West Asian region. 
The competition to control the Jordan River is intense as this is the major source 
of water in a water-scarce region. On the one side is Israel and on the others are a 
uicmbei of Arab State. The political hostility between Israel and the Arab State has 
spilled over to the issue of sharing water so much to that waters of the Jordan have 
become emirate in controversy since the establishment of the Jewish State. 
Facing acute water scarcity, the state of Israel ever since its establishment, has 
sought to acquire a major part of the water of the Jordan. Having faced prepretual 
hostility from its Arab States, Israel considers the control over water supply as a stra-
tegic instrument and defensive technique that greatly affects regional balance of power. 
Israel has persisted in her plans to divert the Jordan River out of the water and area to 
the Negev desert. This was the major feature of the National Water Carrier Project. 
The first stage started almost immediately after the Armistice Agreement of 1949 and 
66. Natasha Beschomer, op.cii., p.42. 
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it gave partial access to the headwaters of the Jordan. 
The Johnston 1955 Unified Plan rejected by Arab League which was based on a 
multinational appioach to Jordan water development and management. 
Throughout the 1950's and early 1960's the US along with the UN kept an trying 
to convince with the Arab and Israelis of the need to adopt a multilateral and coopera-
tive approach. However, neither of them were in a mood to relevant with the result that 
each party tended to proceed with their unilateral schemes. This confrontationist ap-
proach was bound to lead to conflict sooner or later. The third Arab-Israel War of 1967 
was paitly the result of rising tensions over the issue of sharing of the Jordan. In the 
1967 war, Israeli captured the West Bank, Gara Strip, Golan Height. 
The Litani, which is in the south of Lebanon has been a major source of friction 
between the Republic of Lebanon and the state of Israel. The sharing of water of the 
Litani river has always remained at the centre of a controversy between the two. 
Though the Litani is a wholly national river, for a water scarce Israel, it has always 
been a source of great attraction. Time and again, Israel has made repeated attempts to 
acquire a portion of the Litani's water but with little success. After the 1967 Arab 
Israeli War I ebanon became the most important base for Palestinian guerilla activities 
against Israel. In order to counter Palestinian raids, its initiated a policy of retaliatory 
raids against guerilla basis in Lebanon since early 1970. 
The Israeli raids were instrumented in the break down of the Lebanon political 
system and break-out of Civil War in 1975. In March 1978 Israel launched a massive 
invasion of Lebanon code named operation 'Stone of Wisdom'. According to Ezer 
Weizmann the operation and plans worked out by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) were 
to operate against Palestinian terrorist and their bases all along the Lebanese-Israeli 
border up to distance of 10 kilometres inside Lebanon. 
The Israel invasion led to the setting up of the UNIFIL which was deployed in 
South Lebanon to oversee Israel withdrawal and act as a buffer between the combat-
ants. Though UNIFIL could not be deployed in the whole southern Lebanon, as re-
quired by mandate, it took active steps to ensure that as far as possible its area of 
operation continued to remain under its control. UNIFIL did not use force either 
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against Israel or its surrogate Saad Haddad's South Lebanon Army nor against the 
PLO. Throughout its active Ufe, since March 1978 to Israel invasion of June 1982, 
LTNIFIL functioned with great difficulties. From time to the leadership of the PLO gave 
assurances of its intention to cooperate with UNIFIL but, attempts by Palestinians and 
Lebanese armed elements to enter the UNIFIL area of operation were a recurring fea-
ture. After the Second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 code named operation 
'Peace for Galilee' the Israeli forces established a security zone in southern Lebanon 
* 
including the Litani Wazzani, Hasbani river. It was handed over to Israel's portage 
major Saad Haddad. 
Water was an important item on the agenda of the multilateral talks which began 
in Madrid in 1991. At the subsequent rounds of negotiations Israeli government 
showed a willing to withdraw from southern Lebanon in return for assured water sup-
ply from the Litani But Lebanese government was unwilling to give any concessions. 
In Vienna round of multilateral talks held in May 1992, the Jordanians Palestinians and 
Israelis agreed to cooperate and exchange data on water resources. The Jordanians 
insisted that water utilization must be user-related and an accord should seek to more 
from a position of disparity to equitable allocation of water. The working group on 
water resources has met seven times, most recently in Amman in June 1995. Though 
the participants are far from an agreement there are indications that a ,consensus is 
gradually evolving. The Euphrates and Tigris are international rivers. These have im-
mense regional importance. The economic prosperity of Turkey, Syria and Iraq revolve 
around the two river as they constitute the principal source of hydropower and agri-
cultural development. As an upstream state Turkey has sought to exploit water in its 
territory, thereby causing acute concern to its downstream state. The relation between 
Turkey and Syria have been strained many a times mainly due to formers efforts to 
control the flow of the rivers. During the dry season when the Turkish and Syria dams 
impounded part of the Euphrates spring flood, a major crisis developed between Syria 
and Iraq that brought the two countries to the brink of war Iraq and Syria traded hos-
tile statements in which Iraq threatened to take any action necessary to regulate the 
Euphrates flow. In early 1980's Iraq and Syria complained against Turkey that it was 
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holding back a part of the water from the Euphrates for its use. In 1982 a Joint Techni-
cal Committee was set up by Turkey and Iraq. Syria joined it 1983. The committee had 
discussed fifteen times on exchange of hydrological data, but the problem of water 
allocation however has not been solved so far. Turkey's assertive position on the issue 
of Euphrates water right is unacceptable to both Syria and Iraq. They have therefore 
spurned Ankara's offer of joint adventures as long as their legitimate rights are not 
recognized by the Turkish government. 
In the 1990's the problem of sharing Euphrates water has become more compli-
cated as Syrian and Turkish irrigation works are nearing completion and sewage and 
industrial development in the two countries threaten to lower water qualities grown up 
phenomenally the recent years. Growing population is also a source of water concern 
as the demand for domestic use has polluted the water quality and quantity day by day. 
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CHAPTER: IV 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE EQUITA-
BLE SHARING OF RIVER WATERS 
AMONG RIPARIAN STATES 
Water is an essential natural resource and since the begining of this cen-
tury several long standing conflicts have emerged over equitable water dis-
tribution among states sharing international rivers. 
Historically, decisions relating to use of water resources have been 
made independently of most other land use management decisions. ' Law 
provides a perfect machinery for the peaceful resolution of disputes, of-
fering accomodation of correlatives rights of each country. The evolution 
of International River Laws has taken many centuries and the process still 
continues. A number of principles and treaties for management, sharing, 
utilization and conservation of international water resources have been codi-
fied during the past two centuries. 
International Water Law which forms part of international law itself, 
has emerged from various sources, such as Article 38 of the statutes of the 
international conventions, international custom; the general principles of 
law, and the decisions of International tribunals including aribitral awards. 
To these source should be added the law making activities of international 
bodies and the resolutions and recommendations of inter-governmetal or-
ganisations.^ 
1. Dante, A.Coponera, International River Law, Munir Zaman (ed). River Basin Development 
(Dublin: International Publishing Ltd, 1983), pp.173-177. 
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Numerous rivers cross several state boundaries and it is necessary to dis-
tribute tlie water of those rivers among the various state which they cross. 
Water rights depend on, and vary with, a country's system of law. The de-
velopment of water resources in any country or state must involve relevant 
legislation and subsequent institutions to control that development.^ 
The riparian right system has developed from early times. Basically, a 
right to use water comes from the occupation of land bordering a water 
course, such land being termed riparian land. A customary law may be ap-
plied in this condition. 
Broadly speaking, a riparian owner has claim to the benefit of the natural 
flow of the watercourse bordering his land. The state should take water 
from its immediate upstream neighbour and fellow riparian owner without 
a material change in its quality and quantity and pass it on to its down-
stream neighbours in a similar state. It is entitled to the use of the water, 
which flows past its riparian land for its ordinary use. It is generally ac-
cepted as being for the purpose of domestic use.'' In case of conflict over 
the distribution and use of river water flowing through more than one po-
tential unit, the criteria of prior use, of historic rights and relative require-
ments have been advanced as equitable standards. They have been invoked 
in various controversies between sharing states.^ 
During the mid 19th century, arbitration of international dispute was 
not common. However, by late 19th century, it was becoming increasingly 
common but was done on an ad-hoc basis. In International Law, a distinc-
tion is normally drawn between national and international rivers. A river, 
which passes through or along the territory of two or more states is de-
scribed as international river and is governed by the rules of the interna-
tional river law. A river, which flows entirely within the territory of a sin-
3 Samir N. Saliba, The Jordan River Dispute (TheHague: Martnus NijhofT 1968), pp.48-49. 
4. Dante A Coponera, op.cit., pp.175-176. 
5. Oscar , Schachiter, Sharing the World's Resources (New York; Columbia University Press, 1977), 
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gle state is described as a national river.^ 
1. WATER TREATIES ON EUROPEAN CONTINENT 
Europe was the first continent which witnessed sharp differences over the 
sharing of waters of international rivers as the thrust for harnessing water 
for industr ial and economic development in the 19th century gained 
momentun. In most cases these disagreements were solved through nego-
tiations. The agreement between Turkey and Austria in 1619 over Danube 
River and between Germany and France in 1697 over Rhine were among 
the early landmarks in the making of modern International Law on naviga-
tion. ' Much later, in the 19th century two commissions were setup— the 
European Commission on the Danube and the Central Commission on the 
Rhine-to regulate navigation on these two rivers.* The Rhine and Danube 
Commission were primarily administrative bodies related with navigation 
issues. 
In 1916, Holland, affronted with the final act of the Congress of Vi-
enna, strived in the name of its sovereignty to render delusory the rights 
of the riparians of the Rhine. Between 1816 and 1956, Germany concluded 
approximately twenty water treaties with its neighbours. ' The principle that 
was recognized in all these treaties was that no state may take measures 
on its own territory concerning an international water course which will 
affect the flow of water in the territory of another state to the disadvan-
tage of the latter. This rule has come to be recognized in International 
Law.'" For instance. Article 21 of the treaty between Germany and Czecho-
6. G. Kaeckeabeek, International Rivers (London : Oceana Publishers, 1962), p . l . 
7. B.G. Berghese, "Water Laws and Compacts", Berghese (ed), Waters of Hope-Integrated Water 
Resources Development within Himalayas Ganga Brhamaputra Bank Basin (New Delhi : 
IBH Publishing & Co. 1990), p.307. 
8. Moore, John Basset, A Digest of International Law House Doc No. 551, 56th Congress 2 session 
(Washington: 906 ) Vol. 8, p.628 Chacko, The International Joint Commission (New York : 
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Slovakia regarding frontier waters stated that if an installation is likely to 
cause any considerable or permanent change in the flow of a frontier water 
course or stream intersected by the frontier, each of the two states shall 
take account of the legitimate claims of the interesected parties in the other 
s ta te ." Similar provisions are to be found in the treaties between Germany 
and France, and the Grand duchy of Luxembourg, relating the Upper Rhine 
and the Moselle respectively.'^ Similar principles came into the Berne Con-
vention of October 4, 1913, between France and Switzerland. Article 4 
provides that the dam to be constructed would operate in accordance with 
"a set of rules agreed between the two government with a view to avoiding 
any risk of floods and any damage to the plant upstream, and so far as 
possible ,mitigating down stream the detriment which may result from the 
changes in the water flow.'"^ 
The principle of limited territorial sovereignty is to be found in the 
convention between France and Italy of December 17, 1914.In Articles 1, 
and 3 of that treaty, both parties declare that they will avoid using or al-
lowing the expioitaiioii of the Raya river and its tributaries in the sections 
only under their jurisdict ion unless prior concurrence in given. 
From the foregoing analysis of some of the European water treaties 
are important principle becomes apparent i.e, each state possesses rights 
of sovereignty. However this right is limited by a second consideration which 
is the duty not to injure the rights of the co-r ipanan state. '" 
2. THE AMERICAN CONTINENT 
The American Continent too witnessed sharp disagreement over the shar-
ing of river waters in the 18th and 19th centuries. The treaties signed on 
the European Continet at times provided the basis for cooperative action 
11. League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 109, p.219. 
12. See Berber, op.c(V.,p.75. 
13. H.A.Smith, Economic Uses of International Rivers (London : 1931), p. 178. 
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with regard to the allocation of river waters. However in some cases the 
situation demanded a completely new set of ideas and rules which had to 
take into account the particularties of a specific situation. 
For instance, the Jay treaty of 1794, concluded between Great Britain 
and the United States in connection with navigation of boundary waters is 
an important landmark in the evolution of international rules regarding water 
rights. It was mutually agreed, that "both parties living on both side of the 
boundary should be free at all times to pass and repass by land or inland 
navigation into the respective territory of each country; to navigative all 
the lakes, rivers, and water thereoff, and freely to carry on trade and com-
merce with each other.'^ A return to the north American scene shows united 
attempts to develop machinery for the settlements of boundary water prob-
lems. 
Another milestone in the evolution of International River Law is the 
treaty of Washington signed between United States and Mexico in 1906. In 
1894 a dispute started as a result of the change in the course of the Rio-
Grande in the United States to the detriment of Mexico's interest in the 
river. The Mexican Government protested against the injury caused to its 
existing interest claiming that, the principles of International Law would 
form a sufficient basis for the rights of the Mexican inhabitants of the bank 
of the Rio-Grande.'^ During the late 19th century and the early 20th cen-
tury demands upon the waters of the Rio-Grande were increasing and fric-
tion between the United State and Mexico over the control of the river 
waters gathered momentum. ' ' 
Negotiations between US and Mexico ultimately culminated the treaty 
of water. The United States renounced de-facto, if not dejure the principle 
15. See Detail in L.M. Bloomfield and G.R. Fitzgerald, Boundary Waters Problems of Canada and the 
States (Toronto: 1958), pp.2-3. 
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of absolute sovereignity.'* The convention of May21,1906 provided that 
Mexico would receive a limited a quantity of water from the Rio-Grande. 
Article 4 of this treaty makes it clear, however that the supply of water to 
Mexico "should not be construed as recognition by the United States of 
any claim on the part of Mexico to the said waters".'*^ 
The US shares water and shares longer boundaries related to water 
with Canadian. The two were at longgerhead for some time over the issue 
of water rights. In most case, the United State, being the riparian state, 
defended its case by invoking the principle of absolute territorial sover-
eignty, although Canada as the lower riparian state, upheld the principal of 
territorial integrity, whereby restriction are placed on another states right 
to change the natural flow of in terna t ional waterway without perior 
occurence. As a matter of fact, Canada explained the United States atti-
tude as contrary to International Law.-° An important boundary waters treaty 
was signed between them in 1889. The treaty defines boundary water in its 
preliminary Article as: 
"The waters from main shore to main shore of the 
lakes and rivers and connecting waterwavs, or the 
port ion thereof a long which the internat ional 
boundary between the United States and the Do-
minion of Canada passes includung all bays, arms 
and inlets thereof, but not including tributary wa-
ter which in their natural channels would flow into 
such lakes, rivers and waterways, or waters of rivers 
flowing across the boundary."^' 
18. Pierre M. Sevett, Legal Aspect of Hydro- Electric Development of Rivers and Lakes of Common 
Interest (U.N. Document E/ECE/136, 1952 ), p . l l 4 . 
19. Samir N. Saliba, op.cit., p.52. 
20. Chacko, The Inter national Joint Commission (New York :1932 ), p .74-75; Gibbans, International 
Relations, Papers Relating to the Work of the International Joint Commirsion (Ottawa: 1929), pp.8-9 and 
see also Burpee, A Sucessful Experiment in Internationa! Relations, Papers relating to Work of the 
International Joint Commission (Ottawa: 1929), pp.2-7. 
21. Quoted in L.M. Bioonifield and G.R. Fitzgerald, op.cit., p . l7 . 
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An International Joint Commission (IJC) was set up in 1909 under the 
provisions of this treaty to resolve disputes relating to both boundary and 
transboundary waters. The boundary water treaty and IJC dealt the matter 
on diversion of flows for irrigation purposes and power generation as well 
as, reduction of municipal and industrial waste discharge, sharing water 
costs and benefits concerning the water issues.^-^ 
The Columbia River, which originates in Canada and which flows into 
the United States, has been the scene of large scale of hydroelectric gen-
eration and irrigation development. The International Joint Commission es-
tablished an International Columbia River Engineering Broad which made 
extensive technical studies and on the basis of this was able to draw up 
plans for the development of the river on a cooperative basis. The commis-
sion also, at the request of the two governments, submitted a report relat-
ing to the principles to be applied in determining the allocations of benefit 
and the distribution of costs which would result from co-operative devel-
opment of the Columbia basin. The Columbia River treaty is an example of 
an effective use of the federal approach in context of International basin 
development and settlement of water dispute. Under the fedreal approach 
crucial and divisive problems can be solved with mutually staisfactory re-
sul ts ." 
3. AFRO-ASIAN CONTINENT 
International water treaties in the Afro-Asian continent are of relatively 
recent origin and the earliest treaty that was concluded in this part of the 
world was signed in 1929 between Egypt and the United Kingdom. This 
treaty was in connection with the diversion of the waters of the Nile River 
in equal proportion. The Britsh Government suggested that it should be 
22. Mackay," The International Joint Commission Between the United States and Canada", American 
Journal of International /.mi.,Vol.2 (1928), p.293. 
23. Charles E.Martin, International Water Problem in the West : The Columbia Basin Treaty Between 
Canada and the United States ", in David R. Deener (ed), Canada United States Treaty Relations 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1963), p.71. 
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based on following consideTations; the legal principle is that the waters of 
Nile river, the combined flow of white and blue Nile and their branches 
should be accepted as a single unit, planned for the use of people inhabit-
ing their banks according to their needs and capacity to benefit from the 
Nile.-^ 
In November 1956 an agreement was signed between United Arab 
Republic and Sudan in the context of the Nile river waters. The main in-
tention of this treaty was that water must be used according to actual need 
and for the prupose of development. The treaty assigned an estimated 555,000 
MCM of waters per year to Egypt and 18,500 MCM to Sudan. The treaty 
also provides for the creation of a Permanent Joint Technical Commission 
for the planning of Nile river as single hydrological unit to be developed 
on the basis of mutual benefit for all riparian states. At present, the 1959 
Nile agreement will continue to be the principal regulatory instrument for 
rnanaging waters of Nile river.^^ 
( i)THE INDUS RIVER BASIN AGREEMENT 
In 1939 a controversy arose between the province of Sind and province of 
Punjab as a result of the diversions of the Indus River.Sir Bengal Rao headed 
a commission which was established to look into the and to make recom-
mendation towards its settlement. 
Just after the partition of India, a conflict arose between India and 
Pakistan regarding the water allocation of Indus Basin. A treaty was con-
cluded between these two counties on May 4,1948 for the utilization of 
waters of Indus basin. This treaty which was signed with the aid and ad-
vice of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development laid down 
the following rules:. 
The Western rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab and its waters are ex-
clusively useful for the development Pakistani territory, except the Jhelum's 
24. Samir ,N. Saliba, op.cii., pp 56-57. 
25. Naff and Maston , op.cii., p.149. 
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flow in Kashmir which is significant for the development of Kashmir. 
In the case of the eastern rivers Rabi Beas, and Sutlej India would 
utilize their waters except for a specified transition period during which 
India would partially supply waters to Pakistan. Each country would con-
struct the works located on its own territories which are planned for the 
development of supplies.-* 
The cost of such works would be born by the country to be benefited 
thereby. An appropriate procedure would be established for adjusting or 
arbitrating dispute related to allocation of cost under this principle.^^ Per-
manent Indus Commissin was set up to settle the dispute over water as the 
provisions of the treaty. 
(ii) THE GANGES WATER AGREEMENT 
The Ganges Water Agreement was signed on November 5,1977 over the 
sharing of Ganges waters at Farakka. Its aim was also to find a long term 
solution for augmentation of the dry season flows of Ganges. Bangladesh 
and India visualized divergent solution as to how to increase the dry sea-
son flow of Ganges River. The proposal of India was a transfer of water 
from the Brahmaputra River in Assam through a long canal passing through 
Bangladesh. On the other hand Bangladesh proposed storage dams in the 
upper reaches of the Ganges River in Nepal and India that would store wct 
season flow for release during the low flow period. Bangladesh was un-
willing to permit the country's second major river to fall under the physi-
cal control of India, which the diversion structures at Jhogighopa and the 
outfall at Farakka would involve. Officially, Bangladesh has rejected the 
link canal proposal as technically and economically unfeasible and ecologically 
ruinous. The Ganges water agreement of 1977, neverthless, has provided a 
solid foundation for a durable settlement to be reached. Pending a pernia-
26. Report of the Indus Rem Commission 1942, Vol.1 (Punjab: Government Printer, 1950), pp. 10-11, and scr 
also United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 54. 
27. Quoted in Berber, op.cii., p. 106. 
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nent settlement the agreement of 1977 can be beneficial for the existing 
dry season flows.-^ 
4. INTERNATIONAL WATER TREATIES IN WEST ASIA 
Treaties regarding international rivers in West Asia have been patterned 
on the lines of American and European water treaties. The earliest treaty 
on West Asian water resources was concluded in December 1920 between 
France and Britain involving the Tigris, Euphrates, Jordan and the Yarmuk 
rivers. The treaty the practice where the vested as well as reserved rights 
of riparian states were protected. Under Article 3 of the treaty two con-
tracting parties would agree to nominate a commission to examine a plan 
of irrigation organized by the government of the French mandatory, terri-
tory the execution of which would be of a nature to diminish in any con-
siderable degree of the Tigris and Euphrates water at the point where they 
enter the British mandate in Mesopotamia."^'Article 8 of the same treaty 
further has become essential for the agreement that a second commission 
was to be appointed to invigilate incommon-the empolyment, for thr irri-
gation purposes and the production of hydroelectric power, of the waters 
of the upper Jordan and the Yarmuk and its tributaries, after satisfiction of 
the needs of the territory under the French mandatory power. 
In 1921, the Treaty of Friendship was concluded between Persia and 
Russia. The two countries stated that "they shall have equal rights of us-
age over the Atrak River and other frontier rivers and Waterways".^° An 
important West Asian treaty was signed between the United Kingdom and 
France on February 3,1922 in connection with the utilization of the Yarmuk 
waters proportionately. This treaty recommended that the "inhabitants of 
Syria and Lebanon shall have the same fishning and navigation rights on 
28. Malin Falkenmark, "Fresh water as a Factors in Strategic Policy and Action" in Arther H wesling, 
(ed), Global Resources and International Conflict (New York: Oxford University , Stockholen 
International Peace Research Institute 1986), pp.93-94. 
29. League of Nations Treaty Series Vol.22 pp.355 Quoted in Saniir N. Saliba op.cit., p 60. 
30. League of Nations Treaty , Vol .9. p401. Quoted in Samir N. Saliba, Ibid., p.59. 
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Lake Huleh and Tiberias and the river Jordan as the people of Palestine.^' 
The Final Protocol of the Franco-Turkish delimitation commission, 
May 3,1930, recommended that: "whereas its neighbourshood on the Tigris 
imposes on the riparians specific obligations, it becomes neccessary to es-
tablish rules in connection with the rights of each sovereign state in its 
context with the other". All questions, for example-navigation, fishing, in-
dustrial and agricultural utilization of the waters, and the policing of the 
river shall, be solved on the lines of complete equal i ty ." Internationally 
the general rule for boundary river is that the boundary follows the thalweg.lt 
is considered to assure access to navigation to both countries.In the case 
of the Shatt, however, Iraq can make a compelling appeal to equitable con-
siderations of the sort often in deciding marine boundaries.^^ 
On March 29, 1946 the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly 
Relation was concluded between Iraq and Turkey. It declared that both 
countries have importance of conservation works on the Tigris and Euphrates 
with it branches, in order to insure the flow of the two rivers with a view 
to avoid the danger of floods during the annual periods of high water.^'' 
The treaty has significance for cooperation on the part of both countries 
on matters in the light of the exchange of information on the water-flow 
records and other data of the two rivers. Turkey moreover, agreed to grant 
the Iraq to right to construct dams and other similar works on sites which 
are located in Turkish territory with the stipulation that Iraq will defray 
the cost of the constructions. Article 4 of the treaty stated that the above 
mentioned works shall be the subject of a separate agreement in respect of 
its site, cost operation and maintenance, and its use by Turkey for pur-
poses of irrigation and power production. Under Article 5, Turkey agreed 
to keep Iraq informed of plans for the construction of conservation works 
on either of the two rivers or tributaries. On June 4, 1953, Syria and Jor-
31. Ibid., p.60. 
32. Uniled Nations Treaty Series. Vol. 37, pp.207-291. 
33. Naff and Maston , vp.cii., p. 178. 
34. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 84. p.24. 
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dan signed a treaty concerning the joint development and utilization of the 
Yarmuk river." On July 6,1987 an agreement was signed on economic co-
operation between Turkey and Syria. Turkey was infavour of ad-hoc bilat-
eral joint ventures in water and energy development and was prepared to 
cooperate on data management. 
It is obvious that International water treaties in West Asia are few and even the 
ove's that have been signed are of a genera] nature. Many question stiU remain unan-
swerable and there seems to be very little effort to deal with contentious issues. Do 
upstream state within which a river originats, have priority over down stream states? 
Do population growth and other needs in one riparian state give it priority over an-
other ? Should a riparian state be demanded to consume water in' more economical 
ways? Should it be demanded if one riparian state to use only certain sources of waters 
and leave specific sources for supplying the needs of other? These and related ques-
tions are as yet unanswered in the region and there is very little by way of international 
water treaties to serve as a guide. The lack of political understanding and intense com-
petition for regional influence is an important factor hindering the evolution of mutu-
ally acceptable water treaties in the region. Coupled with this is fact that the subject of 
water raises unique emotions. The result is that each country prefers to go it alone and 
ail pragmatic solution have been scarificed at the altar of populist and sometimes gran-
diose schemes. It is only in the 1990's that the states in the region have shown some 
degree of willingness to eschew unilateral action and work out solution on a coopera-
tive basis in the light of existing international laws and conventions. 
CONCLUSION 
International Law in connection with the sharing of river water resources is still in a 
status quo stage and a full fledged international legal regime pertaining to this can 
develop only with the cooperation of all riparian states. The development of water 
resources or a regional basis must involve relevant legislation and subsequent institu-
35. Samir N.Saliba , op.cir., p.61. 
36. Natasha Beschorner, "The Tigris Euphrates Basin Region ", Water and Instability in the Middle East, 
Adelphi Fapres 273 f Winter 1992-93). 
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tions to control that development. In international law, a distinction is drawn between 
national or international rivers. If a river, touches through or along the territory of two 
or more states it is known as international river and is governed by the rules of the 
international river Law. If a runs completely with in the territory of a single state then 
it is a known as a national river. 
Europe was the first continent which witnessed disagreement over the sharing of 
river waters. In 17th century dispute arose over navigation rights on Danube and Rhine 
rivers. This controversy was resolved with the singing of several agreement which have 
become milestones in the development of international law on navigation . 
The American continent to evident sharp disagreement over the sharing of Rio 
Granda, Colorado, Columbia rivers, waters in the 18th and 19th century. The treaties 
signed on the European Continent at times provides the basis for cooperative action 
with regard to the allocation of river waters. However, in some cases the situation 
demanded a completely new set of ideas and rules which had to take into account the 
particularties of a specific situation. International water treaties on the Afro-Asian Continent 
are of relatively recent origin and the earliest treaty that was concluded in this part of 
the world was signed in 1929 between Egypt and the United Kingdom. The treaty was 
regarding the diversion of the waters of the Nile in equal proportion. The subsequent 
1959 agreement continues to be the principal regulating instrument for managing wa-
ters of Nile river. 
In 1939 a conflict arose between the province of Sind and province of Punjab as 
a result of the diversions of the Indus river sir Bengal Rao headed a commission which 
was established to find a solution. Just after the partition of India, a controversy flared 
up over the allocation of waters of the Indus Basin Between India and Pakistan. On 
May 4, 1948 a treaty was signed between these two countries which contemplated that 
further negotiations should take place in order to settle by agreement and in accord-
ance with international law and equality the problems of Indus Basin. Ganges water 
agreement was signed on November 5,1977 over the sharing Ganges Water at Farakka. 
Its main aim was to find a long term solution for augmentation of the dry seasons flow 
of water of Ganga. 
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Treaties related to international rivers in West Asia have been patterned in the 
light of European and American water treaties. The earliest treaty in this connection 
was following: 
Franco-British convention signed in December 1920 in relation with the Tigris. 
Euphrates, Jordan and the Yarmuk rivers. Under the convention they reflect the prac-
tice where the vested and reserved rights of riparians states were protected. In 1921, 
the treaty of friendship concluded between Persia and Russia stated that the two coun-
tries they shall have equal rights in connection with the sharing of Atrak river and other 
frontier rivers and waterways. In 1922, the treaty was passed on Yarmuk river, the 
treaty was concluded between Syria and Lebanese shall have same have same fishing, 
and navigation rights on Lake Huleh, Lake Tiberias and the river Jordan. In 1930 the 
final protocol of the France Turkish Delimitation Commission, stated that the neigh-
bouring states should have waters of Tigris for the multipurpose uses. In 1946, the 
treaty of friendship and Good Neighbourly Relation was signed between Iraq and Tur-
key. Both countries shall have equal region in connection with the conservation works 
on the Tigris and Euphrates to regulate the flow of the two rivers and in order to insure 
the maintenance of a regular water supply during the annual periods of high water. 
In 1953 Syria and Jordan concluded a treaty over Yarmuk for its Joint develop-
ment. The main purpose of this treaty was to establish of a joint Syrian-Jordanian com-
mittee to supervise the execution of the plan. In July 1987 on economic agreement was 
concluded between Turkey and Syria. Turkey was willing to have adhoc bilateral joint 
ventures in water and energy development and was prepared to cooperate on manage-
ment. It is a fact that international water treaties in West Asia are few and even the over 
that have been concluded are of a general nature. In these negotiations which are still 
continuing some progress has been made regarding sharing of water resources How-
ever, long term cooperative development of international river water resources in West 
Asia present the greatest challenge to policy makers within and outside the region. In 
the West Asia region a number of water rellated economic and strategic issues still 
remain unresolved. 
In 1990's water issue where on the agenda of the multilateral talks which were 
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concluded began in Madrid in 1991. In connection with the equal water sharing be-
tween riparian states. 
A comprehensive water development scheme for the region can be successful 
only if the parties to the conflict are prepared to make essential concessions. This 
requires the subsuming of narrow national interests of each riparian state to the greater 
regional interest. 
CONCLUSION 
International Law in connection with the sharing of river water resources is still 
in a status quo stage and a full fledged international legal regime pertaining to this can 
develop only with the cooperation of all riparian states. The development of water 
resources or a regional basis must involve relevant legislation and subsequent institu-
tions to control that development. In international law, a distinction is drawn between 
national or international rivers. If a river, touches through or along the territory of two 
or more states it is known as international river and is governed by the rules of the 
international river Law. If a runs completely with in the territory of a single state then 
it is a known as a national river. 
Europe was the first continent which witnessed disagreement over the sharing of 
river waters. In 17th century dispute arose over navigation rights on Danube and Rhine 
rivers. This controversy was resolved with the singing of several agreement which have 
become milestones in the development of international law on navigation . 
The American continent to evident sharp disagreement over the sharing of Rio 
Granda, Colorado, Columbia rivers, waters in the 18th and 19th century. The treaties 
signed on the European Continent at times provides the basis for cooperative action 
with regard to the allocation of river waters. However, in some cases the situation 
demanded a completely new set of ideas and rules which had to take into account the 
particularties of a specific situation. International water treaties c . the Afro-Asian Continent 
are of relatively recent origin and the earliest treaty that was concluded in this part of 
the world was signed in 1929 between Egypt and the United Kingdom. The treaty was 
regarding the diversion of the waters of the Nile in equal proportion. The subsequent 
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1959 agreement continues to be the principal regulating instrument for managing wa-
ters of Nile river. 
In 1939 a conflict arose between the province of Sind and province of Punjab as 
a result of the diversions of the Indus river sir Bengal Rao headed a commission which 
was established to find a solution. Just after the partition of L.dia, a controversy flared 
up over the allocation of waters of the Indus Basin Between India and Pakistan. On 
May 4, 1948 a treaty was signed between these two countries which contemplated that 
further negotiations should take place in order to settle by agreement and in accord-
ance with international law and equality the problems of Indus Basin. Ganges water 
agreement was signed on November 5, 1977 over the sharing Ganges Water at Farakka. 
Its main aim was to fmd a long term solution for augmentation of the dry seasons flow 
of water of Ganga. 
Treaties related to international rivers in West Asia have been patterned in the 
light of European and American water treaties. The earliest treaty in this connection 
was following: 
Franco-British convention signed in December 1920 in relation with the Tigris. 
Euphrates, Jordan and the Yarmuk rivers. Under the convention they reflect the prac-
tice where the vested and reserved rights of riparians states were protected. In 1921, 
the treaty of friendship concluded between Persia and Russia stated that the two coun-
tries they shall have equal rights in connection with the sharing of Atrak river and other 
frontier rivers and waterways. In 1922, the treaty was passed on Yarmuk river, the 
treaty was concluded between Syria and Lebanese shall have same have same fishing, 
and navigation rights on Lake Huleh, Lake Tiberias and the river Jordan. In 1930 the 
final protocol of the France Turkish Delimitation Commission, stated that the neigh-
bouring states should have waters of Tigris for the multipurpose uses. In 1946, the 
treaty of friendship and Good Neighbourly Relation was signed between Iraq and Tur-
key. Both countries shall have equal region in connection with the conservation works 
on the Tigris and Euphrates to regulate the flow of the two rivers and in order to insure 
the maintenance of a regular water supply during the annual periods of high water. 
In 1953 Syria and Jordan concluded a treaty over Yarmuk for its Joint develop-
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ment. The main purpose of this treaty was to establish of a joint Syrian-Jordanian com-
mittee to supervise the execution of the plan. In July 1987 on economic agreement was 
concluded between Turkey and Syria. Turkey was willing to have adhoc bilateral joint 
ventures in water and energy development and was prepared to cooperate on manage-
ment. It is a fact that international water treaties in West Asia are few and even the over 
that have been concluded are of a general nature. In these negotiations which are still 
continuing some progress has been made regarding sharing of water resources How-
ever, long term cooperative development of international river water resources in West 
Asia present the greatest challenge to policy makers within and outside the region. In 
the West Asia region a number of water rellated economic and strategic issues still 
remain unresolved. 
In 1990's water issue where on the agenda of the multilateral talks which were 
concluded began in Madrid in 1991. In connection with the equal water sharing be-
tween riparian states. 
A comprehensive water development scheme for the region can be successful 
only if the parties to the conflict are prepared to make essential concessions. This 
requires the subsuming of narrow national interests of each riparian state to the greater 
regional interest. 
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CHAPTER: V 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of sharing river water and problem of water shortage has become acute in 
the West Asian region. These problems are likely to become critical unless urgent and 
immediate action is taken both to increase and to conserve existing supplies of water 
resources. West Asia is a developing arid region and is facing the problem of water 
crisis. It has arid or semi-arid climate with average annual rainfall levels of less than 
250 MMY. It is also a cyclone dominated area. Some parts of the region which are near 
the Mediterranean Sea, experience a special type of climate called the Mediterranean 
climate. There winters are mild, summers are warm and rainfall is during the winter 
season. There are three major drainage basins: the Jordan drainage basin, the Litani 
drainage basin and the Euphrates-Tigris drainage basin. 
The Jordan River is the most important source of water in the Jordan basin. The 
river flows through Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. The length of this river is 156 
miles of which 73 miles is under Israeli controlled territory. Its total flow is 1880 
MCMY of which 77 per cent is in the Arab States and 23 per cent in Israel. The Jor-
dan's northern headwaters have three tributaries- the Hasbani in Lebanon, the Dan in 
Israel and Baniyas in Syria. The major tributary of Jordan is the Yarmuk. Its annual 
discharge is 400 MCM. The area of Yarmuk basin is 7,252 square kilometres. Upper 
Jordan and headwaters of Yarmuk are major source of ground water. The Jordan basin 
includes also Israeli captured territories West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. 
The Jordan system discharge an average annual flow of 1850 MCM into the Dead Sea. 
Generally high quality of water is received by the Jordan's headwaters. As the Jordan 
proceeds down into the Rift Valley toward the Dead Sea it becomes saltier. 
For centuries, the Jordan River has been a symbol of life and peaceful coexist-
ence in West Asia. As water comes down the southern slopes of Jabel-cl Sheikh, it 
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stops for a time'in Lake Huleh and the Sea of Galilee and then it meanders southward 
through the Jordan Valley into the Dead Sea. With the passage of time, the emergence 
of Zionism demanding exclusive control over historic Palestine sowed the first seed of 
discord in the basin. In 1897 Theodor Herzl wanted the creation of a Jewish State for 
the Jews. The First Zionist Congress was held at Basle on August27, 1897 which de-
manded the creation of a National Home for Jews in Palestine. The outbreak of the 
First World War provided the Zionist movement the much needed opportunity to work 
for its goal. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I led to a redrawing of the 
map of West Asia. At the Paris Peace Conference held in 1919, Britain a long time ally 
of Zionism was given the mandate over Palestine and Transjordan and France got man-
datory powers over Syria and Lebanon. It was during twenty five years of mandatory 
rule that the foundations of a Jewish state was firmly laid in Palestine. With the active 
connivance of the British authorities, massive Jewish immigration from Europe to Pal-
estine took place during this period. 
The indigenous Arab population of Palestine protested this massive influx of for-
eigners and several times this protest degenerated into violence. However, Arab pro-
test had little if any impact on Jewish immigration which continued unabated. After the 
Second World War, Britain, unable to handle the explosive situation in Palestine de-
cided to terminate its mandate and handover Palestine to the United Nation. The UN 
decided that partition of Palestine into an Arab and Jewish State was the only logical 
solution to the problem of Palestine. Thus the State of Israel was created by the UN in 
June 1948. 
The Arab-Israeli War started in early 1948. It was concluded by four Armistice 
Agreement in 1949. Form early 1920's, a number of plans have been put forth for the 
utilization of the water of the Jordan. However, till now none of them could be imple-
mented due to differences among the riparian states. Some of the important plans 
were: lonides survey (1939), Lodermilk Plan (1944), Hays savage plan (1948), 
McDonald plan (1951), Cotton plan (1954), Arab plan (1954), Baker Harza plan 
(1955), the Unified Johnston's plan (1955), Israeli National Water Carrier plan and the 
Jordan headwaters diversion (Arab League plan 1964). 
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Israel considers the control over water supply a strategic instrument and defen-
sive technique that greatly affects regional balance of power. Predictably, Israel's 
policy has generated a lot of tension as the riparian states have opposed Israel's at-
tempts to control the water of the River Jordan. After its failure to acquire water of the 
Jordan in cooperation with the Arab State, its embarked on its National Water Carrier 
project. A major feature of Israeli water project was in connection with irrigation of 
the Negev and its articulated water policy. The National Water Carrier Project was 
started after the armistice agreements of 1949. 
The Litani river originates in the south of Lebanon and is a national river in the 
republic of Lebanon. The Litani is IVOKm long and has narrow ridge and width ap-
proximately 6km . Its basin has been divided into three major parts; the Upper basin, 
Middle basin and Lower basin . The area of its basin covers 2,290 sq. km that separates 
the Litani from the Hasbani river, a tributary of Jordan. The total flow of Litani is 
approximately 700 MCMY, of which Upper basin contributes 325 MCM, the Middle 
basin adds a net flow of 315 and the lower basin 60 MCM per annum. The Awali river 
is also a major contributor in the context of waters of Lebanon. 
The early 20th century, Israel has been showing interest to acquire the Litani 
waters. In February 1919 the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) placed before the 
Supreme Council at the Paris Peace talks, a proposal concerning the boundaries of 
Palestine. It started from the Mediterranean coast just south of Sidon, running in east-
erly direction across the Litani river and included whole of the catchment area upto it 
northern most source in Rashayya before turning south towards Golan Heights. The 
Zionist proposal was opposed by France which insisted upon the original Sykes-Picot 
line. 
The joint study approved in 1943 therefore, that most of the water be diverted 
from a point where the river takes a westward bent through a tunnel into Palestine. In 
exchange for water Lebanon would receive all or part of the power produced by the 
water drop from the mountains to the Jordan Valley. The study heartened the Zionist, 
whose dream of Negev development could not be fully realized without the Litani 
waters. In 1944,W.C. Lowdermilk proposed a Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) on the 
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lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The details of JVA were developed by 
James Hays, Chief engineer of TVA. Lowdermilk noted the possibility of tapping the 
Litani and diverting some of the water to the Palestine coast and Negev. Soon, these 
scheme howevei, lost lelevance because of establishment of the state of Israel in May 
1948. The establishment of Israel immediately sparked off the First Arab Israeli War. 
The Israeli army occupied southern Lebanon up to the point where the Litani takes a 
West ward bent, when negotiation for a General Armistice started, Israel tried to link 
its withdrawal form Lebanese territory with guaranteed access to the waters of the 
Litani. Israel's attempt to bring in the Litani into a regional water development scheme 
did not find favour with the Americans. Waters of the Litani have been a source of 
great attraction for the Jewish State since 1948. Prior to the establishment of the state 
of Israel, the Zionist Agency in Palestine made every possible efforts to include the 
Litani river within the boundaries of the future Jewish State. However, they failed in 
their efforts and the Litani remained within Lebanon. It was only in the late 1970's that 
Israel could manage to obtain a foothold on the Litani when it occupied a portion of 
Southern Lebanon. With the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the early 1980's, 
this occupation was further, expanded and consolidated. Israel carried out extensive 
hydrological and technical studies, aimed at diverting part of the Litani's water into 
northern Israel. In 1990's several multilateral negotiations were held to solve the prob-
lem related to water. The 1991 Gulf War acted as a catalyst in reopening peace talks in 
the region. The first round of the talks between the frontline Arab States and Israel 
took place in Madrid in October 1991. One of the items on the agenda of the multilat-
eral talks was sharing of river water in the region. At the subsequent rounds of negotia-
tion Israeli government has shown a willingness to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 
return for some amount of assured water supply from the Litani. The Lebanese govern-
ment too has indicated that it is not averse to sharing water with Israel for its better 
economic development. 
The longstanding problem of sharing Litani waters, can only be solved by adopt-
ing a creative approach in the frame-work of regional cooperation. Both Israel and 
Lebanon can workout a formula whereby water can become an instrument for promot-
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ing peace and regional development. What is needed is a willingness to make mutually 
beneficial compromises on the part of Beirut as well as Tel-Aviv. Without such a posi-
tive attitude it is extremely unlikely that the vexed question of sharing water can ever 
be solved in this turbulent region. 
In January and May 1992 multilateral talks were held at Moscow and Vienna 
respectively. At the Vienna talks the Jordanians, Palestinians and Israeli delegations 
agreed to cooperate and exchange data. An interim agreement on sharing 
groundwaters of West Bank was signed between the Palestinians and Israeli in Septem-
ber 1993. The following year in 1994 the Israeli delegation at the multilateral 
agreed to discuss water rights. 
The Euphrates and Tigris are the major rivers in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. The 
Euphrates flows through Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The Euphrates is 1,480 miles in length 
from the confluence of Karasu and Murad-Suyu to Basra. Three major tributaries of 
Euphrates originate in Turkey—Khabur, Sajur, and Balikh rivers. The Firat is the main 
stream and it has four important branches the Karasu, the Murat, the Munzur and the 
Peri. The mean discharge of Euphrates is 31,820 MCMY. The annual discharge differs 
from 16,871MCM to 43,457MCMY. The maximum discharge is 164,000MCMY. The 
Euphrates carries about 6,100 ppm silt by weight and it is deposited in the inland delta. 
The Tigris flows in southern Turkey and comes directly into Iraq from Turkey and the 
its total length is 1,718km. The major tributaries are the Great Zab, the Lesser Zab, 
Diyala and the Adhaim. The Tigris carries an average of 42,230MCM water discharge. 
The minimum discharge is estimated to be 5,140MCMY,and the maximum 
44,000MCMY. During times of flood, the Tigris receives about 20,000ppm sit by 
weight. The Tigris and Euphrates together drains 808,000sq.km. 
The Euphrates and Tigris rivers have been a source of livelihood since 4000B.C. 
In this basin various old civilization have developed and thrived. The region is called as 
the "cradle of civilization". The Mesopotamian and Babylonian civilizations have 
flourished in the region. From the beginning of this century, the sharing states of 
Euphrates-Tigris drainage basin have all formulated plans and implemented projects to 
regulate the flood waters of Euphrates as well as utilize its water for multipurpose 
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projects. In 1913 a Hindiyia barrage was constructed on the Euphrates to divert water 
of Euphrates into a canal, and increment in the general water level of the Euphrates. In 
the 1950's a second barrage was made at ar-Ramadi. Its main purpose was the diver-
sion of Euphrates flood water into Lake Habbaniyah and the Abu Dibbis natural reser-
voirs to avert the danger of flood. The Euphrates dam was completed in 1973 with the 
Soviet help and cooperation. Turkey started work on a series of multipurpose dams. 
The Keban dam was constructed in 1974 on the Euphrates river with a total capacity of 
1,650 MCM, of which 360 MCM is left for storage. The dam at Karababa, renamed the 
Ataturk dam, is intended to supply irrigation water for 3000,000 ha (2,964,000 
dunams) in the Severck-Hilian Upper Martin and Nusaybin Cizre areas. The total ca-
pacity of Ataturk dam is 48,700 MCM. 
Several dams and barrages have also been constructed on the Tigris river. In 
Baghdad, both rivers flow in distinct and well defined valleys at a distance of 40km 
from each other. Tharther barrage, similar to the Ramadi, was built in 1955-56 at 
Sammara on the Tigris. It has capacity of diverting 28,382 MCMY of water in the 
direction of the depression of wadi and its storage capacity is 72, 840 MCMY. The 
Dukhan dam was constructed in 1959 on the Lesser Zab river and has total capacity of 
6,300 MCMY. Further south, the Darbandi Khan dam was built with in 1961 on the 
Diyala River with total storage capacity 3,250 MCMY. During the dry seasons when 
the Turkish and Syrian dams impounded part of the Euphrates spring flood, a major 
crisis developed between Syria and Iraq that brought the two counties to the brink of 
war. Iraq and Syria traded hostile statements in which Iraq threatened to take any 
action necessary to insure the Euphrates flow and Syria protested that it was passing 
on to Iraq 71 per cent of the water it received from Turkey. 
At the end of April 1975 a technical committee was formed by the Arab League. 
Which had of representatives from Syria, Iraq and seven other Arabs state. As tension 
mitigated between Syria and Iraq, a round of hostilities erupted between the riparian 
states and this time which related to the construction of Karakaya Dam in Turkey. 
During the late 1970's and early 1980's. Baghdad and Damascus complained against 
Ankara that it was holding back a main part of the water from the Euphrates for it use. 
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A committee discussed several time on exchange of hydrological data. But the problem 
of water allocation has not been solved so far. Turkey's assertive position on the issue 
of Euphrates water right is unacceptable to both Syria and Iraq. They have therefore 
spurned Ankara's offer of joint ventures as long as their legitimate rights are not recog-
nized by the Turkish government. In the 1990's the problem of sharing Euphates water 
has become more complicated Euphrates rivers for HEP generation and irrigation pur-
pose. The first stage of GAP consists of 13 projects of which 7 are on the Euphrates 
and 6 on the Tigris. The Euphrates and Tigris are international rivers. Both have im-
mense regional importance. Control of these rivers has become increasingly conten-
tious, as the demand for water an increasing every year, in this dry region. The eco-
nomic prosperity and regional development of those state are based on them. In late 
1960's and the early 1970's various difference cropped up between sharing state in 
connection with the water allocation of two rivers. The relations between Turkey and 
Syria have been strained many a time, mainly due to the formers efforts to control the 
flow of the rivers . 
Due to the inability of three riparian states to reach formal agreement to share 
water the 1970's witnessed several clashes between Turkey, Syria and Iraq over shar-
ing right. A serious disagreement regarding water flared up in 1975 between Iraq and 
Syria flow as the outcome of the completion of Syria's Tabqa dam. During the by 
season when the Turkish and Syrian dams impounded part of the Euphrates spring 
flood, a complicated as Syrian and Turkish irrigation works one at the verge of com-
pletion as well as sewage and industrial development in the two countries threaten to 
water lower quality as gone up phenomenally in recent years. 
Growing population is also a source of concern as the demand for water for 
domestic use has detoriated the water quality and quantity day by day. With the quality 
and quantity of Euphrates water detoriating day by day, Iraq is the country most ad-
versely affected. 
International Law regarding the sharing of river water resources is still in a nas-
cent stage and a full fledged international legal regime pertaining to this issue can 
develop only with the cooperation of all riparian states. The development of water 
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resources on a regional basis or state must involve relevant legislation and subsequent 
institutions to control that development. In international law, a distinction is drawn 
between national and international rivers. If a river, passes through or along the terri-
tory of two or more states it is know as international river and is governed by the rules 
of the international river law. If a river flows completely within territory of a single 
state then it is a national river. 
Europe was the first continent which witnessed disagreements over the sharing 
of river waters. In 17th century controversy arose over navigation rights on the Dan-
ube and Rhine rivers. This controversy was resolved with the signing of several agree-
ments which have become milestones in the development of International law on navi-
gation. The Rhine and Danube commission were primarily administrative bodies con-
cerning navigation issue. The American continent too witnessed sharp disagreement 
over the sharing of river water in the 18th and 19th century. The treaties signed on the 
European continent at times provided the basis for cooperative action with regard to 
the allocation of river water. However, in some cases the situation demanded a com-
pletely new set of ideas and rules which had to take into account the particularities of 
a specific situation. There various treaties were signed in connection with the naviga-
tion boundary waters in an important landmark in the evolution of international rules 
regarding water rights. For instance; Jay treaty (1794), Rio-Grande treaty (1906), Co-
lumbia river treaty (1909), and Tijiuana and Colorado treaty (1944). 
International water treaties in the Afro-Asian continent are of relating recent ori-
gin and the earliest treaty that was concluded in this part of the world was concluded in 
1929 between Egypt and the United Kingdom. This treaty was in the context of the 
diversion of the waters of the Nile river proportionately among riparian states. The 
British Government suggested that it should be based on following consideration: The 
legal principle is that the waters of Nile river, the combined flow of the white and blue 
Nile and their branches should be accepted as a single unite, designed for the use of 
people inhabiting their banks according to their needs and capacity to benefit from the 
Nile. 
Just after the partition of India, a conflict developed between India and Pakistan 
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in relation with the water allocation of Indus Basin. The treaty was signed between 
these two countries on May 4, 1948 for the utilization of water of Indus basin. The 
Ganges water agreement was signed on November 5, 1977 over the sharing of Ganges 
water at Farakka. Its aim was also to seek a long -term solution for a augmentation of 
the dry season flows of Gangas. The Gangas water agreement of solid foundation for a 
durable settlements to be reached. Pending a permanent settlement, the agreement of 
197'] can be useful for the existing dry seasons flows. 
Treaties regarding international rivers in West Asia have been patterned on the 
lines of European and American water treaties. The earliest treaty in this connection 
was following: the Franco-British convention concluded in December 1920 involving 
the Tigris, Euphrates, Jordan and the Yarmuk rivers: It reflects the practice where the 
vested as well as reserved rights of riparian states were protected. During the mandate, 
Britain and France adopted several agreement to regulate the flow of international 
rivers under their jurisdiction to develop upstream consumptive uses in Syria and 
Lebanon. They agreed to permit Palestinian authorities to do work in Syria for the 
benefit of down stream users. The mandatory system provided legal machinery for 
resolving conflicts over water through bilateral consultations. In 1921 the treaty of 
friendship concluded between Persia and Russia stated that the two countries they 
"shall have equal rights of usage over the Atrak river and other frontier rivers and 
water ways". An important West Asian water treaty was signed between the United 
kingdom and France on 3 February 1922 in connection with the utilization of the 
Yarmuk waters in equal proportion. The Final Protocol of the Franco-Turkish delimi-
tation commission. May 3, 1930 recommended that: "whereas its neighbourhood on 
the Tigris imposes on the riparian specific obligations, it becomes necessary to estab-
lish rules regarding the rights of each sovereign state in its contexts with other water 
purpose." In March 1946 the treaty of Friend Neighbourly Relation was concluded 
between Iraq and Turkey. As per this treaty both countries could carry out conserva-
tion works relating to the Euphrates and Tigris in order to regulate the flow of the two 
rivers with a view to avoiding the danger of floods during the annual period of high 
water. The main aim of this treaty was both countries can conservation relating 
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Euphrates and Tigris, in order to regulate the flow of the two river during the annual 
period of high water. 
In June 1953, Syria and Jordan signed a treaty concerning the joint development 
and utilization of the Yarmuk river waters. In July 1987 an economic cooperation 
agreement was signed between Turkey and Syria. Turkey was infavour of ad-hoc bilat-
eral joint ventures in water and energy development and was prepared to cooperate on 
data management. It is obvious that; International water treaties in West Asia are few 
and even the over's that have been signed are of a general nature. Many questions still 
remain unanswered and these seems to be very little effort to deal with contentious 
issues. Do upstream states within which a river originates, leave specific, have priority 
over down stream states? Do population growth and other needs in are riparian state 
gave it priority over another? Should a riparian state be demanded to consume water in 
more economical ways? Should be demanded of one riparian state to use only certain 
sources of water and leave specific sources for supplying the needs of other? These and 
related questions are as yet unanswerea iu the reeion and there is very little by way of 
international water treaties regime to serve as a guide. The result is that each country 
prefers to go it alone and all practical considerations and pragmatics solutions have 
been sacrificed at the alter of populist and sometimes grandiose schemes. It is only in 
the 1990's that the states in the region have shown some degree of willingness to es-
chew unilateral action and workout solutions on a cooperative basis in the light of 
existing unilateral laws and conventions. 
From the foregoing analysis it is apparent that the instead of exploiting the river 
on a regional basis, each of these states has preferred to go it alone on whatever por-
tion of the river that happens to lie within or along its borders. The result of this ap-
proach has been tragic, not only because such an approach is insufficient and uneco-
nomical, but also and perhaps more importantly, such action has the potential of pre-
cipitation war among the sharing states of West Asia. 
Water, however, has often been seen as the primary strategic factor behind the 
political and military manoeuvring in region. Under such tensed conditions, issues that 
might otherwise be managed peacefully can always trigger extreme responses. Water 
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conflict in West Asia have been zero sum water for one user means lack of water for 
the other. Factors of ideology and nationalism, prevent West Asian states from cooper-
ating with each other to alleviate the problem of water scarcity. However, in the present 
scenario the only remedy lies in taking a regional approach to the problem. That is, 
water from certain countries could be diverted to other, according to the needs. This 
implies tacit recognition of the legitimacy of various demands. Thus factors like popu-
lation growth and other needs in one riparian should be given priority over another. At 
the same time a riparian should be asked to consume water in more cronomical ways. It 
should also be demanded of one riparian to use only certain sources of water leave a 
specific source for supplying the needs of other. Conservation measures such a reduc-
tion of waste in irrigation, phasing-out of water intensive crops and price increases 
towards real value should be taken up an endangering basis. Neither time, money or 
hope should be wasted on regional water development projects. Care must be taken, 
however, to avoid plans that are grandiose or impossible part water development projects 
like the 1950's plan of Eric Johnston failed to anticipate the level of hostilities in the 
region. In order to avoid past mistakes future project could be financed by the interna-
tional monetary fund on the condition that the granting of money depended an unani-
mous agreement among the all riparian states. 
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